SCOTS' ATTITUDES TO BRITAIN AND TO THE EUROPEAN UNION : THE PSYCHOLOGY OF NATIONAL SEGREGATION AND SUPRA-NATIONAL INTEGRATION

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

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ABSTRACT

This thesis is concerned with attitudes towards supra-national bodies, and more specifically with Scots' attitudes towards union in Britain and Europe. Firstly, it is suggested that support for, or opposition, to integration in a supra-national body depends on the extent to which this body is believed to enhance or undermine the ability to express national identity (*identity enhancement* vs. *identity undermining*). Identity undermining, in turn, depends upon a combined sense of incompatibility with outgroup identities/interests and of ingroup powerlessness within the supra-national body. Secondly, it is suggested that these features of the social context and of identity meanings can be actively constructed in order to fulfil strategic purposes, such as persuading audiences in favour of separatism or integration.

Five studies are reported which investigated these hypotheses. In study 1, we looked at the discourses of Scottish politicians and at the way their accounts of group identities and social reality could be understood in strategic terms, i.e. in relation to their political projects regarding Scotland's status in Britain and in Europe. In the second study, a survey design was used in order to provide quantitative evidence of the relationship between identity undermining, incompatibility, powerlessness and separatism. The third (experimental) study sought to clarify the causal relationship between these variables and showed that manipulating identity undermining lead to increased support for separatism. Finally, the fourth and the fifth (experimental) studies suggested that identity constructions, in the form of judgements of group prototypicality, can vary as a function of the strategic claim made by participants.

In conclusion, the merits are stressed of an approach to identity processes and attitudes towards supra-national bodies that is sensitive to both context and content. It is also stressed that context and contents should not be taken as perceptual givens but as actively constructed by social actors.

CONTENTS

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

This thesis has two major threads. First and foremost, it aims to contribute towards a social psychological analysis of national separation and integration. It will seek to analyse the conditions under which people support different types of relations within and between nation states and which lead to support of or opposition to separation from or integration within supra-national bodies. It will also explore some of the consequences of those particular political attitudes. More precisely, it will focus on the role social identities (i.e. in this case, national identities) play in those phenomena. Empirically, it will focus on the case of Scotland and investigate Scottish people's attitudes towards the United Kingdom and the European Union.

Second, in exploring these issues, this thesis also seeks to make a point at a more general level. It seeks to argue for an approach to group and intergroup phenomena which takes into account the social context in which social identities are inscribed, as this context constitutes an essential requirement for understanding and predicting social behaviour in these areas. This includes, as we will see, socio-structural variables as well as the specific meanings ascribed to social identities and to the relationship between different identities in a given context. Accordingly, the model of national separation/integration which will be proposed attempts to follow this general perspective.

In taking up the issues of national separation and integration with the concept of social identity at the core of our focus and argument, we are placing ourselves explicitly in strong continuation with Social Identity Theory (SIT), founded and developed by Tajfel and Turner (1979; Tajfel, 1978, 1981) – or rather, with what can be labelled the Social Identity (SI) approach or tradition (Turner, 1999), which includes both Social Identity Theory and its development into Self-Categorisation

Theory (SCT: Turner, 1985, 1991; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987; Turner, Oakes, Haslam, & McGarty, 1994).

It is indeed this tradition which is mainly responsible for having put the issue of identity to the fore of social psychological investigations of intergroup relations and group phenomena, for the past 30 years or so. In a nutshell, and as its very name indicates, the main credo of the SI approach has consistently been that, besides any other factors which might contribute to the explanation of group relations and conflict, identity does matter and is indeed crucial to their understanding.

Thus, originally, much of SIT's argument was directed at pointing to the limits of more sociological approaches to intergroup relations, such as Sherif's realistic conflict theory (RCT: Sherif, 1966; Sherif, Harvey, White, Hood, & Sherif, 1961), which saw intergroup relations as determined by conflicts over objective, material resources, or else by the co-operation that the appropriation of these resources might require. In relation to those theories, Social Identity theorists argued, and still argue today, that intergroup dynamics should not be seen as being driven only by the pursuit of 'economic' resources or other 'real' rewards of life (Geertz, 1993), but can also be underpinned by interests over symbolic resources, i.e. concerns relating to identity (Hogg & Abrams, 1988; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). The theory therefore provides a framework for a better understanding of what has sometimes been called 'identity politics' in the contemporary world of international and intra-national relations (see e.g. Guiberneau, 1996).

To be more specific, one of the main claims of SIT is that intergroup behaviour comes about to the extent that we see others and ourselves in terms of our group memberships (social identity) rather than our individual characteristics (personal identity). If our personal identities are defined by comparing ourselves to other individuals (I vs. you/he/she), we also possess social identities which come from our memberships of different groups and which are defined by comparison with other groups (we vs. them). In areas of group and intergoup phenomena, it is the processes and interests associated with those social identities which are relevant, rather than those associated with personal identity.

According to Tajfel (1972b; 1981), social identities are important because they help us make sense of the social world, giving us a situated and distinct place within it, and thereby acting as a guide for social action. Furthermore, the theory assumes that, for reasons of self-esteem, people are motivated by a desire to possess

a positive social identity. The pursuit of a distinct and positive social identity is therefore a key driving force in the dynamic of intergroup relations.

As it sees social identities as being comparative in nature (i.e. their content is determined by comparison with other groups), SIT states that a distinct and positive identity can be achieved through the establishment of positive differentiation from other groups on valued dimensions of comparison (Tajfel, 1978; Turner, 1975). It thus also provides an account of a tendency frequently observed in social life and often referred in the social-psychological literature as ingroup favouritism or ingroup bias: namely, the tendency to favour the ingroup over the outgroup and to evaluate it more positively. Indeed, much of SIT research to date, if not the majority of it, has focused on the investigation of this phenomenon (or associated ones, such as prejudice and discrimination: see e.g. Brown, 1995). Potentially, however, SIT's tenets also have important implications for the understanding of attitudes towards superordinate groups (including supra-national bodies), i.e. whether or not ingroup members are willing to be part of such groups (for practical purposes, these will be simply label as 'political attitudes' from now on) - hence its relevance for the present work.

Thus, SIT distanced itself from 'sociological' approaches such as RCT by stressing the importance of the psychological dynamics of identity. On the other hand, however, it also rejected intergroup explanations based purely on intra-psychic cognitive processes (such as categorisation processes). This is expressed not only in its assumption of a motivational element, based on self-esteem, but, even more crucially, with its insistence that the effects of social identification should always be understood within the social context in which it is embedded. Social factors, such as economic, ideological, political, cultural and historical circumstances, are not to be considered as mere secondary complications to an essentially psychological dynamic, but as crucial elements which, by feeding identity processes, determine their very outcomes. In relation to that point, Tajfel and Turner (1979) actually praised Sherif's RCT which, by taking seriously the impact of some of these broader social factors, was at least the first truly intergroup approach within social psychology.

However, as we will see, the treatment of this 'contextualist' side of the theory by SIT researchers has been somewhat more problematic, and there have been many questions raised about whether the approach has really been up to the task it

gave itself in that respect. Thus, despite our indebtedness to SIT, it will argued below that, if this approach has originally helped to make both the issues of identity and of its social context relevant for enquiry, subsequent research based on its principles has also contributed to the neglect of the contextualist dimension by showing a tendency to focus on identity processes in isolation. We will argue that this side of the theory, which was present in its original impetus, has to be retrieved and expanded in order to avoid some pitfalls and shortcomings which were for the most part identified by Tajfel himself (Tajfel, 1981). This will also have direct consequences for the model of political attitudes we will propose. Indeed, the reasons for developing such an argument are not only to provide some insight into the basis of SIT, and thus into the origins and logic of our own approach, but also to disentangle what aspects of SIT we intend to keep and where we tend to diverge somewhat from the way it has sometimes been understood and applied.

Before going on with this argument, however, a note of caution might be necessary. The issue of the interplay between psychological processes and social context touches on fundamental epistemological and metatheoretical questions that are, of course, not limited to the SI tradition itself, but that concern social psychology and indeed social science as a whole. The argument is, basically, that we need to understand not only psychological processes but also the ideological, cultural and social framework in which they take place in order to understand social behaviour. The scope of this argument will appear clearly when it will lead us to consider, for instance, questions about levels of analysis, individualism and the relation between the individual and the social, the tension between universalism and particularism, methodology, or even the very way in which social psychology can be seen as a science.

It is unavoidable to touch on these more general issues, lest too many questions are left unanswered. Moreover, some of the tenets of our model of political attitudes towards superordinate groups crucially rely on our own view about the way such issues are best addressed. At the same time, however, it should be clear that what follows does not pretend to deal with them as fully as they would deserve – even less should it suggest that this thesis attempts to empirically address all the general points which will be raised. As a result, even within our metatheoretical discussion, the focus will very much remain on the more specific domain of social identity.

The remainder of this chapter will be divided into two parts, dealing respectively with each level of our argument. That is, we will start firstly by outlining the general background of our enquiry, based mostly on metatheoretical reflections on the problem of interactionism and the relationship between social context and psychological processes. Then, in a second part, we will delineate our model of political attitudes, which, amongst other things, attempts to do justice to the argument developed in the first part.

1. CONTEXT, CONTENT AND PROCESSES IN THE SOCIAL IDENTITY TRADITION

1.1. Social context and social behaviour

Interactionism: between two reductionisms

In most of its classical presentations (see e.g. Hogg & Abrams, 1988; Tajfel & Turner, 1979), SIT is generally reported as having grown from two main bases. On the one hand, at the empirical level, the findings yielded by the minimal group paradigm (or MGP: Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, & Flament, 1971) are said to have triggered a search for an adequate theory which would be able to explain them. On the other hand, at the metatheoretical level, SIT is presented as an attempt to provide an answer to the epistemological concerns and critiques that Tajfel expressed in the context of the 'crisis' in social psychology (Israel & Tajfel, 1972; Tajfel, 1969, 1972a, 1981)[1].

In one of these key metatheoretical texts, entitled 'experiments in a vacuum', Tajfel argued most forcefully that, in order to understand social behaviour, social psychology should take into account the peculiarities of the social context in which people live, and stated "*the impossibility of making efficient predictions about the former without a close analysis of the latter.*" (Tajfel, 1972a, p.20). He then drew up the consequences of this position for social psychological research and attributed the origin of the 'crisis' to the fact that traditional social psychology, influenced by an individualist ideology, had so far practised its experimental works in a 'social vacuum', blatantly ignoring the influence that participants' social background may have on the results of those experiments. According to him, people's social background helps them to define the meaning of the situations they are confronted with, including experimental situations, thereby determining which type of behaviour they will find appropriate in order to do deal with the situation at hand.

[1] The 'crisis' or 'crisis of confidence' are the usual terms used to designate this period in the early seventies when social psychology was crippled with self-doubt, to the point that the question was posed whether the discipline had any intellectual or practical value at all. Since then, the critics might not have totally disappeared, and the problems might not be solved for everybody, but this was the moment, more than any other, where the critics took hold of the mainstream.

Consequently, Tajfel rejected an universalist view of social psychology and dismissed the possibility of universal laws of social behaviour as a myth. He noted that, if in a particular experiment, subjects share the same social definition of the situation, behavioural regularities might indeed be observed; but that should not imply that it will be possible to deduce or confirm universal laws from it, given that these regularities are tied to a particular social context. The meaning and scope of experimental results and social psychological findings will always be intrinsically linked to particular social contexts, falling somewhere between the uninteresting individual case and the mythical general case.

Of course, in order to avoid sociological reductionism, Tajfel also insisted on the importance of psychological processes in understanding social phenomena, of which some might indeed be universal (Tajfel, 1969). But he stressed that the way these processes will translate into behaviour always depends upon the social content that feeds them, a content which is in turn always provided by a specific social context. In short, he pleaded for an interactionist social psychology and developed a form/content solution to the problem of relating the psychological and social levels of analysis (Hogg & Abrams, 1988; Wetherell, 1996). This point, which is also the position we will adopt, is reiterated by Turner 30 years later:

> *Process theories such as social identity and self-categorization require the incorporation of specific content into their analyses before they can make predictions either in the laboratory or in the field, and are designed to require such an incorporation.* (1999, p. 34)

The context in SIT research

Nowadays, the ability to offer an interactionist and non-reductionist theory of social behaviour is still one of the strongest claims of the SI tradition. However, when we look closely at the other basis of SIT with this claim in mind, i.e. the results and explanation of the MGP experiments, things can appear somewhat confusing.

In the minimal group paradigm, participants are divided into two artificial and arbitrary categories (e.g. according to whether they tend to under- or overestimate the numbers of dots on a screen), designed only for the purpose of the experiment, and devoid of any historical or evaluative content. It is therefore with some surprise that

Tajfel and his colleagues, when they ran the first version of this paradigm (Tajfel et al., 1971), discovered that despite the arbitrary nature of the division, people nevertheless tended to favour their ingroup when they were given the opportunity of distributing resources between the two groups. Participants were apparently even willing to sacrifice absolute gain in order to maximise the difference of gain between the two groups.

As it has been mentioned, SIT was first developed in order to provide an explanation for these results. This explanation runs as follows. First, through a universal cognitive process of categorization, people subjectively divide the participants into two groups, according to the arbitrary labels provided by the experimenter. Then, because those categories are their only accessible tool for making sense of the situation at hand, they are assumed to accept the category they belong to as defining their self or, in other words, to psychologically identify with the ingroup category (i.e. a process of identification). Finally, through the distribution of resources (the dependent variable in the experiment), people engage in social comparison with the other group and, because they are driven by a universal motivational need for positive self-esteem, they show a tendency towards positive differentiation from this other group.

However, the problem lies in the fact that, as many authors have pointed out, this explanation is undoubtedly mainly psychological, and ultimately rests on intra-psychic and universal processes. As we can see, any reference to participants' social background or to a social context existing outside the laboratory is remarkably absent. Given such a picture, it is therefore not so surprising that SIT has not been exempt from being criticised for its individualism and its universalism, for the very same reasons it uses to criticise its rival theories. It seems, at least at first sight, to be at odds with its own interactionist claims.

One of the first attacks against SIT which was built on this basis came from Taylor and Brown (Taylor & Brown, 1979) while Tajfel was still alive. In his answer to these authors, Tajfel acknowledged that the processes assumed by SIT to be at work in the MGP are indeed fundamentally psychological. But he added that there was more to the theory and that these processes only represented 'one leg of a conceptual tripod':

> *...the aim of a theory of intergroup behaviour is to help us to understand certain selected uniformities of social behaviour. In order to do this, we must know (i) something about the ways in which groups are constructed in a particular social system; (ii) what are the psychological effects of these constructions; and (iii) how the constructions and their effects depends upon, and relate to, forms of social reality* (Tajfel, 1981, p.46).

Thus, if SIT's answer to point (ii) does indeed lie in the psychological sequence of social categorisation – social identification – social comparison described above, Tajfel was nevertheless aware that this sequence is far from being sufficient when it comes to making concrete predictions about the behaviour of real groups, in contrast to the artificial groups used in the MGP. According to him, these processes provide the necessary psychological basis which makes intergroup behaviour possible, but, on their own, they do not allow one to predict the particular form such behaviour will take. For instance, as some experimental variations of the MGP have shown (see e.g. Jetten, Spears, & Manstead, 1996, 1997; Turner, 1975), negative discrimination is not the only strategy which people can rely on to establish a positive and distinct social identity (or, more generally, to protect and enhance their self-esteem). In order to determine which strategy and which type of behaviour will actually be chosen, it is necessary to take into account the specific social reality in which the psychological processes of categorisation, identification and differentiation take place (i.e. point i and iii), as these latter processes do not operate in a vacuum. In other words, social identities possess contents that are socially defined, and these contents must influence behaviour and the particular choices that are made between strategies. Otherwise it would mean that we deal with universal psychological processes which work identically and give rise to the same behaviours, whatever their content and the social context might be.

Thus we can see again how much the solution to reductionism proposed by SIT is entirely dependent upon relating psychological processes to social context and to the social content of identities. This is indeed the very backbone of its interactionist claims. And if the development of this aspect cannot be found in MGP accounts, then it has to be sought elsewhere.

When they are confronted with this question, SIT researchers commonly refer to what has been called the macro-social aspect of SIT. This facet of the theory contains mainly propositions about how various understandings of the intergroup context (e.g. whether any differences in group status are perceived as legitimate or illegitimate, whether intergroup boundaries are seen as permeable or not, etc.) impact upon the strategies chosen by people in their search for a positive and distinct social identity. Such understandings determine, for instance, when they will pursue social change (i.e. collectivist) or social mobility (i.e. individualist) strategies (for more extended accounts, see e.g. Haslam, 2001; Hogg & Abrams, 1988). This macro-social aspect of SIT also includes some writings about the social functions of stereotypes in intergroup dynamics (e.g. their role in promoting or impeding social change in the status quo of intergroup relations; see Tajfel, 1981).

However, despite all the conceptual answers provided by Tajfel's points and by the macro-social side of SIT, a first criticism that could be made is that, empirically, SIT researchers have tended to focus most of their attention on the psychological consequences of group membership (Tajfel's point ii) and thereby to neglect this macro-social dimension. For instance, Reicher (1996b; see also Moghaddam & Harré, 1995) has argued that, apart from a few exceptions (see below), they have largely forsaken the study of social change (and its related concepts of legitimacy, permeability, etc.), although this was at least one of the main priorities aimed at by Tajfel through the creation of SIT, if not the very *raison d'être* of the theory. Likewise, Condor (Condor, 1990; see also Reicher, Hopkins, & Condor, 1997b) makes a similar point regarding the study of the social functions of stereotypes.

Given this relative lack of interest in its macro-social aspect, one can thus understand why, despite Tajfel's answer, SIT has also been subject to criticisms of individualism and universalism. Although it still makes theoretical references to macro-social concepts, actual empirical research has for the most part focused only on the universal, intra-psychic processes which translate these macro-social products into behaviour. As Abrams (1990) also notes, the strategy by which SIT attempts to avoid individualism rests primarily on the idea that:

> *...social behaviour is explicable in terms of psychological states, structures or processes only to the extent that these represent shared*

> *social meanings. Increasingly, however, the processes which are specified by social identity theory and later self-categorization theory...emphasize individual cognition and motivation. It may be true that the macrosocial part of social identity theory contains a rudimentary conception of social structure, but explanation for behaviour still rests on the dual operation of cognitive (categorization) and motivational (self-enhancement) processes within individuals.* (p. 89).

A case in point is certainly the very strong dominance of MGP experiments – and, more generally, of artificial groups paradigms - in the SIT research program. Too often SIT is used as if its main aim and scope were to explain discrimination in those experiments, seemingly ignoring Tajfel (1981) when he stated clearly that "*these studies were in no sense crucial experiments; but, rather, they served as crutches for further thinking about the issues involved*" (p.268), and when he acknowledged, as noted above, that if SIT was limited to that, it would be as individualist as traditional social psychology. But on the other hand, the tendency of investigating and relying almost exclusively on general psychological processes is by no means limited to MGP experiments, as, for instance, the intergroup contact research inspired by SIT framework shows (see part two of this chapter).

The norm explanation of the MGP

Perhaps one of the turning points in the move away from Tajfel's contextualist position can be found in the rejection of the first explanation of the MGP in terms of social norms, in favour of the social identity account (Wetherell, 1996) – or, even if it did not play a causal role in this move, at least it can help to illustrate it. In their first account of the MGP's results, Tajfel et al. (1971) proposed that participants in the MGP discriminated because they behaved in terms of a norm of 'competitiveness', which is associated with many group memberships in our competitive society, and which participants therefore deemed appropriate in order to respond to the experimental situation framed by an intergroup divide. Likewise, attempts to treat the two groups equally, which also appeared in the MGP results, were attributed to the influence of an existing norm of 'fairness'.

As we can see, this explanation had the advantage of making explicit reference to the social context outside the experimental situation, and thus of being more consistent with Tajfel's epistemological claim. This is not to say, however, that Tajfel did not have good reasons to reject this explanation, nor that we should regret it. Indeed, the concept of social identity has proved very fruitful within social psychology, triggering a whole new stream of research. And it remains, in our opinion, an essential cornerstone in trying to conciliate individual and social levels of analysis in social psychology.

However, Tajfel (1981) also stated that the norm explanation was not incorrect as such. He just found it uninteresting and not truly heuristic. An ad-hoc norm, he argued, could always be invoked to explain experimental results afterwards, and as such it did not allow one to make risky and a priori predictions. Also, it did not answer the question of why people do accept social norms in the first place as guidelines for their behaviour. The concept of social identity, on the other hand, was in a position to provide an answer to such a question: through the process of identification, people come to see particular social contents, including norms, as defining themselves and thus are ready to behave in accordance with them. As such, SIT should therefore have allowed to integrate the norm explanation into its framework.

However, as time went by, there has been little attempt to realise such an integration more concretely. Again, in MGP accounts, everything is explained by reference to psychological processes together with the characteristics of the experimental situation itself. All the participants need to bring in from the outside is their basic psychological potentialities. Faced with the 'Kafkaesque' situation of the MGP, they are assumed to make sense of the situation by accepting the artificial categories provided by the experimenters, and to discriminate not because of a specific (though widespread) norm but because of a universal need for positive differentiation. The possibility to resort to more familiar situations, to existing social identities and norms is not touched upon.

On the other hand, this picture might also explain why a few authors, in trying to retrieve some of the original spirit of SIT, have argued for a reinterpretation of the MGP which is quite close to a reinstatement of the norm account. Ibanez (1994), for instance, reminds us of Tajfel's (1972a) statement about the fact that participants resort to their social background in order to make sense of the

experimental situation. It is on this basis that he argues that natural groups do play a role in the MGP. When this experimental paradigm does succeed in inducing discriminatory behaviour, it is because subjects associate the content of those real categories with the experimental categories 'we/they' and 'import' their associated norms – possibly, but not necessarily one of competitiveness - into the experimental situation. Likewise, this is also how Wetherell (1996) accounts for her findings of cultural variations in the patterns of responses within the MGP, with participants in some cultures not choosing discrimination as the dominant strategy (Wetherell, 1982).

However, our purpose here, in discussing this alternative view of the MGP, was not so much to discuss which account of it is the best one, nor, if they both play a part, exactly how they should be integrated. Rather, our aim was twofold. Firstly, it was to provide a specific illustration of where and how attention has moved away from context and content to processes in SIT, and, as such, it can serve as an analogy for many other areas of SIT research. In the process, something is gained, i.e. a more sophisticated view of people's psychological processes through which social factors impact on them. On the other hand, however, something is also lost, which is more than just the idea that specific social norms impact on behaviour. For resorting to norms was also what allowed Tajfel et al. (1971) to link the results of the MGP to broad sociological and ideological aspects of our society. With the loss of this point of articulation, it is therefore that dimension as a whole which tends to disappear from the picture.

Secondly, the mere existence of the norm explanation shows that a purely universal explanation of the MGP is not the only possible one. Consequently, it suggests that the problem of universalism in SIT might not only lie in what should be added to the MGP to complete the picture, as has been argued above, but might also be found inside its very explanations as well. This leads us to a slightly different level of criticism of the universalist tendencies within SIT.

Generic processes and social behaviour

This second level of criticism often flows as a direct consequence of the first. To put it briefly, it is that the empirical neglect of social context can sometimes lead to its theoretical neglect as well. Indeed, if one starts by prioritising processes at the

expense of context, it is easy to end up with theoretical positions which use content-free processes in an attempt to predict specific behaviour patterns. In such cases, it is not only that the articulation between processes and context/contents is not realised. More than that, this articulation becomes impossible and its necessity is, implicitly if not explicitly, denied.

Thus, for instance, a large number of studies conducted within the SIT framework have proposed different kinds of generic relationship between the psychological process of identification and particular attitudinal and/or behavioural outcomes, such as discrimination, ingroup favouritism or ingroup protectionism (see e.g. Brewer, 1991; Brewer & Brown, 1998; Brown, 1995, 1999; Hewstone, 2000; Hinkle & Brown, 1990). In relation to such uses of SIT, Turner, after emphasising once more the importance of social context, collective ideologies and shared social meanings in predicting intergroup behaviour, has lamented that:

> *To suppose, therefore, as many researchers have done, that social identity theory holds that there should be simple correlations between ingoup bias in some real-world setting and degree of ingroup identification, or status position, or some measure of personal self-esteem, is seriously to misconstrue the theory.../.../...the social identity perspective is often reduced to a 'prejudice' theory and then criticized because the evidence fails to support the revised version of the theory. Some of the main examples of this reduction are assertions that social identity theory predicts that social categorization automatically leads to ingroup bias, that intergroup relations should be characterized by universal ethnocentrism, that there should be positive correlations between individual differences in ingroup identification and ingroup bias, that low status groups should always be more biased than high status groups, that intergroup discrimination is driven by an individual need for self-esteem and should directly enhance self-esteem and so on. There is a notion in many reviews that social identity theory is simply the assertion of a universal irrational drive for ethnocentrism, unconstrained by social realities or the social meanings of intergroup attitudes, that this drive serves some individual, almost quasi-biological need for self-esteem,*

> *and that some simple, single factor which triggers or relates to this drive should be positively correlated with intergroup discrimination, virtually independent of social context or the perceived nature of intergroup relations.* (1999, p.9/19)

In this passage Turner gives us several examples of this tendency. One of the most common one, which will become particularly relevant for the present work, is the idea of SIT as 'a prejudice theory', with the prediction that the more someone identifies with his or her ingroup, the more he or she should favour the ingroup and discriminate against the outgroup (see e.g. Brewer & Brown, 1998; Hinkle & Brown, 1990; Messick & Mackie, 1989). Thus, according to this view, bias and prejudice are the inevitable consequences of social identification, and ingroup favouritism a universal characteristic of human social life. This is so because the requirements of a positive social identity entail a view of the ingroup as 'better' than the outgroup, or, in other words, because discriminating against outsiders is the only way to achieve positive individual or collective self-esteem (Crocker & Luhtanen, 1990).

Much research is usually quoted in support of this view, and in particular the experiments using the MGP. Indeed, given the fact that the MGP seems to suggest that mere categorisation can be enough to trigger intergroup differentiation, this might seem, at least at first sight, like a powerful demonstration of a deep-rooted tendency towards discrimination, and, more generally, towards ethnocentrism. If discrimination can happen in such an arbitrary and artificial situation, then certainly it should be even more the case for natural groups where the emotional stakes can be much higher. Furthermore, some subsequent variations of the MGP have shown with some success the existence of a link between the degrees of identification and ingroup bias in that paradigm (Branscombe & Wann, 1994; Gagnon & Bourhis, 1996; Perreault & Bourhis, 1999).

However, to complement the earlier theoretical critique with an empirical one, there is also significant evidence which undermines this view (see e.g Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 1999). Firstly, as far as the MGP itself is concerned, it is not clear that it does constitute a demonstration of universal ethnocentrism. Possible cultural variations in MGP findings have already been alluded to, but even in our competitive Western culture, one should not forget that not everybody discriminates in the MGP experiments, and that a strategy of fairness is also the choice of many of the

participants (Spears, Doosje, & Ellemers, 1999). Moreover, some authors have argued for a distinction between the activity of positive differentiation, which is what is found in the MGP, from open hostility towards outgroups (Crocker, Blaine, & Luhtanen, 1993; Crocker & Schwartz, 1985; Mummendey et al., 1992) - or else, between differentiation and discrimination in its negative connotation (Reicher & Hopkins, 2001).

Secondly, the question of the empirical generalisation from the artificial groups of the MGP to natural situations is far from being straightforward. Ingroup bias is far from being always present in natural groups (Mummendey & Schreiber, 1984; van Knippenberg, 1984). Some researchers have even found evidence of outgroup bias in such situations (Jost & Banaji, 1994; Spears & Manstead, 1989). Hinkle and Brown (1990) reviewed 14 studies investigating the link between identification and ingroup bias in a variety of research frameworks, and concluded that this link has proven to be somewhat unstable, with some research failing to find it or finding it only in a weak form. In fact, some authors (see e.g. Branscombe, Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 1999) have been arguing that the ease with which discrimination appears in the MGP might precisely be due to the fact that the experimental conditions are minimal, i.e. (ideally) devoid of all social context and content, which might constitute particularly favourable conditions to trigger a powerful need for differentiation. Also, Turner (1975) has suggested and provided evidence that discrimination in the MGP is tied to the fact that this paradigm only makes available a limited number of behaviourial choices to participants. That is, in the classic MGP, discriminating against outsiders is the only means offered to participants in order to achieve positive collective self-esteem. However, providing group members with other opportunities to raise their self-esteem can lead to the disappearance of discriminative behaviour. In that respect, it is interesting to note that, in Hinkle and Brown's review, the correlation between identification and ingroup bias appears more often when artificial groups are used, whilst for 6 out of 8 studies using natural groups the median correlation was negative or effectively zero.

From a contextualist point of view, what accounts for these results is the fact that, as we have already stressed above, while psychological processes of identification might be universal, the way they will translate into specific attitudes and behaviours always depends on other factors of a more social nature. Ellemers, Spears and Doosje (1999), for instance, have stressed the role of the social content of

identities (i.e. everything that defines ingroup identiy: stereotypes, norms, values, etc.) in determining the outcomes of identification processes. Using an argument which integrates SIT with the earlier norm explanation of the MGP (see above), they propose that while the salience of identity will lead group members to emphasise their distinctiveness from the outgroup, the dimensions along which such distinctiveness is expressed depend upon ingroup norms. Distinctiveness could mean being especially fair or tolerant towards the other if this is the specific valued ingroup norm and dimension of distinctiveness involved (Jetten et al., 1996). This impact of identity content is precisely what makes the difference between the process of differentiation and negative discrimination, which is only one of the possible outcome of this process (Reicher & Hopkins, 2001).

Likewise, Turner (1999) has emphasised the role of the broad structural and ideological context of group processes[2]. In particular, he argues that intergroup hostility will emerge when groups in unequal power relations perceive the social situation to be illegitimate, unstable and liable to change. Another example of such an emphasis can be found in Tajfel (1981), when he pointed out that, while it is true that SIT assumes a drive for positive identity and self-esteem, there are actually many instances in the social world where, due to specific political and ideological conditions, minority groups have come to accept their supposedly 'inferior' status as legitimate and actually show some form of outgroup favouritism.

More generally, then, this kind of research shows that the same psychological process of identification working with different contents can yield different or even opposed results in terms of actual behaviour. And although the research reviewed here concerns mainly attitudes towards outgroups, there is no reason why the importance of the social context and of the social content of identities would not apply in predicting attitudes towards superordinate groups, and this will be reflected in our model.

Experiments in a vacuum

Another issue which has been identified by some critics is the question of whether and to what extent the slide towards psychological universalism in much

[2] Of course, contents of identities are intimately related to the social context. However, there are actually a number of different positions on the extent to which they are related and in what ways.

research which claims the SIT mantle could be due to the faith Tajfel kept in the experimental method and to the ensuing predominance of this method within SIT research in general (see e.g. Reicher, 1996b; Reicher & Hopkins, 2001; Wetherell, 1996). Although, as pointed out at the beginning, the aim of this introductory chapter is not to treat this question in detail, it would indeed be a mistake to consider method and theory as separate issues, especially in this case. As the title and content of Tajfel's text 'experiments in a vacuum' indicates, the problems surrounding the neglect of the social context and those regarding experimentation have been interwoven from the very start. After all, it was also in order to save the experimental method, whilst criticising the way it had been practised until then, that Tajfel wrote this chapter, in which he pleaded for a more *social* social psychology.

However, the important point is not so much that Tajfel considered experimentation as a valid method of enquiry in social psychology (if properly used), but rather that he also maintained its privilege over other methods, a privilege it has always enjoyed inside the discipline. In introducing his 1981 book, he wrote:

> *...the aim of the present chapter was to express my preoccupations as a social psychologist whose work has been entirely within the experimental tradition of the discipline and who continues to believe that...theories which can be tested experimentally contain the least doubtful promise for the future.../.../... there is no evidence that other approaches to the psychological aspects of social conduct present even as much solidity as the experimental straw appears to have.* (p.18).

If there is, at least in our view, nothing wrong about trying to save the experimental method from more radical critiques that would like to see it totally disappear, giving it a strong privilege over other methods is more problematic. All methodologies, including experiments, have their own strengths and weaknesses, as SIT researchers often admit when they underline the benefits of methodological pluralism (see e.g. Hogg & Abrams, 1988). For example, insofar as they constitute short-term interventions taking place at a particular point in time, it can be argued that experiments are particularly ill-suited for the study of social change and the social functions of stereotypes - some of the very issues which, as we have seen, SIT

research has been accused of neglecting. Indeed, a thorough study of these issues would obviously require at least some diachronic analysis of the social context (Condor, 1990, 1996; Moghaddam & Harré, 1995; Reicher, 1996b). Turning the argument around, it can also be argued that experiments are, on the other hand, particularly well adapted for the investigation of some other aspects of socio-psychological phenomena. This could be the case for cognitive and automatic processes, as these latter are less sensitive to problems of reactivity and of experimental demands than processes in which people are more actively and more consciously involved (Stengers, 1997).

Thus, the peculiarities of the experimental method could help to explain the pattern of neglects and emphases regarding the objects of enquiry in SIT research (and, as a matter of fact, in social psychology as a whole), given that, despite frequent claims in favour of methodological pluralism, it has been as much dominated by experimental work as traditional and mainstream psychology. As experimentation is classically associated with the production of universal laws, it therefore also provides a place to look for the origins of universalist tendencies in SIT. It might well be true, then, that if these universalist tendencies can be partially described as the result of a selective emphasis on some parts of Tajfel's work - such as the insistence on psychological aspects, and, even more specifically, on cognitive aspects - together with a move away from some other parts of its work, it can also be attributed to some tensions in Tajfel's own work and principles, such as its criticism of universalism in experimentation versus his will to maintain the value and the privileged status of this method within social psychology (Reicher & Hopkins, 2001; Wetherell, 1996).

Nevertheless, it must be pointed out that, whatever priority Tajfel gave to experiments, he also stated that, at least in the domain of social psychology, they should be conceptualised in a different manner, that is, not as tools leading directly to universalism. The whole point of 'experiments in a vacuum' is, as pointed out earlier, precisely to stress that no general, universal laws about social behaviour can be drawn from them. But once again, one can observe that most of those who followed Tajfel retained from this chapter only the importance of social context and the idea of an interactionist social psychology. When it is quoted, it is usually to make this point; while, on the other hand, the consequences that Tajfel drew from this insistence on social context, in terms of how we should conceive experiments

and regarding the limits of general laws in social psychology, tends to be forgotten (again, see e.g. Hogg & Abrams, 1988).

These comments also show that the issues of universalism and experimentation are further linked to the question of whether social sciences should be considered as similar in nature to natural sciences. Again, it would be an error to treat these problems as separate. The classical, universalist way of thinking about experiments and about the status of their results actually draws its ideas from the official model of natural sciences.

Many of Tajfel's statements, as well as Bruner's foreword for his 1981 book, hint that he indeed thought of social psychology as being unlike natural sciences or even general psychology. For instance, he rejected without any ambiguity the possibility for the social psychologist to be neutral or objective[3] in the same sense that the natural scientist is (whatever objectivity might mean for the latter). But it is crucial to emphasise that this should not especially be taken as a question of hierarchy and superiority of the latter over the former, as if a more truly scientific status could only be achieved by copying the model of natural sciences. On the contrary, trying desperately to do so by pursuing a quest towards an ever stronger and more rigorous purification in experimentation can have detrimental consequences. A telling quote by Tajfel makes the point more clearly:

> *Our experimental conditions are always 'contaminated'; and the nature of this contamination is one of the principal objects of our study.* (1981, p.23)

Thus, if unlike research in natural sciences, social psychological experiments are always 'contaminated', this contamination is not a curse, a deviation from a pure ideal. A totally pure, non-contaminated experimental setting is not even an ideal model which, while knowing it can never be fully reached, we would still have to pursue, hoping to reduce the contamination further with each advance in research. Rather, the 'contamination' is an essential part of socio-psychological work, and by trying to eliminate it, we would thereby eliminate 'one of the principal objects of our study'.

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[3] Although unfortunately, he never provided a more detailed account of his view about the way and the extent to which this non-neutrality acts in social psychological research.

Practically speaking, however, the most concrete and direct consequence of these remarks for the present work lies not so much in the details of how experiments in social psychology should be conceived. Rather, it lies in underlining our commitment to the principle of methodological pluralism (Hewstone, 1997), and of what has sometimes been called triangulation (Denzin, 1970), i.e. the use and integration of results drawing from different methods investigating the same phenomenon. Accordingly, the research carried out in the next chapters will attempt to reflect that principle by using different tools of investigation tailored to answer different questions. This section should make clear that this is not just a matter of preference, taste, or practicalities, but reflects fundamental epistemological choices.

The dangers of particularism

At this point, the attacks that have been levelled against universalism might raise the question of whether a contextualist and more genuinely interactionist view of SIT, and of social psychology in general, implies that we should reject all kinds of general statements entirely and all universal notions in this area. Again, this is a complex question, which goes well beyond the scope of this discussion. However, leaving it totally unanswered could give rise to some legitimate concerns and to detrimental misunderstandings.

A first concern could be that a contextualist view of SIT, or of social psychology in general, would undermine its predictive power, and thus the usefulness of the theory. However, if we follow Tajfel on this point, the opposite is true: it is only by taking context into account that accurate empirical predictions can actually be made. Thus, formulated in this way, the question could be seen as being in part an empirical one; that is, empirical tests should arbitrate between the two positions and show us which one yields the best results.

But it would be too simple if that was all there is to it. In part, this is also a matter of intellectual strategy and of what is judged to be 'useful' and worthy of emphasis in order to give us a better understanding of social behaviour. Contextualists might argue, for instance, that attempts to reduce social and cultural variations into universalist formulations, even where successful, often end up in generalities which are so vague that they are barely illuminating in giving us more insight into the social phenomenon under investigation. On the other hand,

universalists might argue that, even where empirically correct, too strong a focus on the particular is equally uninteresting for it does not allow to draw any conclusions holding outside the context of particular pieces of research. This leads us to a second, and more serious concern.

This concern relates to the very dynamic of scientific activity. Indeed, scientific research is not a lonely activity; quite the opposite, its very essence lies in a community of people working and collaborating together, exchanging ideas and relying on each other's work and results. But how then would it still be possible to use other people's research, and how could one ever succeed in interesting in one's research other researchers who are not investigating exactly the same topic, if all research results and their explanations were always inescapably tied to the particular social context in which the phenomenon under investigation takes place?

However, as argued above, a contextualist stance does not necessarily mean that we cannot find, in principle, generality in social psychology or social identity phenomena – and this, even if there might be arguments about each generality which is actually proposed. As a matter of fact, the present research and the model which underpins it will rely more than just a little on postulating generic processes.

In fact, at one level, it must be acknowledged that it is impossible to reject all kind of generalities. Generalities have a recursive quality, which makes them reappear as soon as one tries to reject them, although (and this is a key proviso) not especially in the same form. Stating the inescapable social and ideological nature of human action, for example, is in itself a statement about the essence of human beings, characterising them by their very sociability. Similarly, stressing the diversity in human forms of life that flows from this social character is indeed making a general claim about human nature, characterising it by the very diversity of its expression.

The key difference, however, lies in how we conceive these generalities and what role they should play in our theorisation of human beings and social behaviour. Thus, the contextualist position does imply that these generalities should not lie in commonalities of behaviour (Geertz, 1993; Reicher, in press). Rather, they lie in generic human potentialities, such as psychological capacities and processes. But those general processes are only empty potentials which always take shape in particular societies, and if they can be used and possibly simulated in laboratory settings, they must always wait to be given a specific social and ideological content

before we know which behavioural outcomes they will concretely lead to in the real world. Where the problem lies is not especially (or not always) in the postulation of universal processes *per se* but in their use in understanding and predicting behaviour on their own.

In other words, such processes should not lead us to disregard the specificity of ideological meanings and of behaviours in different societies; quite the opposite, it is possible to argue that it is precisely by paying attention to these specificities that we can discover richer and more enlightening generalities. Indeed, confronting the same issue in anthropological enquiries, this is what Geertz (1993) has argued most vividly:

> *...the notion that the essence of what it means to be human is most clearly revealed in those features of human culture that are universal rather than in those that are distinctive to this people or that is a prejudice we are not necessarily obliged to share. Is it in grasping such general facts – that man has everywhere some sort of 'religion' – or in grasping the richness of this religious phenomenon or that.../.../...that we grasp him?.../.../...it may be in the cultural particularities of people – in their oddities – that some of the most instructive revelations of what it is to be generically human are to be found... The notion that unless a cultural phenomenon is empirically universal it cannot reflect anything about the nature of man is about as logical as the notion that because sickle-cell anemia is, fortunately, not universal, it cannot tell us anything about human genetic processes.* (p.43-44).

And with such a perspective comes

> *...a definition of man stressing not so much the empirical commonalities in his behaviour...but rather the mechanisms by whose agency the breadth and indeterminateness of his inherent capacities are reduced to the narrowness and specificity of his actual accomplishments.* (p.44-45).

Likewise, Reicher (in press) has argued that when generalities and specificities are set up against each other, as it is necessarily the case if generalities are conceptualised at the same level as specificities (i.e. in terms of behaviour), the implication is that the search for the former can only be made at the expense of the latter. It is then that we are confronted with the dilemma that the more general the categories are, the more they end up to be poor in meaning, whatever their degree of truthfulness. But if, on the other hand, we stop seeking generalities in behaviour, then the opposition generality/specificities is not inevitable anymore.

The very concept of a social self as conceived by the SI tradition, the cornerstone of our own enquiry, provides a good example of how a notion can embody both universal and specific components at the same time. It can be argued on the one hand that it is a universal concept insofar as every people and all individuals, whatever the society they belong to, possess ways of defining and thinking about themselves, which include their group memberships and social relationships. But on the other hand, the social self is equally a contextualist notion because the precise way those people will think about themselves is always particular and shaped by the social milieu they live in.

Thus, in sum, if we do not want to be reduced to anecdotism, generalities can and even must play a role in socio-psychological explanations, as they do for instance in anthropological enquiries. But as many authors in this area realise, they should do so as ingredients which, by themselves, do not tell us how they will manifest themselves in a particular context. It is therefore possible to look in other researchers' work for hints and inspirations, but not to use them as a source of authority which would legitimise the mechanical application of pre-set models and laws, allowing one to judge in advance what is going on and to bypass the work of reconstructing the historical, social, political and ideological particularities of the context in which particular phenomena take place.

1.2. Context: given or constructed?

So far we have reviewed the argument for a social psychological approach to group phenomena which takes into account the social context in which they are embedded. However, it might not come as a surprise that, in concrete terms, this can mean quite different things to different researchers. Therefore, it is now time to switch to another side of the debate concerning the SI tradition. That is, to put it briefly, it is possible to distinguish between two general ways of dealing with the social context, depending upon whether it is taken as a given or seen as constructed. We will underline the limits of the first view and place our approach within the second framework. This, however, is in direct continuity with the preceding argument for, as we shall see, it raises the same general issues.

The origins of social context and contents

To start with, it is worth acknowledging that, if the view of the SI tradition which has been presented so far contains, in our view, more than a grain of truth, it is also, arguably, in part a picture relying on a 'straw man', i.e. a caricature put in place in order to make as clear an argument as possible. Indeed, there are many notable exceptions to the neglect of social context within the SI tradition.

First of all, even though it has been the exception rather than the rule, there has been some research on the macro-social aspect of SIT. For the most part, this work has been trying to simulate experimentally the socio-structural conditions stated by Tajfel (1981; Tajfel & Turner, 1979) as determining the way social identity processes unfold in particular contexts (i.e. legitimacy, permeability of group boundaries, unequal power, etc.), in order to see what their effects are on intragroup and intergroup behaviour – using measures such as ingroup bias, ingroup identification, or individual mobility vs. social change strategies (see e.g. Caddick, 1992; Ellemers, 1993; Ellemers, van Knippenberg, & Wilke, 1990; Ng & Cram, 1988; Sachdev & Bourhis, 1991; Turner & Brown, 1978; Wright, Taylor, & Moghaddam, 1990).

Secondly, and perhaps even more importantly, there is of course the impressive amount of work inspired by Self-Categorization Theory (Turner, 1985, 1991; Turner et al., 1987; Turner et al., 1994) of which we have not spoken yet.

Indeed, one of the main aims of SCT is, according to Turner and Bourhis (1996), to provide a detailed answer to the first point mentioned above by Tajfel in his 'conceptual tripod' (i.e. how groups are constructed in particular social settings). More specifically, this is addressed in the part of SCT which deals with the question of the salience of social categories, i.e. the question of what conditions lead people to categorise at a social rather than at an individual level in a specific social setting, and, provided that the social level is used, what specific social categories, amongst the different possibilities, will be made psychologically salient by that setting. In dealing with this question, SCT is directly concerned with the impact of the social context, and, moreover, with the concept of normative fit (described below) it does make explicit reference to the situated social content of categories.

Nevertheless, both those lines of work create different but related difficulties to those raised by the universalist/contextualist debate. This stems from their particular treatment of the social context and from the fact that, for both, the focus of enquiry is exclusively on the psychological (and, eventually, behavioural) consequences of the features of this social context. What feeds the psychological processes, the social context and the content of categories, does play a role in the explanation of the results, but these are very much taken for granted. That is, they are treated as an obvious point of departure and the question of their origin, how they are constructed and how they come to be as they are in the first place, is avoided. SCT's hypotheses about the salience of social categories, for instance, deals with how groups are constructed *psychologically*, leaving the problem of social construction to other areas of enquiry.

In section 1.1., we stressed that there is nothing wrong *per se* in postulating general psychological processes in order to understand social behaviour. Likewise, there is certainly nothing wrong with asking questions about the effects of social reality on psychological processes and behaviour (and accordingly, this will also be part of the present investigation, particularly in Chapters 3 and 4). Yet, the difficulties arise once more from the one-sidedness of such a focus. And those difficulties have to do, again, with the question of promoting a truly interactionist social psychology. Indeed, such an interactionist ambition requires us to do more than simply relating psychological constructions and their behavioural effects to social reality. If the relationship between social context on the one hand and psychological processes and social behaviour on the other has to be a two-way

dialogue, as both Tajfel and Turner have stressed many times (see e.g. Oakes, Haslam, & Turner, 1994; Tajfel, 1981; Turner & Oakes, 1986), then the logical conclusion is that there must be a feedback of social behaviour and social practices into social reality. In other words, social psychological processes must play a part in the construction of social reality.

The reasons for this are pretty straightforward. A one-way link going from the social to the psychological implies that the latter would be under the deterministic rule of the former, i.e. that the social would be imposing itself upon psychological processes. Such sociological reductionism thereby runs the risk of denying human agency and *"the responsibility of social actors for constructing the world in which they live"* (Condor, 1996, p.286), ending up in a view of individuals as 'social dopes' or 'social puppets', a view that Tajfel explicitly wanted to avoid.

However, to take it as a case in point, this is actually the picture which sometimes seems to emerge from SCT in its treatment of the issue of category salience. According to SCT, the salience of a specific social category can be conceived of as a product of its 'accessibility' and 'fit' (Oakes, 1987; Oakes & Turner, 1986). Accessibility, or perceiver's readiness, is defined as *"the active selectivity of the perceiver in being ready to use categories that are central, relevant, useful, or likely to be confirmed by the evidence of reality"* (Turner et al., 1994, p. 456). The concept of fit concerns the relationship between categories and external social reality. It is divided into two complementary aspects. The principle of comparative fit stipulates that the categories which maximize the 'metacontrast ratio', that is which both maximise intergroup differences and minimise intra-group differences on the relevant dimensions of comparison, will be most salient. As for normative fit, it refers to the fact that those intergroup differences and intragroup similarities must match the social stereotypes of these categories. In other words, the socially available stereotypic expectations provide the specific dimensions on which the meta-contrast ratio, the calculation of differences, operates.

Thus, with the only exception of the under-investigated concept of accessibility, the psychological categories used by people are assumed to match almost perfectly the surrounding social context; they reflect objective (but selective) features of the social world (Oakes, 1987; Oakes et al., 1994; Oakes, Turner, & Haslam, 1991). Those features are assumed to be read by people through an automatic and rather mechanical process of cognitive computation, which leaves

little room for human agency (Abrams, 1990; Reicher, 1995, in press). Moreover, even with the idea of accessibility on board, it presents a 'labyrinthic' view of activity (Ibanez, 1994), whereby people can make choices between pre-formed options, but without any participation in their actual construction. Such picture, it could be argued, hardly does full justice to the scope of human activity. It also presents the context and its features as being obvious and transparent to people. Thus, once a category is salient for a group of people, every member of this group is supposed to share the same definition of its meaning (i.e. stereotypes, norms, etc.), as if this latter could simply be read from an unproblematic reality[4].

Another related consequence of this essentially cognitive-perceptualist position, is that the social context tends to be reified. It ends up being seen as a reality composed of objective features lying outside intergroup and sociopsychological processes. As Condor (1996) states,

> *...in self-categorization theory, the 'social field' or 'context' is treated (or at least spoken of) as if it were essentially external to the perceiving subject...rather than a process of which they are a part.* (p. 289)

Again, this way of treating context can arguably be imputed, at least in part, to a tendency to rely mostly on experimental work. Indeed, within experiments, features of the context are usually imposed on participants, and the ideal is that these features should be defined in such a way that they are perceived in the same way by all members of the same experimental condition (in order, for instance, to avoid 'noise' variability). Accordingly, the experimental studies which have been conducted to support the salience hypotheses have taken place in an environment in which all the relevant features of the context with which the experimental participants are confronted are set in advance and are unambiguously defined (Oakes, 1987; Oakes & Turner, 1986). This is hardly the case in most 'real-world' social situations, where social context and social meanings are more often than not

[4] More recently, Haslam, Oakes, Turner, McGarty and Reynolds (1998; Haslam, 2001) have qualified this assumption. They propose that consensus about meaning is not an automatic product of self-categorisation but the result of a process of consensualisation into which group members enter because, by virtue of their common identity, they expect to agree. However, the final outcome is still the same, i.e. the process of consensualisation always leads to a final consensus, even if contestation might take place in the first instance.

ambiguous, always evolving, and subject to multiple interpretations (see e.g. Herrera & Reicher, 1998).

However, the rationale which is often invoked within the SI approach, in order to justify leaving aside questions of the construction of social reality and the origins of content, is of a different nature. It can be traced back to Tajfel who, despite his two-way interactionist statements, also implied that such questions should be left to other disciplines:

> *The content of the categories to which people are assigned by virtue of their social identity is generated over a long period of time within a culture; the origin and development of these ideas are a problem for the social historian rather than for the psychologist. The task of the social psychologist is to discover how these images are transmitted to individual members of a society.* (1981, p.134)

At the very least, this has provided an epistemological justification for his followers to narrow the focus onto the consequences of social reality (see e.g. Turner & Bourhis, 1996; Turner et al., 1987), if it has not actually triggered this tendency. Of course, there should be no doubt that Tajfel is right to point out that social psychology cannot represent the whole story of intergroup relations and behaviour, let alone of the processes of construction of social reality and social identities. Amongst other things, the study of these phenomena would indeed need to be complemented by detailed historical analyses. But if it is right that social psychology cannot deal with *all* aspects of social construction (especially in its long-term historical aspect), a truly interactionist discipline should nevertheless have something to say about it, lest it becomes (in fact if not in theory) a one-way interactionism with all the pitfalls that this implies.

Thus, at one level, leaving questions of construction to other disciplines can be seen as a wise and welcome statement of theoretical modesty (Billig, 1996). However, at another level, and when it is stated in absolute terms, it also tends to lead to a picture of social processes working in their own separate and independent realm, a realm which would therefore concern social psychology only when it comes to affect psychological processes and is translated through them into behaviour. Besides, and regardless of how sincerely it has been wished for, the expected cross-

fertilisation between social psychology and other disciplines, which would have filled in the gaps voluntarily left open, has actually hardly happened. Symptomatically, Billig (1996) and Condor (1996) have noted how little the SIT and SCT literature - in contrast to Tajfel's own writings - actually refers to the work taking place in other disciplines such as social history, sociology or social anthropology (and vice-versa).

Context and content as rhetorical constructions

Our aim is therefore to promote an approach which not only takes seriously the impact of the social context and the social meanings of identities on social behaviour, but which also takes the view that context and meanings are constructed through social interactions and practices as well as being their determinants. Both sides should be seen as evolving together in a constant dialogue. Our notions of identities and social reality are constantly constituted, sustained and/or transformed through and by the very social practices they engender (Billig, 1995). As Reicher (1996b) points out, identity is both a reflection of the world and a project about how it should be. In that respect, it is the source of social behaviours which aims to maintain or change the very social context in which they take place.

In order to address this second side of our approach, we will draw in part on the resources of Billig's rhetorical psychology (Billig, 1987, 1995) and of discourse analysis (Potter & Wetherell, 1987; Wetherell & Potter, 1992). A synthesis of these strands of research with SIT and SCT's principles has recently been attempted by Reicher and Hopkins (1996a; 1996b; 2001; Reicher et al., 1997b), and for a major part the present body of research aims to expand the approach of these authors in relation to attitudes towards supra-national bodies. However, before going into the details of our model, what we wish to do here is to consider in what way the resort to rhetorical and discursive approaches fits into the debate on interactionism and how these can help us in addressing the second side of the two-way relationship – in a way that does not necessarily require us to become social historians.

In that respect, what these approaches provide is twofold. First of all, they provide a specific area of social practices in which to look for constructions of identities and context, i.e. the highly social and public domain of discourse. Indeed, one of the basic arguments of both these lines of work is that reality, far from being

an obvious given, is constantly constructed (and argued over) through language and discursive practices. The idea, to put it simply, is to apply this argument to the aspects of social reality which we, in line with the SI tradition, are interested in, that is the aspects of the social context and of category definitions which we will hypothesise to be linked with political attitudes.

Secondly, they also give us some theoretical and methodological tools for analysing the discursive construction of those aspects. In particular, these approaches argue for a functional approach to language and for seeing discourse as a form of social action. They argue that language is more than a neutral means of communication, that even the simplest descriptions are constructions not organised in function of some truth criterion aiming at a simple reflection of reality, but according to pragmatic ends. If there is, as Edwards and Potter (1992) put it, no neutral account of reality, it is because people's interests and motivations are not separable from the particular constructions of the social world they provide. Accordingly, different versions of reality serve different purposes by making different inferences available.

Thus, it can be argued that, if the SI perspective is right about the consequences of context and identity for guiding social action, then the definition of those aspects should be of the greatest importance for those who seek to direct social action in particular ways. That is, it should be a central concern for those who seek to promote specific political projects related to the future of the group and its identity. It is in this spirit that Reicher and Hopkins have looked at the way in which the form and the content of social categories, far from being taken for granted, are fiercely argued over, contested and constructed by various '*entrepreneurs of identity*' (Besson, 1991) - such as politicians, activists or politically committed intellectuals -, through discourses which aim at mobilising the audience around different political projects. What this work shows is that the classic idea that perceptions of the social context lead to specific intergroup and political attitudes is only one side of the story. For it is in order to make a case for their specific positions that speakers develop particular constructions of social categories which sustain them. Thus, for those social actors, it is very much their general attitudes and projects concerning the future of their identity, as well as their more localised strategic concerns, which determine their account of social reality and social identities (see also Klein, 1999; Klein & Azzi, 2001b; Klein, Azzi, Brito, & Berckmans, 2000; Klein & Licata, 2003; Roosens, 1989).

This, of course, is not to say that all constructions of social reality always answer to strategic concerns of social actors, whether they are aware of them or not. Nor is it to say that it is the only possible process of construction, and that discourse and political mobilisation are the only forms of social practice through which it occurs, even if we exclude questions of long-term historical development and stay within the confines of social psychology. Other forms of social activity where this takes place would include, for instance, intergroup contact and interactions (Sherif et al., 1961), crowd behaviour (Drury & Reicher, 2000; Reicher, 1996a), communication and negotiation (Emler & Hopkins, 1990). The aim of the present work is only to provide a limited contribution to this issue and to the dialogue between social reality and social behaviour and practices.

Nevertheless, as a concluding remark, it is worth noting that the question of the construction of social reality and of identities does constitute more than an add-on to be put in simple juxtaposition to the issue of their psychological, attitudinal and/or behavioural consequences. Rather, these aspects should be seen as going hand in hand, and cannot be theoretically separated (even if, in the context of specific empirical studies, and for analytical purposes, they can be somewhat isolated). This is so because, first of all, promoting a two-way model implies that the consequences of social reality do not stop at attitudes or behaviour as an end point. Asking questions about the latter also leads to asking questions about the way they, in turn, help in sustaining or redefining the very social context which nourished them. Secondly, and conversely, we think that it is precisely because social reality has strong psychological and behavioural consequences that it is subjected to argumentative, strategic and constructive work, and it is our contention that without those consequences in mind, it would be impossible to understand the particular form they take. Therefore, such an understanding requires a specific model of what their consequences might be.

By the same token, this is where we meet with what we see as one of the limits of discursive approaches in their most radical forms, i.e. where they deny altogether the importance of intra-psychic processes in favour of purely discursive ones. Without going here into the details of such a critique, let us just say that it would be, at the very least, quite difficult to understand why all this argumentative work is done if it would never lead to practical consequences, outside the purely discursive domain. And, without a basis in intra-psychic processes (though this

should by no means be limited to cognitive ones), it would be equally difficult to explain how it can have such consequences and impacts on social actors, as well as what makes specific constructions more or less efficient in that respect (Reicher, Hopkins, & Condor, 1997a; Reicher et al., 1997b).

2. NATIONAL IDENTITIES AND SUPRANATIONAL GROUPS

Unification between and separation within states are certainly major issues in the contemporary world. Separatist nationalism has undoubtedly attracted most of the attention from both scholars and the media, especially with the collapse of the Soviet block and the ensuing 'resurgence of nationalism' - as it has been called – in ex-USSR and in Eastern Europe. One of the main reasons for such attention is the intergroup violence such phenomena have often been associated with, although it is important not to forget that there have also been more peaceful examples of separation, such as in ex-Czechoslovakia. Less dramatically, devolution is also an important topic in today's state politics, with many a state now being on the road to some sort of decentralisation of power – in particular within the UK, which is going to be at the centre of our empirical focus -, while sometimes having followed strong centralisation and homogenisation policies in the past (see e.g. Anderson, 1991; Sabatier & Berry, 1994)[5]. On the other hand, however, we are also witnessing several important attempts and pressures towards various forms of supra-national unification, most notably perhaps in Europe with the advances of the process of European integration.

The major purpose of this work is, as already indicated, to provide some insight into the sociopsychological conditions and consequences of political attitudes relating to such phenomena. What leads social actors to support separatism or integration and how does this affect their group judgements? What are the views of social reality, of group identities and group relationships which goes with such positions, both as perceptions which underpin them or as strategic constructions which sustain their political claims?

2.1. The antecedents of political attitudes

Impact on ingroup identity: undermining or enhancement?

Let us start by considering the question from the angle of the antecedents of political attitudes. It should already be clear from the first part of this chapter that the

[5] Of course, this does not mean that these states have totally abandoned all centralisation and homogenisation policies.

view that these could be explained and predicted simply on the basis of people's degree of identification with their nation (i.e. the stronger the national identity, the more people would be opposed to supra-national groups and vice-versa) has to be rejected from the very start. This view is relatively widespread in our culture, and often equates national(ist) sentiments with separatism, depicting high identifiers as the inescapable victims of an inward-looking and parochial spirit[6]. This is also a view which could come out of a reductionist view of the SI perspective which we criticised above. Indeed, if we were to accept the idea that ingroup identification led directly and inevitably to discrimination and negative perceptions of outgroups, supposedly because this would be the only way of maintaining a positive and distinct identity, the same reasoning could as well be applied to super-ordinate groups. From there, it would then be only a small step to argue that high identifiers would inevitably tend to hold separatist tendencies, favouring independence from superordinate groups.

In answer to this reductionist view, our general argument, which we intend to apply here, was that rather than being a direct function of psychological processes such as identification, attitudes should depend upon the social context and the social meanings associated with the relevant identities in specific situations.

At a general level, and based on a SI perspective, it is possible to distinguish between two different ways in which this might occur in the context of attitudes to superordinate groups (Reicher & Hopkins, 2001). First of all, as is the case for attitudes towards outgroups (Jetten et al., 1996, 1997; see part 1), specific norms or values or ideologies attached to ingroup identity can be such as to prescribe the way ingroup members should react towards superordinate groups (in general or vis-à-vis specific ones). If we agree with SIT's prediction that the more one identifies with one's group, the more we act according to the norms and values of this group, it follows, that, depending on the specific content of these norms and values, ingroup identification could lead to unionist attitudes as well as to separatist ones. Thus, for instance, for those European nationals who see themselves as being outward-looking and having an international outlook, being in favour of membership in the European

[6] This should not necessarily be understood as a critique of 'common sense': indeed, it is clear that nationalism *can* lead to negative consequences, and it is usually this kind of nationalism which the 'common sense' has in mind when making this amalgam. The point, however, is that it only constitutes a particular form of nationalism, but not nationalism *per se* (Billig, 1995).

Union can be construed as the right way of expressing this identity while opposing it can be construed as denying it (we will see an example of this in Chapter 2).

It is the second way, however, which is going to receive most of our attention in the studies carried out in the following chapters. Since the norms and values which characterise ingroup identity define what is valuable to ingroup members, i.e., the nature of the collective self-interest (Ringmar, 1996; Sindic, Castano, & Reicher, 2001; Sonnenberg, 2003), attitudes towards a specific superordinate group can be determined by the way this group is seen to impact on ingroup identity and hence on these interests. The key factor here is going to be whether national identity and the national interests it defines are construed as being enhanced or undermined within the superordinate group. Thus, political attitudes will depend upon the definitions of ingroup identity, of the superordinate body itself (and/or of any specific outgroups belonging to it), and hence of the relationship between them.

This point has been illustrated by Reicher and Hopkins (Hopkins & Reicher, 1996; Reicher & Hopkins, 1996a, 1996b, 2001; Reicher et al., 1997b) in their analyses of political rhetoric. As the work of these authors not only constitutes the basis for our present model, but also focused mainly on the same empirical case which is going to be the focus of enquiry in the present research, i.e. the issue of Scottish identity and of Scots' relation to the U.K. and the European Union, let us illustrate our argument by describing some of their findings.

A major part of Reicher and Hopkins' data was collected during the 1992 election campaign for the UK government, in which the constitutional status of Scotland within the UK (i.e. whether Scotland should be independent, receive some limited autonomy through the creation of a devolved Scottish parliament, or whether the status quo should be perpetuated), as well as its relationship with Europe were central political issues.

Their analyses of this data showed that, first of all, the idea that the strength of national identification would be enough to predict attitudes towards separation or integration was far too simplistic. Indeed, a fact that came out very clearly was that politicians could claim a very strong national identity together with holding a position in favour of the inclusion of Scotland within Britain or Europe. For instance, the politicians of the Scottish National Party (SNP), the main political party advocating independence, quite logically professed a strong attachment to Scottish national identity; but, despite their anti-UK stance, they also advocated the merits of

European integration. Their electoral slogan, 'independence in Europe', reflected that double position. On the other hand, however, making political claims in the name of Scottish identity was not the privilege of SNP members. Conservative politicians, for instance, who were defending the Union in Britain by opposing independence as well as devolution, also stated their own strong attachment to Scottish identity and rooted their pro-UK political claim in this very attachment. Here are two examples of such a claim:

> *I yield to no-one in my Scottishness and I believe that I do have some understanding of the needs and aspirations of the people of Scotland. I therefore yield that emotional high-ground to none. It is not anti-Scottish to be for the Union rather it is anti-Scottish to put the future of Scotland at risk...For all of us who love Scotland, let us ensure her continuing place as a full partner within the United Kingdom.* (Lord Mackay, Conservative peer; quoted in Hopkins & Reicher, 1996, p.82)

> *...to me, my Scottishness in fact, transcends all other considerations...wanting to be part of the Union within the United Kingdom, is a very natural corollary of my personal feelings as a Scot.* (Conservative candidate; quoted in Reicher & Hopkins, 2001, p.60).

Thus, a pro-Union stance appeared to be quite compatible with a strong Scottish identity. What seemed to be the main basis of politicians' attitudes towards the constitutional status of Scotland, and what seemed to differentiate them at this level, was therefore not the locus or strength of their identification as such but the way they conceptualised the impact of the larger community on ingroup identity - that is, whether the relationship between Scotland and Britain or Scotland and Europe was construed as undermining or enhancing ingroup identity. Contrast, for instance, the two following views:

> *The trouble with the Scots is that without their own government they therefore don't have a political system which actually reflects the true nature of the Scottish psyche. What I mean by that is that now we have policies in education, law, which are based on alien English ideas*

> *which are being imposed.* (SNP MP; quoted in Reicher & Hopkins, 2001, p.87)

> *...I think as part of the UK we enjoy the benefits of an influential presence and that is what in turn helps us to preserve what it is that matters to us and what is important to us and what is discernibly Scottish.* (Conservative candidate; quoted in Hopkins & Reicher, 1996, p.84)

As we can see, whatever the position actually defended, in both cases Scottish identity and interests stay the main focus of concern for the speakers. The key question resides in whether this identity and its interests are positively or negatively affected by being part of the superordinate group.

Quantitatively speaking, and as regards the general electorate rather than just politicians, a similar lesson comes out of the Scottish Parliamentary Election Survey 1999 (Paterson et al., 2001) and of earlier Election surveys since 1979 (see Thomson, Park, & Brooks, 1999). Reviewing the evidence of these surveys, Paterson and colleagues point out that whether Scots identify themselves primarily as Scottish or British is a very poor predictor of their support for devolution, as well as of their actual votes in the 1997 referendum on devolution (Brown, McCrone, Paterson, & Surridge, 1999; Thomson, Park, & Bryson, 2000; see section 4 for some details on the context of this referendum). Consequently, these authors underline that the issue of home-rule "*does not act to partition the electorate by national identity*" (Paterson et al, 2001, p.112). As regards support for the SNP and for independence (which in fact appears not to be one and the same thing), they acknowledge that it does bear a somewhat more significant relationship with people's prime locus of identification: for instance, in 1999, 31% of Scottish identifiers supported independence, as opposed to 11% of British identifiers. However, as the authors equally stress, this latter result also means that the majority of Scottish identifiers do not support independence, and therefore that "*...thinking of oneself as Scottish does not guarantee support for independence*" (p.112). In view of these results, these authors conclude that:

> *The fact that party choice, national identity and constitutional preference do not overlap in any neat way suggests that there are different ways of 'being Scottish'. When the SNP lays claim to be 'Scotland's party', this is highly contested by other parties who have strong claims of their own. This rather loose correspondence between ways of being Scottish permeates social and political life. One might say that national identity in Scotland is a poor predictor of vote and constitutional preference not because it is unimportant, but because it is all-pervasive, and not the property of any single political party.* (p.115-116)

In other words, Scottish identity in itself is a poor direct predictor of political attitudes not because it does not play a role in explaining them but because all political projects pretend to speak in the name of Scottish identity and interests. What differentiates these projects is how they define this identity and these interests.

Thus, following Reicher and Hopkins' work, the general psychological processes which the present research will rely on are, as we have already stated, by and large the basic processes postulated by the SI perspective, i.e., the process of social identification and the related motivations to protect and enhance one's social identity. However, these general identity processes are a starting point rather than the end of the story, and if we were to relate them directly to political attitudes without any intermediary, our position would be open to the critique of establishing generic relationships to attitudes and behaviour outside the social context. Thus, in our model, these processes do not themselves predict their outcomes, i.e. whether there will be support for integration or for separatism, as this will be dependent on how the specific nature of the superordinate group and/or of ingroup identity is construed.

Furthermore, this is not to imply that any kind of positive or negative impact produced by a superordinate group on the ingroup will necessarily and automatically lead to attitudes of separatism or unionism. There is a gap between reacting to protect or enhance one's identity and doing so by promoting separatism/union, if only because other strategies could be available. For instance, a subgroup whose members feel their identity is threatened within a common group could potentially engage in resistance and direct social competition with other subgroups within the superordinate group rather than in a separatist strategy - i.e., to choose a 'voice'

rather than an 'exit' strategy (see Tajfel, 1981, after Hirschman, 1972) at the subgroup level.

Thus, we need to identify the specific social conditions leading to the kind of feelings of identity undermining or enhancement which should be correlated more specifically with support for separatism (or at least for enhanced autonomy) or for integration. We need to ask how such feelings come about, i.e. how and to what features of the social context and of identity contents they relate. This is essential not only in order to understand the social and practical conditions which trigger those feelings, but also in order to understand their very nature and their likely consequences. In other words, it is by putting identity threat (or enhancement) into context that it starts to become more than a merely psychological phenomenon and that we can actually start to make predictions concerning political attitudes.

Distinctiveness threat

As pointed out by Branscombe and her colleagues, the notion of identity threat remains ill-defined within the intergroup literature, as it encompasses research which has investigated many different types of threats (for a review see Branscombe et al., 1999). However, according to Reicher and Hopkins' data, the sort of issue which seems associated with claims of separatism or unionism, at least within the Scottish context, is probably most akin to what has been labelled 'distinctiveness threat' (see e.g. Breakwell, 1986; Spears, Doosje, & Ellemers, 1997). Indeed, the quotations we have cited show a concern to preserve "*what is discernibly Scottish*" or for the ability to express "*the true nature of the Scottish psyche*" within the British political system (see above), and then make the point that Britain either protects and enhances this distinctiveness of Scottish identity, or conversely that it undermines the ability to express it (e.g. because it is an alien English identity which dominates the political system).

Thus, although most of the research on distinctiveness threat has focused on its effects on attitudes and behaviour towards outgroups, it could potentially also be highly relevant for understanding political attitudes towards superordinate groups and the origins of feelings of identity undermining/enhancement, given that the membership in such groups might indeed create conditions where ingroup specificity is threatened by the other subgroups.

Distinctiveness threat relates to SIT's statement that people need not only a positive but also a *distinct* identity, and there is indeed evidence suggesting that the need for distinctiveness is different from the need for positiveness and might even in some cases have priority over it (Mlicki & Ellemers, 1996). SIT predicts that any situation where the specificity of ingroup identity is put in jeopardy will be uncomfortable and lead to attempts towards re-establishing ingroup distinctiveness through increased differentiation from other groups. Overall, there is some evidence that threat to ingroup distinctiveness can have such an effect (Jetten, Spears, & Manstead, 1999), whereas respecting or even emphasising ingroup distinctiveness can improve intergroup perceptions and relations (Brown & Wade, 1987; Deschamps & Brown, 1983). Thus, according to Hornsey and Hogg (2000), distinctiveness threat is one of the central factors shaping subgroup relations within a common group and which determines whether or not identity processes will lead to actual hostility towards these other subgroups.

Apart from the work which has directly addressed this issue, there are two other lines of research which tend to converge with that conclusion. First of all, it can be seen as one of the lessons coming out of the work on intergroup contact, also partly inspired by a SI perspective, which has focused on the question of whether promoting or reducing the salience of different levels of identity is the best strategy to reduce intergroup hostility and tensions. Thus, in their Common Ingroup Identity model, Gaertner and his colleagues (Gaertner, Bachman, Dovidio, & Banker, 2001; Gaertner, Dovidio, Anastasio, Bachevan, & Rust, 1993; Gaertner, Mann, Murrel, & Dovidio, 1989) have stressed the advantages of promoting a superordinate identity in order to reduce intergroup bias and prejudice, in the context of groups which are put in presence of each other. On the other hand, such a model has been criticised by Hewstone and Brown who, in their own 'mutual intergroup differentation model', have stressed the necessity of keeping subordinate identities salient, insofar as they see it as a necessary condition for the potentially beneficial effects of contact to generalise outside the specific contact situation (Brown, Vivian, & Hewstone, 1996; Hewstone & Brown, 1986). More recently, however, both these *recategorisation* and *categorisation* models have somewhat converged, ending up in recognising the merits of a dual identity model (Anastasio, Bachman, Gaertner, & Dovidio, 1997; Dovidio, Gaertner, & Validzic, 1998; Hewstone, 1996), in which promoting the

salience of both the subordinate and superordinate level of categorisation are assumed to yield the best results.

At one level, this research can be seen as a variant of the generic approach to identity processes which has been criticised, insofar as it relies on hypotheses which directly link the degree of identification (or level of identity salience) to specific orientations towards outgroups. However, its partial convergence with our concern lies in the fact that, apart from the generalisation issue raised by Hewstone and Brown (1986), one of the main reasons for advocating the maintenance of some level of salience of subordinate identities is that attempts to remove or underplay those identities might be experienced as a threat for ingroup members and thereby trigger hostility against those who are responsible for these attempts.

Another major area where the idea of identity threat has been explored is in research on multiculturalism (which stretches well beyond the boundaries of social psychology; for a review see e.g. Hornsey and Hogg, 2000). Berry's acculturation model (Berry, 1984; Berry, Kim, Power, Young, & Bujaki, 1989), for instance, describes the different ideological and/or political strategies which can be followed within multicultural or multiethnic societies (i.e., most of the time, nation states) in order to deal with their inter-subgroup relations. One common strategy, called 'assimilationist', recommends that all individuals should (ideally) be treated in a 'category-blind' fashion. All are supposed to drop their particular subgroup identity and to accept and live only by the culture, norms and ideology of the superordinate group (melting-pot assimilation). Or yet, minorities have to accept the culture of a particular dominant subgroup within it (minority group assimilation; see Hornsey and Hogg, 2000; Moghaddam and Solliday, 1991; in practice the distinction might sometimes be blurred though, for often the superordinate culture will reflect in large part the dominant subgroup). In both cases, the ideal is of 'one group, one culture', which, for the promoters of that model, is the recipe for harmony.

By contrast, the advocates of a strategy of 'integration' or 'cultural pluralism' recommend that, as with the idea of 'dual identity', subgroups should be encouraged both to keep their distinct identity and to take on board some aspects of the superordinate group culture. As with contact models (see also Schofield, 1986), the main argued rationale for such a strategy is that assimilation policies might lead to resentment and defensive or aggressive reactions amongst those who have to drop their original identity (even by those who are willing to integrate and adapt to the

culture of the superordinate group). The premise is that people are strongly motivated to retain their subgroup cultural heritage and need to be secure in their subgroup identity in order to relate positively to others.

The origins of identity undermining and enhancement: incompatibility and power.

In sum, there is now a large body of empirical work available relating to distinctiveness threat and its effects, which suggests the key role that the need for a distinct subgroup identity might play in relation to membership in a superordinate group. Nevertheless, this work only provides limited help for our purposes, for several reasons. First, as has been alluded to above, the effects of this threat on *political* attitudes towards superordinate groups – i.e., on whether subgroups, as a whole, wish to leave or stay within that common group - still remains in need of direct investigation. Second, this research has not explored the other side of the 'threat' phenomenon, namely, in the context of superordinate group membership, the possibility that (and the reasons why) subgroup members might also feel that their identity is enhanced within such a group.

Third, and more fundamentally, the basic problem which stands in the way of an application to political attitudes is that this research has mostly dealt with distinctiveness threat conceived of as a cognitive threat, as if it was a question of comparing group traits or attributes in the abstract. However, as the research on multiculturalism illustrates, the question of membership in superordinate groups is, for subgroup members, at least as much a practical issue as it is a cognitive one (i.e. whether or not such membership constitutes a practical threat to ingroup identity).

That is, our general view is that people are not merely concerned about having a distinct identity as if this were only a matter of possessing a certain psychological/cognitive state and of making an abstract comparison of traits with other groups. Given that identity is a guide to social action (Reicher, 1996b; Tajfel, 1981), people are also concerned about having the means to express and enact this distinct identity in practice, at a material and concrete level, and to possess institutions and social practices which are build around the values of this identity, i.e. a way of life which allows and is based on the expression of their identity. This is true in general, but takes particular importance in the context of superordinate group membership. Indeed, in this context, the key question is, as we alluded to before,

whether this membership, and the integration with the other subgroup(s) it entails, implies that the distinct ingroup identity can still be practically expressed, or else that it will be repressed, assimilated and 'diluted' in the common group, perhaps in favour of other subgroup(s) identity(ies), as a result of having to share common institutions and practices with these.

Such a perspective also requires us to reconsider the antecedents of 'distinctiveness threat' as they have usually been conceptualised. Indeed, when conceived of at the cognitive level, the logical implication of the notion of distinctiveness threat is that it should be triggered by intergroup similarity, or a lack of clear intergroup boundaries. Accordingly, much research in this area has been focusing on the role of these variables (Brown, 1984a, 1984b; Brown & Abrams, 1986; Moghaddam & Stringer, 1988). As intergroup differences might be also seen as potential source of intergroup tension and conflict (Byrne, 1971; Rokeach, 1960), a debate has therefore ensued on whether it is similarity or difference with outgroups which is the most threatening situation for ingroup members (see e.g. Brewer, 1991; Roccas & Schwartz, 1993; Jetten, Spears, & Postmes, 2004; Jetten & Spears, 2004).

In our view, the controversy around this issue has taken the wrong track. At least within the context of subgroup-superordinate group relationships, what matters is not so much inter-subgroup similarities and differences *per se*, but the practical meaning or implication of such similarities or differences. That is, what matters is whether the contents of ingroup and outgroup identities are construed as being incompatible or not, i.e. whether or not they can be both expressed in the context of a common group. In some circumstances, group differences (whether they concern traits, values, norms, behaviours, ways of life or interests) might indeed be construed as fundamentally incompatible, i.e. that it is not possible to bring them together or express them both without some form of conflict, in which case differences are likely to be a source of threat. But, on the other hand, it is also possible, in other circumstances or for other people, to construe group differences as having a positive meaning because, for instance, they are perceived as complementing each other (Brown & Wade, 1987; Deschamps & Brown, 1983). As for similarities, they might well be more likely to be associated with a perception of compatibility between groups and their interests; yet, though this might be empirically less frequent, similarities between groups could also potentially be seen as incompatible, if for instance the enactment of an ingroup characteristic risks to enter into conflict with

the outgroup's expression of the same characteristic (e.g. if two groups see themselves as competitive, expansionists, etc.)[7].

Accordingly, the problem of superordinate group membership is not that it can raise the threat of having to live with one or more similar or different outgroups, but that it can raise the threat of having to live with one or several incompatible outgroups who are going to impose their own incompatible identity and interests. In other words, it is not *existing* similarities or differences which are threatening *per se*, but the prospect that the expression of ingroup specificity might be impeded, and thus that it might be lost in the long-term, replaced by a created and imposed similarity. In this spirit, a study by Henderson-King and colleagues (Henderson-King, Henderson-King, Zhermer, Posokhova, & Chiker, 1997) suggests that intergroup differentiation might be used precisely in order to resist such threats. Indeed, these authors have shown that similarity with outgroups can lead to ingroup bias and negative outgroup evaluation, as predicted by SIT, but only for those outgroups which constitute a perceived 'practical' and concrete threat, such as an external threat to the existence of the ingroup itself.

Thus, as far as identity contents are concerned, we see the issue of incompatibility vs. compatibility (or complementarity) of those contents, rather than differences vs. similarities, as key in terms of the determinants of support for separatism or union. Incompatibility, however, does not just refer to the sort of incompatibility which could come from comparing groups and their characteristics cognitively, at an abstract level. Rather, it has to be considered within a practical context, which can create situations where it is perceived that only one way of life, or one set of norms and values can be followed in order to guide practices - an analogy with zero-sum games could be made. To put it simply, different values, even seemingly incompatible ones, might not be a problem where everybody can follow their own path. But these might become problematic when it is necessary to decide to which ones the institutions and the practices of a superordinate group will be tailored.

The reference to the practical dimension of attitudes to superordinate groups also allows a transition to the next point. What also needs to be integrated in a model

[7] This is not to say that any combination of characteristics can be considered as being in essence compatible or incompatible. Again, it depends upon peoples' interpretations. With some creativity, someone could for instance argue that there is nothing incompatible with two groups being competitive or expansionists.

of national separation and integration is a consideration of perceived power differences. It is easy to understand that, when it comes to join potentially incompatible outgroup(s) in a common group, the threat to ingroup identity acquires different meanings depending upon whether or not the ingroup feels it has the power to make its specific views and identity heard and respected by others. Incompatibility might lead to a zero-sum game situation in practice, but it might not be such a problem if one can get one's way, at least to some extent. It certainly becomes a problem if one feels that the others' views are to prevail consistently. The danger is then raised not only that the ingroup is unable to enact its own identity but that, within common practices, it will be imposed upon the incompatible ways of the other.

Thus, incompatibility and lack of power together might lead to a situation where it is felt that the superordinate group, its values, institutions and ways of life, are defined exclusively by others and do not represent the ingroup and its identity. This is illustrated by the common complaint of Scottish separatists that Britain actually means England (Reicher and Hopkins, 2001), or that British identity only reflects English identity (so that there is in actual facts no such a thing as a British identity). It also converges with recent research on 'ingroup projection' (Mummendey & Wenzel, 1999; Wenzel, Mummendey, Weber, & Waldzus, 2001), which has shown that subgroups, and particularly dominant ones, can indeed project their identity onto the superodinate group and develop a "*sense of 'ownership' over the superordinate identity*" (Hornsey and Hogg, p.152). What matters here, though, is not so much the actual attitude or 'ingroup projection' of the dominant outgroup, but how this issue is perceived by the ingroup. That is, in reaction to a perceived lack of power, ingroup members might actually exhibit the opposite tendency, i.e. resenting the fact that it has no ownership over the superordinate identity and that the latter is not representative of ingroup identity (see Chapter 5).

Overall, our insistence on the practical dimension of identity threat explains why the research on multiculturalism comes closer to our perspective than the literature on distinctiveness threat, for it does contain such practical considerations. Indeed, where there is assimilation, it means that there is a practical pressure towards accepting the dominant culture, norms and ideology of the superordinate group, which shows the relevance of the power dimension. As alluded to earlier, the common group might or might not be dominated by a specific and powerful outgroup

who has the means to impose its views (e.g. because its bigger size gives it a stronger voice in a democratic context, or because it has a stronger hold on institutional power). But in any case, feelings of ingroup powerlessness remain possible and relevant. Moreover, even within the context of melting-pot assimilation, the process is not just one of mere 'natural' assimilation by sheer weight of number, but depends on an ideology of melting-pot held by the superordinate group itself, which might not be shared by the subgroup under threat.

Our perspective is also in line with research on ethnolinguistic vitality (Giles, Bourhis, & Taylor, 1977; Harwood, Giles, & Bourhis, 1994; Sachdev & Bourhis, 1993). The idea of subjective ethnolinguistic vitality proposed by these authors refers to perceptions of how well or how badly the identity of ethnic subgroups is surviving and thriving within a multicultural group, and depends on factors such as the dominance of outgroup(s), the ingroup's sense of control over its destiny and of representativeness within the superordinate group. The threat of the repression and dilution of ingroup identity can be seen as the downside of this sense of vitality, i.e. the feeling that ingroup identity is in danger of dying out within the superordinate group because it cannot be properly expressed within that group.

As for identity enhancement, it could also be linked to considerations of power in two ways. Firstly, the converse of the above reasoning is that we would hypothesise identity enhancement to be linked to the perception that the ingroup has enough power within the superordinate group to express itself. However, power can also relate to identity enhancement in another way, for being part of a common group where incompatibility is not an issue can lead to a feeling of enhanced power and agency for both the ingroup and the superordinate group. One's identity can be enacted on a larger scale within the superordinate group, and/or the subgroup can also enjoy a stronger voice in terms of relations to other groups outside the superordinate group. Likewise, even where some degree of threat is present, the perception that breaking from the superordinate group might entail a loss of that sort of power could potentially mitigate the link between this threat and a wish for separatism (however, if the lack of power within the superordinate group does not allow ingroup identity to be enacted at least to some extent, then the superordinate group is unlikely to be construed as giving more power in relation to outsiders; see Chapter 2).

Thus, our aim is to investigate the specific kind of threat/enhancement which is rooted in those conditions. The concern is not only about the possession of a distinct identity (and certainly not if it is just a question of comparison between abstract traits), but is also about having the means to express this identity in practice and the possibility that it might wither away, actively overcome by an alien identity, in the process of establishing common practices and values . Rather than talking of 'distinctiveness threat' then, we will use the terms of *identity repression* or *identity loss*, depending on whether we want to refer to the perception that the expression and enactment of ingroup identity is repressed, or to the perception that such repression will lead to a loss of ingroup identity.

Of course, there would be, admittedly, many others features of the social context which would be worthy of consideration if we wanted to provide an even richer picture of the conditions of national separatism/integration. Examples would include the perceived legitimacy/illegitimacy of power differences, the perceived feasibility and viability of projects of change, and so on. At this point, we have to acknowledge the limits of what can be accomplished within the framework of a single set of studies. For practical reasons, we need to narrow our focus somewhat, and the conditions identified here are, at least in our view, amongst the most crucial ones. However, let us turn now to one last contextual dimension which will also be of relevance for one of our studies (see Chapter 2).

The ideological context of nationalism and national identities

Understanding how general identity needs and the general processes associated with identity undermining and enhancement might lead to seeking national separation or integration also requires, to some extent, an understanding of the ideological context within which such a quest takes place. That is, we are not dealing here with any type of subgroup-superordinate group relationship, but with the specific case of the relationship between national groups and supra-national bodies. Accordingly, the peculiar ideology of nationalism and national identities might also be a necessary component in making the link between these processes and their attitudinal and behavioural expression.

As Billig (1995) points out, being a nation is only possible within the context of a world of nations. That is, it does not only imply living by the ingroup identity

and values but also the acceptance of a wider ideology, a common framework within which the specificity of all national identities are expressed (e.g. each nation *must* have a specific flag, a national anthem, etc...). This peculiar ideology does not only contribute to explain the fact that national identity matters, perhaps more than many other type of identity (Billig, 1995; Reicher et al., 1997a; Sindic et al., 2001). It also frames the ways in which the national self should be expressed in general, and therefore, what can be construed as threatening to that self and its expression, and the types of strategy deemed appropriate in order to deal with those threats.

Thus, in the context of nationalist ideology, one component which is undoubtedly of crucial importance is the principle of national sovereignty. The ideology of the nation prescribes that the latter should be autonomous, sovereign, and run by its own people. Furthermore, it also involves a theory of the nature and basis of this sovereignty, which often entails the principle that each nation should have, and deserves to have, its own state. Indeed, the idea that the nation should be co-extensive with the state is part of the very basis of today's prevailing international system of nation states, where the nation state has become the political form or unity by definition (Anderson, 1991; Gellner, 1983; Smith, 1995). As Billig (1995) stresses, nowadays the very principles of collective self-determination and democracy reside within the nation states.

In the same spirit, other ideological components would include, for instance, the roots of nationalism in romantic expressivism, which helped to bring about the very idea of national culture and "*the notion that each people has its own way of being thinking, and feeling, to which it ought to be true; that each has a right and a duty to realize its own way and not to have an alien one imposed on it*" (Taylor, 1989, p.415, emphasis added; see also Guiberneau (1996) and Chapter 6).

Accordingly, these ideological components specific to national identities might contribute to explaining, for instance, why national identities might be particularly sensitive to threats to their expression and their sovereignty, and why the feeling that it is undermined by membership in a larger group can translate into a quest for a separate statehood. Indeed, by contrast, groups based on other types of identities (i.e. regional, religious, ethnic identities) which come under threat might not react through such claims for a separate state, not necessarily because those identities would be less strongly felt, but because it would be quite difficult to see it

as a legitimate claim and/or to gain acknowledgement of this legitimacy in our world of nation states.

This is not to rule out the possibility that national identities and national ideology can also be used and invoked in order to sustain purposes other than (or even opposed to) separatism and the creation of an independent state. We have seen above that it can also be a basis for supporting supra-national integration (see also Chapter 2). But even in those cases, the principle of national sovereignty will more often than not maintain its hold, for it is likely that arguments based on that principle will be put forward, e.g. the supra-national body does not lead to a loss of sovereignty, or that the 'supra-national body' is itself a nation.

This ideological dimension of nationalism and national identities will not be a central focus in this thesis, though we will touch upon it in Chapter 2. However, at a general level, it provides a clear example of how general processes of identity and identity threat, however relevant and central, do not allow one to make predictions of social behaviour on their own, for the specific ideological content which feeds these processes is necessary in order to understand the ways (national) identity is expressed, the forms of threats and the forms of resistance to those threats. Empirically, it might not be such a problem, in most cases, to make general predictions without a detailed consideration of this ideological context, simply because of the all-pervasive nature of nationalist ideology in today's world (see e.g. Anderson, 1991, who points out for instance how even Marxist movements have come to define themselves in nationalist terms throughout this century), and also because some aspects of this ideology, in particular those touching the very conception of the (national) self, might not be exclusive to national identities. But what this does mean is that the nationalist framework, and the form of responses to identity threat which can emerge within it, cannot be taken for granted, at least at theoretical level (and sometimes empirically as well; see Chapter 2).

2.2. The consequences of political attitudes

So far, we have considered the question of political attitudes in terms of their antecedents. That is, we have tried to delineate a model of the conditions of social reality and identity meanings which lead to support for separatism or union. It is now time to consider the other side of the story, which has to do with the consequences of these attitudes. Of course, political attitudes towards superordinate groups potentially have many diverse consequences, e.g. in terms of intergroup attitudes and behaviour. But, for this research, we will focus on a specific aspect of those consequences which can involve the very redefinition of those features of social reality and of group identities shaping political attitudes. This should help in making a contribution to our understanding of their origins, i.e. how social identities and reality come to be construed in certain ways.

Indeed, we have argued above that the social context and the social contents of identities should not be taken for granted, i.e. as obvious and transparent features of an objective reality. Theoretically, it is important that we reject this view, lest we end up reifying these. But, perhaps even more importantly, such an outlook would simply overshadow the empirical fact, illustrated by Reicher and Hopkins' research (Dixon & Reicher, 1997; Reicher & Hopkins, 1996a, 1996b, 2001; Reicher et al., 1997b) that context and meanings are open to debate and to different rhetorical constructions. Indeed, their evidence shows that 'entrepreneurs of identity' can construct the social situation of being part of a superordinate group as either one of undermining or one of enhancement of ingroup identity, depending on how they construct and argue over what constitutes the key 'essence' of the ingroup, the nature and meanings associated with membership in the supra-national group and the presence of the outgroup(s), or both. This can lead to very different accounts of the relationship between the ingroup and the outgroup(s) and between the ingroup and the superordinate group.

Furthermore, this flexibility in identity construction allows for strategic work to be done. Rather than being a mere reflection of their views, the constructions deployed by the 'entrepreneurs of identity' are led by their attempt to mobilise support for their political projects concerning the status of the ingroup vis-à-vis supra-national bodies. Beyond the variability in constructions found between different speakers, and which reflects their different projects, this functional

dimension appears even more clearly in the light of the empirical finding that, when they are confronted with different argumentative or communicational contexts, or when their immediate strategy of influence has to be adapted, the same speakers can use quite variable constructions, whilst at the same time those different constructions remain consistent in terms of sustaining their broader political objectives.

In the same spirit, and in relation to the question of whether specific group relations are characterised by incompatible or complementary interests and goals, Hornsey and Hogg (2000) have underlined that:

> *Further complicating the issue is the fact that goal relations are very susceptible to rhetorical and ideological construction. Where social identity threat is perceived to exist, it is remarkably easy to reconstruct goal relations to be zero-sum game and thus to legitimize and encourage intergroup competition...* (p.151)

We endorse that point wholeheartedly, though we would add that it can also work the other way round, i.e. rhetorical and ideological constructions can contribute to the interpretation of a situation as being non-incompatible/complementary and encourage intergroup cooperation/union, as much as doing the opposite.

In sum, and more generally, this suggests that one of main motives which can lead to strategic work on the meanings of identities and social reality is precisely the very political project - or political attitude – held by a particular social actor. Given that specific views on these meanings lead to support for specific political positions, those who support a particular project can seek to actively construct these meanings in such a way that they are congruent with their project, in order to convince others, or at least to justify their own position in front of others. In other words, the political attitudes we are interested in can therefore participate in the very construction of their antecedents.

Thus, the implication for the stance taken here is that all the concepts we have outlined above and which concern definitions of identity and identity relations (identity undermining, identity enhancement, identity contents, incompatibility, complementarity and even power differences) should not simply be seen as unproblematic features of reality. Rather, they are an arena for argumentation and dissension. Moreover, they should also be seen as (strategic) constructions put into

place by social actors in order to sustain specific projects, as much as they are perceptions or interpretations which determine their attitudes.

However, this does not mean that strategic constructions of social reality are limited to the domain of discourse - at least not when discourse is taken in a narrow sense -, let alone of political discourse, nor that they can only be tapped by the specific qualitative methodology of discursive approaches. Indeed, pragmatic approaches to group judgements have also illustrated the flexible and strategic aspects of these judgements through the use of experimental methodology (see e.g. Ellemers, Barreto, & Spears, 1999; Klein, 1999; Klein & Azzi, 2001b; Leyens, Yzerbyt, & Schadron, 1994; Marques, Yzerbyt, & Rijsman, 1988; Reicher & Levine, 1994). Strategic concerns can impact on people's answers even when they are measured with, say, experimental questionnaires. After all, those can be seen as a form of discourse, yielding itself to rhetorical claims (Potter & Wetherell, 1987). Our perspective is in line with this work, and, in this thesis, we will also explore the consequences of strategic concerns on the perceptions of groups and social reality using both experimental and qualitative methodologies.

3. Plan of the Thesis

It would have been impossible, in the framework of this thesis, to empirically address all the questions and hypotheses we have raised throughout this introductory chapter. Nevertheless, the research strategy we adopted for the present research is one whereby we have attempted to address our general model from a different angle in each separate study (using different methodologies as deemed appropriate). As always, many questions will remain unanswered, but our purpose was to put us in a position where, hopefully, we would have at least something to say on each of the general aspects of the model we have outlined.

Thus, in the next chapter (Chapter 2), we will start by investigating the strategic construction of identities and social context within discursive practices - more specifically, within political rhetoric. The study presented in this chapter was based on interviews with Scottish politicians, and, in analysing their discourse, we will pay particular attention to their constructions of the concepts we have underlined - such as identity undermining/enhancement, incompatibility and power - and on how these constructions relate to the political projects for which they seek to mobilise support, in relation to Britain and the EU. For instance, we will examine whether those who promote separation from a supra-national body construct this body as undermining the expression and the realisation of Scottish identity; whether they depict ingroup and outgroup(s) as incompatible in their identity and interests; and whether they construe the ingroup as powerless within the supra-national body. We will also examine whether those who promote integration deny that there is such undermining and construct group identities and context in such a way that the supra-national body is seen as enhancing ingroup. Thus, we will seek to demonstrate the relevance of our concepts in the understanding of separatism and unionism, as well as to show how they are strategically constructed in order to sustain these political attitudes.

In the next two chapters (Chapters 3 and 4), we will aim to provide quantitative evidence of the existence of a link between the way in which the impact of the superordinate group on ingroup identity is construed and support for or opposition to separatism. That is, we will try to show that, rather than being limited to the level of discursive and strategic arguments, views on the nature of this impact can also act as perceptions which can indeed influence people's attitudes.

Thus, in Chapter 3, we will present the results of a survey study run on a sample of 'ordinary' Scottish people. In this survey, we hypothesised that support for separatism should be predicted by the perception that ingroup identity is undermined within a supra-national body, in interaction with the degree of ingroup identification. That is, it is only when people feel that their identity is undermined that a high degree of identification should lead to stronger support for separatism. In other words, there is nothing incompatible with being a high identifier and supporting integration in a supra-national body, if this body is not seen as undermining ingroup identity. Secondly, we also hypothesised that perceptions of identity undermining should arise from a combined sense of incompatibility with the outgroup and ingroup powerlessness. Moreover, we hypothesised that it is because incompatibility and powerlessness affect the sense of identity undermining that they have an impact on support for separatism (i.e. identity undermining should mediate the impact of these variables on support for separatism). Indeed, it could be argued that power and incompatibility represent separate issues which could impact on political attitudes independently of identity factors. By contrast, should our hypothesis be supported, it would show that these aspects are important because they relate to and affect identity concerns.

Given the correlational nature of the data presented in Chapter 3, in Chapter 4, we will address more directly the issue of the causal relationship between perceptions of the impact of the superordinate group and political attitudes, by using experimental manipulations. Accordingly, the experiment presented in this chapter attempted to manipulate the former in order to appraise its effects on the latter. We will ask whether inducing participants to believe that Britain undermines or enhance a specific aspect of Scottishness lead them to show more support separatism or integration.

Finally, in Chapter 5, we will come back to the issue of the strategic construction of group identities and explore the consequences of strategic concerns for the perceptions of groups and social reality, but this time within a quantitative and experimental context. More specifically, we will focus on judgements of group prototypicality, as these judgements constitute a potentially appropriate area for testing our strategic hypothesis. Indeed, on the one hand, the paradigm of ingroup projection (see part 2 above) predicts that ingroup members usually tend to judge their group as more prototypical of the superordinate group than the outgroup. On the

other hand, however, our model predicts that those who support separatism will sustain their position by stressing the fact that ingroup identity and interests are ignored within the superordinate group and therefore do not contribute to defining the superordinate group identity and practices. In other words, we would expect supporters of separatism to claim that the ingroup is *not* prototypical of the superordinate group, as a way to underline the fact that the superordinate group undermine ingroup identity and interests. Thus, rather than being always biased in a specific direction, this suggests that judgement of group prototypicality could in fact vary as a function of the strategic claims made by participants, in relation to the political project they support. We will investigate this question in the two experiments presented in chapter 5.

4. The Scottish context[8]

Before proceeding with our first study, it might be useful to add a few comments in order to situate the general context of our specific empirical case, i.e. the relationship between Scotland and the two supra-national bodies it is involved in, the UK/Britain[9] and the European Union.

Historically, Scotland has been part of Britain since the Union of the Parliaments in 1707, which merged both the Scottish and the English parliaments into the British parliament. This latter is often referred to simply as 'Westminster' given that it is located at Westminster, London. Technically, England is not the only other group forming the UK with Scotland, for it also includes Wales and Northern Ireland. But it is reasonable to assume that, as the largely dominant group, it does constitute the main focus of comparison and of potential threat for the Scots.

It might perhaps come as a surprise that we refer to Britain as a supra-national organisation. Indeed, as opposed to the EU perhaps, the UK, or Britain, is often seen as a nation rather than a supra-national body, especially in the eyes of many outsiders. However, within the UK, Scotland, England, Wales and Northern Ireland[10] are quite commonly seen as nations in their own rights (even by unionists), and thus the UK as an Union between those different nations, as in fact the name United Kingdom suggests. Of course, whether or not Britain (and, as a matter of fact, Scotland) is also a nation can in itself be a matter of argument with important political implications (see Chapter 2), but the important point for now is simply that it *can* be seen as a supra-national body as well as a nation.

During the 20th century, movements within Scotland aiming at achieving either increased or total autonomy from the UK have come and gone. To focus on the most recent events, support for the Scottish National Party (SNP) reached highpoints in the 70s and since then the party has remained a serious political force to contend with (in fact, at the time of writing, the second most popular party in Scotland after

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[8] The information in this section is taken from the following websites: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/; http://europa.eu.int; http://www.alba.org.uk; http://www.leeds.ac.uk/law/hamlyn/devoplan.htm; http://www.scotland.gov.uk.

[9] Technically, the two terms, UK and Britain, are not exactly the same as the former (but not the latter) includes Northern Ireland. Nevertheless, in practice, they are commonly used interchangeably (i.e. Britain meaning the UK as a whole), and we will follow that practice in this thesis (to the risk of perhaps shocking some Northern Irish sensitivities).

[10] The case of Northern Ireland is more complex as Northern Ireland can also be seen as part of the nation Ireland.

Labour). In 1979, a first referendum on devolution was held. The majority of Scots who did participate in this referendum voted in favour, but the project did not obtain the support of 40% of the total electorate, a figure which had been set by the then Conservative British government as additional requirement before it could be implemented. In the 1992 general elections, the issue was again on the table, but the Conservatives, who opposed a new referendum on devolution, won the elections and were returned into power. In 1997, however, the Labour Party, which was one of the parties to have pledged support for a new referendum in 1992 (along with the Liberal Democrats and the SNP), replaced the Conservatives in Westminster, and implemented that measure. Seventy four % of Scots voted in favour of a Scottish Parliament and this latter became a reality in 1999, when the first elections for the Scottish Parliament took place.

The Scottish Parliament now possesses a large range of devolved powers over areas such as education, health, culture, and so on – although Westminster still legislates for the whole of the UK on issues like taxation, defence and foreign policy (as well as on all English affairs) and still determines the level of public funding in Scotland (through an arrangement called the 'Barnett Formula'). Thus, Scotland is still represented in Westminster, although there are moves to decrease its number of MPs in the near future. Representation in the two parliaments are decided by separate elections.

The research in this thesis took place between 2000 and 2003. At the time it started, the governing party in Westminster was Labour, with the Conservatives as the main opposition party and the Liberal Democrats coming third. This political landscape was not noticeably affected by the 2001 general elections for the Westminster Parliament, on which the study in Chapter 2 focused. Following the results of these elections (which are based on the 'First Past the Post' method), the Labour government was returned into power, with the Conservatives remaining the main opposition party. The Liberal Democrats remained the third most popular party, or the second party in the opposition.

The political representation in the Scottish Parliament at the time of this research was determined by the first Scottish Parliament election in 1999. In these elections (which are based on a combination of proportional representation and of the 'First Past the Post' method), Labour won the most seats and became the senior partner of a Labour-Liberal Democrat coalition forming the Scottish Executive. The

Scottish National Party, as mentioned above, confirmed its place as the second most popular party in terms of votes and won the highest number of seats in the opposition. The Conservatives came second in opposition. The Liberal Democrats were just behind the Conservatives, but became the junior partner in the governing coalition.

As far as the European Union is concerned, Scotland is not in itself a member of the EU, but it is part of the EU through the fact that it is part of the UK. The European Union is an international or supra-national organisation created by the Maastricht Treaty (formally the Treaty on European Union) signed in 1992. It is born out of the European Economic Community (EEC) founded in 1958. Originally, it was formed by 6 countries, not including the UK, but the UK joined in the first wave of enlargement in 1973. As its changing name suggests, the EU has evolved from a trade body into an economic and political union, with political integration gradually taking more and more importance over the years.

However, even more than for the UK, exactly what kind of body the EU is remains open to interpretation. The official line is that it is neither a new federal state nor a simple coalition of separate states, but something unique which strikes a balance between inter-governmental co-operation and 'supranationalism'. In practice, both methods of decision-making can indeed be found in the existing institutions. The tension between those two approaches remains ongoing, all the more debated in recent years with the enlargement of the EU to Eastern European countries. There are forces within Europe pulling in the two different directions.

CHAPTER II

THE STRATEGIC USE OF IDENTITY IN POLITICAL DISCOURSE : A STUDY OF SCOTTISH POLITICIANS

INTRODUCTION

As has been pointed out in Chapter 1, the theoretical framework of this thesis is mainly inspired by Reicher and Hopkins' (2001) research on national identities, and in many ways the present work aims to extend their insights and findings in the domain of attitudes to supra-national bodies. Consequently, it is only suitable that, empirically, our enquiry will also start very much from their work. Thus, in this chapter, and in direct continuity with their analyses, we will address the discursive and strategic constructions of identities and group relationships by looking at the discourses of 'entrepreneurs of identity' - more particularly Scottish politicians - concerned with promoting different political projects regarding the relationship of Scotland with Britain and the EU.

More specifically, our purpose in the present study is to look at what arguments are put forward by these politicians in order to sustain their political projects, and to show that these arguments are based on the construction of those aspects which our perspective predicts to be crucial in shaping attitudes towards superordinate groups, such as the definition of group identities, arguments of identity undermining/enhancement and accounts of the relationship between ingroup and outgroup(s).

By doing so, we aim to achieve two main objectives. On the one hand, we want to show that all political projects (and the politicians who advocate them), be they separatist or unionist, claim to speak in the name of national identity and its

interests. What differentiates these projects is not that some appeal to national identity while others do not; rather, it is the fact that they offer very different versions of what this identity consists of and/or how it is affected by the supra-national bodies, i.e. different constructions of the contents and context of identity (see Chapter 1). Thus, given that the politicians whose discourses we will analyse advocated very different political projects, we would expect to find great variability and fluidity in the way that they construct those aspects of identity. Our first purpose is to look at the richness and complexity of these different constructions. This should sustain our claim that, in issues of separatism and integration, what matters is not whether or not and to what extent identity is involved, but that we need to look at the specifics of contents and context in order to understand how particular projects are supported or opposed.

On the other hand, we want to show the strategic functionality of these discursive constructions, i.e. how they serve to sustain the projects of the speakers and how the variability at the level of arguments reflects the different but constant project of each speaker. Accordingly, we would expect to find a perfect consistency between their arguments and their projects. In other words, whereas there should be great complexity in terms of the constructions and arguments used by speakers, there should be a great simplicity at the level of the relationship between the arguments which are used and the political projects which are sustained.

In this respect, the present study also aimed to further and complement Reicher and Hopkins' work by attempting to address the criticism of selectivity which is sometimes formulated against the type of qualitative approach used by those authors. This was done in two ways. Firstly, rather than borrowing at will extracts and arguments from a large but undefined sample of speakers, our data was based on a circumscribed and systematic sample of politicians. That is, to be more concrete, the data was collected in the context of the British general election of 2001 during which the candidates for each party in a single constituency were interviewed (see method section), and we will rely only on the discourses of these candidates in order to establish our points. This methodological choice provided a safeguard against the possibility of selecting the exceptional individuals which would confirm our expectations while ignoring others (i.e. between-speakers selectivity).

Secondly, we also aimed to address concerns with within-speakers selectivity, i.e. the possibility of selecting within a single interview the arguments which confirm

our expectations while ignoring others. This was a more difficult goal to achieve, given that we also aimed to scrutinise in detail and in their richness the logic and consequences of identity arguments. As this could not be realistically performed for every single argument of each speaker, such detailed analysis will indeed have to be selective in its use of analytical examples. However, the solution we adopted was to add to this detailed analysis a systematic mapping of all of the speakers' arguments but presented in a summarised form. We will then try to show that, if our hypothesis and analysis of the logic of these arguments are correct, all of these arguments are consonant with speakers' political projects. The hope is that the detailed part of the analysis will provide the reader with the necessary tools in order to understand the implications of these arguments even when presented in a summarised format, rather than in their original extended wording.

Overall structure of the analysis

The analysis will be structured as follows. First of all, in part 1, which aims to set the background to our analysis, we will briefly review the positions of each of the candidates on what the status of Scotland should be in relation to Britain and the EU. We will also provide a brief overview of each interview, summarising the arguments made by each speaker individually and using as much as possible their own words. On the basis of this overview, but also on the basis of our theoretical perspective, we will then propose a classification of the different types of arguments which are used in order to sustain political positions.

Secondly, in part 2, which constitutes the main body of the analysis, we will examine in detail these different types of arguments, using selected examples and delineating their meaning and consequences - each section of this part being dedicated to a different type of argument. In particular, we will ask if the arguments encountered fulfil our expectations in terms of how they relate to and rely on identity constructions (e.g. questions of identity undermining/enhancement, etc.). Thus, this part of the analysis can be seen as a thematic analysis of the different arguments used, as well as a rhetorical/discursive analysis of how these argument work. However, we will also do slightly more than that, for, at the end of each section, we will summarise and systematise, this time in the light of our detailed analysis, what was actually argued by each speaker (if anything) on that particular level of

argument, comparing and contrasting directly their arguments. The aim will be to sustain our claim regarding the functionality of arguments by showing how the inter-individual variability in argument is systematically consonant with the inter-individual variability in political projects.

Thirdly, in part 3, as the analysis of the functionality of arguments can be reinforced by evidence of intra-individual variability, we will also briefly look at a few selected examples of such variability in some more detail.

METHOD

Material

The data was collected during the British general election campaign of June 2001. A single Scottish constituency was selected and the candidates of all major political parties standing for that constituency were interviewed, namely, the candidates for the Labour Party, the Scottish National Party (SNP), the Conservative Party, the Liberal Democrats, and the Scottish Socialist Party (SSP). For reasons of space limitation only, however, the interview with the SSP candidate, whose party is less important in terms of electoral support, will not be analysed here[1]. The full transcripts of the interviews are available from the author on request.

All the interviews followed a similar semi-structured format. That is, the interviewer had at his disposal a set of general questions (see Appendix 2.1) relating to the topics of interests, such as the status of Scotland within Britain and the EU, the impact of these body on Scotland, their attitude towards the Scottish Parliament, etc. However, these questions were designed mainly to serve as probes and as a set of loose guidelines in order to ensure that all relevant topics were being covered. Thus, in practice, the interviewer went from one point to another as a function of the evolution of the conversation, while the questions themselves were not necessarily formulated in the exact wording in which they were prepared. Also, some effort was made for these questions not to be too leading by phrasing them very generally. For instance, direct references to identity were avoided until the speaker himself or herself raised the issue. Of course, it must nevertheless be acknowledged that the questions remained leading to some extent (see discussion).

All interviews lasted between 45 and 90 minutes, with the exception of the Liberal Democrat candidate interview which lasted for 15 minutes (this was due to the fact that, as the sitting MP and a senior party figure, his time was very limited).

The interviewer also assisted and recorded a meeting, organised by the National Farmer Union (NFU), in which all candidates were present. In this meeting,

[1] It should also be noted that one candidate, who was standing for the 'Legalise Cannabis Alliance', was not interviewed. This choice was made not only because this is a party attracting only a very small minority of votes, but, more importantly, because this party does not in fact pursue an electoralist strategy (e.g. it has candidates only in a limited number of constituencies). Rather, this

all candidates first made a speech, which was followed by questions from members of the audience to which each candidate had the opportunity to react in turn.

Finally, a number of additional materials relating to the elections were also collected, such as party manifestos, leaflets, press releases, political broadcasts and newspapers. The collection of this material was mainly aimed at determining the general line of each party as regards the status of Scotland in relation to Britain and Europe, and at providing the context of the prevalent debates in this particular election. As a general rule, they are not used directly in the analysis. Where we make exceptions to this rule, it is in order to provide a contrast to the material from within the interviews itself and thereby to gain a better understanding of it.

Method of analysis

The method used in order to structure and develop the second and main part of our analysis was as follows. After several thorough readings of the transcripts of the interviews, the texts were broken up in different extracts which were all coded using general categories, representing different types of arguments (some extracts could belong to more than one category). The set of categories used was mainly determined theoretically and a priori and was reflected in the general questions prepared for the interviews. However, following an iterative processes, these categories also evolved as a function of the data itself and the process of its coding. We will therefore provide the details of these categories after we have been through the summarised descriptions of the interviews (see 1.2.5).

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party is more akin to a lobby using the elections as a platform to push the debate on the specific issue of cannabis.

Convention

Preserving anonymity was not a strong concern for the candidates, but the analysis will nevertheless refer to them using the following labels: Lab (Labour), Lib (Liberal Democrat), S (Scottish National Party), C (Conservative). As for the transcription of the interviews, the following conventions have been used:

word	stress
...	pause or hesitation
(?)	inaudible
.../further on/... or .../.../...	cut in the extract

ANALYSIS

1. BACKGROUND

1.1. Positions of the interviewees

In order to provide a starting point for the analysis, the first thing to do is to establish the nature of the political attitude of our interviewees towards the constitutional status of Scotland in Britain and of Scotland/Britain in Europe, relying on the official line of their party line and/or their own statements in the interview.

1.1.1. Attitudes to Britain

As we have seen in the introduction, the SNP is the main party fighting for Scottish independence. Consequently, not only does this party, and its interviewed candidate, oppose the Union, but they strive for more than a devolved Scottish parliament. They supported its creation insofar as they saw it as a step towards independence, and in that sense still support it. However, support for an unchanged parliament is now construed by this party as support for the status quo and thus support for the Union.

In the middle of the political spectrum on this issue come the Liberal Democrat and Labour parties and candidates. Their positions are very much the same: they argued for the creation of the parliament (and in the latter case implemented it), but at the same time do not want to break up the Union. They also are coalition partners in the parliament (see Chapter 1). Not only are they against independence, but, for the time being at least, they argue against any further change in the division of power between parliaments, thus supporting the status quo.

As far as the conservatives are concerned, they campaigned against the creation of the Scottish parliament and, as the full name of the Scottish Party indicates (The Scottish Conservative and Unionist Party), are the ones who state most strongly their commitment to Britain and to the Union. Although the official party line is now to accept the status quo and the reality of the Scottish parliament, i.e. a position formally similar to Labour and Liberals, their opposition to separatism

or even to any increase in the powers of the Scottish Parliament is put with even more emphasis than Labour or the Liberal Democrats.

Furthermore, taking some distance from this official line (but in agreement with the campaign against the parliament), the interviewed Conservative candidate actually argued directly against the Scottish parliament: *"I was against the Scottish parliament, and I'm still not convinced that it's gonna be a good thing, if you believe in the United Kingdom."* Although this means that C might not be completely representative of his party on this aspect (bearing in mind, however, that one might ask if he would use an argument quite like that if he was running in an election for the Scottish parliament and speaking in front of a Scottish audience), this is in fact quite fortunate for our purpose, as it provides the logical complement to the views of the other candidates.

1.1.2. Attitudes to Europe

The positions towards Europe are more complex than towards the Union. To start with, no extremes are represented in the parties under consideration, i.e. no one, either considering the speakers or the official party lines, is arguing for total withdrawal of the EU or for the creation of an European federal state. This makes all positions somewhat double-sided, i.e. everybody wants some integration and some separation, only to a greater or lesser extent. Moreover, debates about more or less integration or devolution depend much more on the area under consideration. It is possible to argue both ways, depending on the issue.

Nevertheless, if we try to summarise, perhaps in a somewhat caricatured way, in terms of the extent to which parties and candidates are generally more or less pro-European, then it would be fair to divide them in two camps, with the Conservatives at one end and all the others at the other end. This seems to be true at least on the main issue relating to Europe which was argued over during the elections campaign, i.e. the possible introduction of the Euro in Britain in the near future.

Thus, while the Conservatives might deny the label of 'anti-European' and do not argue for a total withdrawal from the EU, they are certainly the most resistant to European integration, as their main slogan during the campaign to 'Keep the Pound' illustrates, reflecting the fact that they opposed unconditionally the introduction of the Euro.

On the other hand, the SNP, Labour and the Liberals Democrats all define themselves as being pro-Europe (although, as it has been said, they would all oppose a federal state of Europe), and support more or less the possible introduction of the Euro. Perhaps it could be said that both the SNP and the Liberal Democrats are more pro-European than Labour, on the issue of the Euro at least (as Labour has made his support for the Euro highly conditional on economic conditions), but this is not of great importance for our purposes.

1.2. summaries of the interviews

Let us now provide a summary of each interview and of the main arguments used by each speaker in order to sustain their political projects.

1.2.1. The SNP candidate

This candidate stresses that there are deep differences between Scotland and England, in terms of type of economy, history, culture, language, law, ideas of sovereignty, attitude to Europe and other countries, etc...These differences are such that "*there's no such thing as a British person*" or as Britishness, and that she and the Scots do not feel British at all. Britain actually means England, for England has 'hijacked' the idea of Britishness. In that respect, she suggests that the English might not have quite given up their old imperialist outlook.

She then argues that the specific interests and priorities of Scotland, entailed by her differences, are not listened to by Westminster, because they are not priorities UK-wide. She stresses how little power Scotland has in the UK to say what she wants or does not want. Scotland is supposed to be an equal partner with England, but, because of their smaller number of MPs, the Scots cannot in fact defeat any measure from the English-dominated British government, even if all Scots agree to oppose it. She also suggests that it is not only a question of what type of government is in charge in Westminster, for Labour, who "*you would think would be sympathetic to Scotland*", also does not listen to Scotland. The problem is that any British government (and even Scottish politicians in that government) necessarily has to look after the interests of Middle England in order to win the elections, and thus has to ignore Scotland.

Thus, she underlines how Scotland has suffered economically under the Union, and continues to suffer under the present devolution settlement, which is not a good deal in terms of how Scotland is funded. However, this is not only about economics, for she also argues that, although the basic nature of the Scot is to be outward-looking, the problems created by the Union have forced them to be more inward-looking. She put forward independence as "*the only way to cure these ills*".

She also strongly denies that she or the SNP are anti-English, and that the wish for independence has anything to do with not liking the English. Where there are signs of anti-Englishness from the Scots, it is either in good humour, or, when it is serious, it is due to the resentment towards of the Union rather than to anti-English racism. Thus, one of the things independence would do is to promote a better relationship with England, where both groups stop complaining about each other all the time.

In fact, at one point, she also suggests that the problem does not come from the English people as such, for many parts of England are as resentful towards Westminster as the Scots. Rather, the problem is that Westminster thinks that "*what's right for London and the South East is right for the UK as whole*". In a way, these English regions are even worse off than the Scots for "*they don't have the kind of unifying cloth perhaps that we have, because we are a nation*".

She argues that a majority of Scots do indeed want independence but that they might not all vote SNP, because they might not like their left-of-centre approach. To these people she says that they should vote SNP at least once, in order to win independence, and that afterwards " *you would be free to vote whatever government you like, but it will be our government, in Scotland, working for you.*"

In relation to Europe, she argues that people in other European countries are not necessarily all very similar to each other and to the Scots (e.g. the Irish and the Italians are, but not the Germans), but what they do have in common is that, like the Scots, but unlike the English, they are outward-looking. This is because *"they've got all these land borders"* and because "*ever since the second World War, when the continent was torn apart, there's this great idea that we never ever want to see that kind of conflict again"*, which means "*they had to learn to live with each other"* and to be open to dialogue with each other.

She also repeatedly relates the issue of Britain to the issue of Europe, for another major negative effect of the UK precisely concerns the relation to Europe.

Indeed, although Europe could be beneficial to Scotland, this potential benefit is impeded by being part of the UK. On the one hand, she advocates the economic benefits of Europe, in particular the fact that Euro would be good for the type of economy Scotland has and that, as a consequence, most Scots do want it. However, if there is a vote on it, it will be rejected thanks to the votes of the English who oppose it. On the other hand, the Scots, being outward looking, have always been more pro-European, and as a result they would like to have fruitful exchanges with Europe (as they had in the past before the Union). But as it is the UK which deals with Europe, it is the reticent, inward-looking attitude towards Europe, typical of the English, which prevails.

This is not to say that Europe is always good for Scotland, but, more generally, the basic problem is that Scotland has no voice in Europe, either to agree or disagree with what comes from it, given that the UK does not and cannot represent her interests properly. This also explains why some Scots have anti-European feelings, for they blame Europe for some of its negative effects when they should blame the UK. Moreover, not only would Scotland have more power in Europe by being independent, but the British Isles as a whole would also have more influence as they would have more votes all together. Finally, she also says that being independent in Europe would raise the self-confidence of Scotland and by allowing her "*to get up off the substitute bench, and show what we can do.*"

1.2.2. The Conservative Candidate

This candidate argues mostly from a British point of view - he says that, given that he is of both English and Scottish descent, he feels both Scottish and English, but also that he feels British above all.

In relation to Europe, his major complaint is that the European Union erodes the sovereignty of the nation states, and of Britain in particular, and this can only lead to negative consequences.

At the general level, this is because different European countries have different identities, cultures and ways of life, and thus also different interests. Therefore trying to "*dictate to each other*" and impose uniformity means that some will necessarily suffer for the sake of others, which could lead to "*great disharmony*" and potential conflicts between nations when "*times get bad*" (as in ex-USSR after

the fall of communism). The nation states are the natural and proper locus of sovereignty, for people need to relate to their government and to their fellow nationals if they are to see this government as legitimate and accept to sacrifice their interest for others. But there is no common identity in Europe, as opposed to the States of America for instance, so people could not relate to a European state.

On top of that, Europe is led by "*a lot of unelected bureaucrats*" who try to harmonise everything against the will of people, are too prescriptive with their binding treaties, and follow a rulebook which does not suit specific situations and the interests of specific countries.

Thus, for all these reasons, what Europe destroys is such universal values as democracy, freedom, the right to disagree, innovation, the right to have a separate culture, etc. On the other hand, Europeans countries could have fruitful trade relations and learn from each other as long as they do not try to dictate to each other. Thus he argues that the EU should be limited to promote such trade relations and economical exchanges, but nothing more.

Applying this reasoning to Britain in particular, he thus argues that Britain runs the risk of having policies imposed that are unsuited to its particular interest. He also gives a few examples of the way the British way of life is already being eroded, and stressed that this loss can only worsen if more sovereignty is lost to Europe, in particular by giving up the Pound for the Euro. Britain needs to keep its sovereignty in order to be able to follow its interests and keep its way of life.

As regards Scotland being part of Britain, the situation is quite different from Europe (and he directly compares the two). First of all, although he acknowledges that Scotland has its own identity and specificity, he stresses that Scots have also a lot in common with other people in Britain – and certainly more than with other European countries -, in terms of common history, family and trade links, etc., and that it "*it's a nonsense to try undo that*". Secondly, he argues that Scotland has not lost his sovereignty in Britain – for Scotland could be independent anytime she wants, if enough people vote SNP –, nor has she lost her specific national identity, which is respected within Britain ("*it doesn't mean that, because we are united with England, that, you know there is anything wrong in being patriotic as a Scot*").

Furthermore, he underlines the advantages for Scotland to be in Britain, and thus what would be lost with independence. There is the economic benefit of a bigger market, but also the fact of being part of a powerful state, which means having "*a*

bigger voice" on the international scene and that "*we can contribute more to overseas as a Union.*", a fact which also affects standards of living and defence.

Finally, he argues that the danger of the Scottish Parliament is that with time it will tend to assume a life and "*an identity of its own*" and that it will create different systems and divisions between Scotland and England, especially if different parties get in power North and South. This "*will make the Scottish identity reassert itself*", and give arguments to the SNP who can pick up on those divisions. Ultimately, it will "*make nationalism stronger*", and "*fuel the move towards independence*", although originally Scots do not really want independence (and would have rejected it if that had been the question in the referendum on the Parliament). The creation of the Parliament was also unfair for the English who were not consulted on the devolution settlement, have now less autonomy than Scotland, and might end up paying more taxes as a result.

More generally, the wish for independence amongst Scots is created by dissatisfaction with the economy and an incompetent government (i.e. Labour), as was also the case before Thatcher came in power. But another danger of the Parliament is precisely that it will make it difficult to identify who is responsible for political decisions, and as a result people could end up blaming Westminster instead of the Scottish Parliament.

1.2.3. The Labour candidate

The Labour candidate displays considerable ambivalence about Scottish identity and about the relationship between Scottishness and Englishness.

First, she suggests that Scotland is far too diverse to be summarised in terms of simple traits. Those things which are sometimes use to represent Scottishness – the kilt, traditional music, Scots language – actually represent only one view of Scotland which is danger of being out of touch with what is happening in contemporary Scotland.

Second, although she acknowledges that "*there's a cultural and historical difference*" between Scotland and England, she argues that "*we're not two separate countries*" given that "*there is a lot of families in Scotland who have their relatives in England*" and that there is "*very much a shared culture*" between Scotland and England, so much so that it is actually quite difficult to distinguish them. As a result,

she says that she feels equally Scottish and British. She also argues that, although she *"would like to think"* that Scotland *"is a more progressive, a more tolerant, a more socially inclusive society"* and is *"more European"* than England, she doesn't think this is actually the case. Moreover, she stresses that differences between regions of Scotland can be sometimes be as important, if not more, than differences with England.

Third, she argues that, even if there might be some cultural differences, at bottom people Scotland and England share very much the same needs and priorities: *"the problems of people living in Glasgow can be much the same as the problems of people living in Manchester."* If there are any difference in priorities, *" a lot of it's to do with differences in systems, and the way in which the different countries managed under the last government."* Under the previous Conservatives governments, lead by Margaret Thatcher, Scotland and England have developed somewhat different systems (e.g. in terms of public services and education) because Labour was stronger in Scotland. Hence this is not an inherent cultural difference, but one dependent upon particular political circumstances.

When it comes to institutions and supra-national bodies, she argues that this is precisely what the Scottish Parliament was created for. That is, it answered to these different needs created by slightly different systems, as well as to a political and democratic need to make *"people in Scotland being much closer to politicians, rather so much than an expression of the Scottish identity."* The Scottish parliament does not represent Scottish identity and should not be seen as being about identity. The wish for a parliament '*came out of how Scotland fell under Conservatism*' which *"focused the need that we didn't really want that to happen again."* She stresses that *"it's quite related to recent history"*, rather than being related to the nationalist picture of *"a gradual drive for Scotland to be independent."*.

Thus, she argues that there is no real desire amongst Scottish people for greater Scottish autonomy. When it seems that there is, it is because of the noise made by the media and the SNP – but the fact that the SNP does not have the majority in the Parliament proves that the majority Scots are not very concerned by the issue. Under conservatism, there was a surge of support for the SNP and independence, and of apparent anti-Englishness, but it was *"born out of poverty and frustration"* created by Thatcherism, and by the feeling that Scots were ignored and *"being ruled by a distant parliament"* , an illusion also created by the Conservative

governments. However, along with the Labour Party, *"the Scottish parliament has been a long way to resolve that"*.

Moreover, Scotland was not alone in its frustrations, others in many parts of the UK (e.g. the North of England) shared similar views. Thus, what can sometimes look like anti-Englishness is actually an anti 'yuppy' culture which people in Manchester felt as much as people in Glasgow. She argues that the *"resentment comes through class more than through nationality."* and *"came out of a feeling that England, you know had better employment, were wealthier"*.

She also stresses repeatedly that Scotland does well in the UK. For Scotland, *"there's economical benefits, but there is also social benefits"* from being part of Britain. Conversely, there are very real social as well as economic dangers from autonomy. At several points she alludes to a tendency towards being parochial, insular and isolationist, which is at odds with how she would like Scotland to be. She suggests that independence is a rather backward looking 'old fashioned' concept.

In terms of Europe, she denies that Scots see themselves as particularly European, but she argues that she would like them to, for being in Europe, as being in the UK with England, gives one a sense of being part of a wider society. This works against the danger of Scotland becoming more parochial. There is also, as for the UK, financial and social benefits from being in Europe (e.g. legislation on Trade Unions and working rights). The problem is that people are not always aware it comes from Europe, and also the fact that the anti-European 'tabloid media' misrepresent Europe.

Conversely, she denies that Europe imposes policies and regulations that harm the UK and Scotland. She dismisses such stories as often relating to things that are unimportant (e.g. the metric system). Or, if there are problems, it has to do with regulations per se, which are *"a fact of life"*, rather than anything specifically European about it. Moreover, the objections tend often to come from businessmen about policies (like the minimum wage) which actually benefit ordinary people.

She also dismisses the idea of 'being imposed' by Europe on the basis that the UK is part of it and thus able to shape what Europe is and does (and/or uses its veto in cases of disagreement) – especially since Labour has a more co-operative approach to Europe than the isolationist Conservatives, allowing the UK to have more influence in Europe. In that respect, she also suggests that, alone, Scotland

would be marginal and have little influence in Europe. By contrast, the UK is powerful and it does speak on behalf of Scotland.

1.2.4. The Liberal Democrat Candidate

Like the Labour candidate (but to a lesser extent), the Liberal Democrat candidate displays some ambivalence regarding Scottishness and its relation to Englishness. In terms of what defines the Scots, this candidate argues that Scots do have some specific traits compared to the English (e.g. less formal, more open and welcoming), but on the other hand he doubts that "*their interests are significantly different from anywhere else in the United Kingdom. Family, job, recreation, things of that kind, I don't think there's anything particular* ".

He then characterises the relationship of Scotland with England "*as like being in bed with an elephant*". That is, it is true that when you live with a stronger partner and "*when the other partner turns over in bed, sometimes it does so without having regard to the fact they may crush the partner that's in bed with it.*" Moreover, he suggests that, because they have long been "*dominated by a much larger English population*" in the Union, Scots have had in the past a certain sense of inferiority.

However, he also stresses that "*the relationship is an evolving one*". During the Thatcher years, the relationship was "*abrasive, antagonistic*", because Thatcher was bossy and dictatorial and because the Scots, being chauvinists, "*don't like being told what to do*", particularly by the English. He also suggests that, as a result, Thatcher acted as a '*recruiting sergeant*' for the SNP. However, he hopes that "*home-rule* (i.e. devolution) *will provide a safety valve for that.*" and "*will make Scotland more self-confident, more self-possessed, less concerned about its relationship with England*".

Thus he rejects the idea that there is a need for independence, for Scotland is stronger and enjoys financial advantages by being in Britain. Moreover, the Scots are "*very canny*" and "*cautious*", and as a result, he do not see "*any real mood...in Scotland for a further constitutional upheaval until we have digested this and seen whether it is to our liking*"

In relation to Europe, he mentions that there is a "*view that Scotland is more sympathetic towards Europe and the European Union*" than the rest of the UK, although "*it's not always borne out by opinion polls*". There is in fact some

resistance to Europe in Scotland, but this is affected by the UK-wide "*propaganda of the anti-European newspapers*". On the other hand, he rejects the 'cultural perception' that Scotland is closer to Europe than to the rest of the UK and that "*there is any particular affinity between Scotland and any other European country*" (although he does mention an affinity between the Scottish and European system of laws).

Nevertheless, being in Europe certainly benefits Scotland economically, and he raises the question of whether this benefit will not be threatened if the UK does not join the Euro (which his party supports). On the other hand, he suggests that Europe has had no particular positive or negative effect on the cultural life. He also argues that, as with Scotland in the UK, there should be a similar devolution in Europe, and that some of the powers which have been given to Brussels should be 'repatriated', for "*we should use Brussels if necessary, but the presumption should always be in favour of the individual state*".

He also stresses that "*the unit of representation in Europe should be United Kingdom. I think there's only a limited area in which Scotland need to have a separate and distinct voice, principally probably on fishing. But in virtually every other element of the relationship between United Kingdom parliament and the European Union, then Scotland is better represented by the fact that this is done on a UK-EU basis rather than a Scotland-EU basis.*"

1.2.5. Structure of the analysis

On the basis of our theoretical perspective, but also on the basis of our data which we just gave an overview of, the arguments used by the interviewees can be organised into four different categories - which will determine the structure of the following analysis:

1. 'Reality' arguments: arguments over what groups/identities are real and relevant to the issues.
2. 'Content' arguments: arguments over definitions of the groups and their related wishes.
3. 'Impact' arguments: arguments over the impact of the superordinate group on the ingroup.

4. 'Relationship' arguments: arguments over the relationship with outgroup(s) within the superordinate group

Let us give some preliminary explanation of these four categories. As we can see from the summaries, a first level of argument takes place on what can be seen as the most basic level of identity constructions, i.e. establishing what are the very identities at stake and relevant to the issues. As we will see in more detail, the main kernel of dispute in this respect lies in the question of what identities are real, as opposed to unreal or artificial. Although this reality of particular identities can often be taken for granted, it can also be articulated and argued over directly for at least two reasons. First of all, their reality is an obvious prerequisite for them to be relevant, and thus to argue about their content, interests and relationships. Where there are practices and/or political arguments which seem to challenge this reality, it might sometimes be necessary to provide an explicit account which counters this particular form of undermining. Secondly, however, the use of 'reality' arguments is not only preparatory or defensive. Indeed, with the help of some ideological resources, arguments over the 'reality' or 'artificiality' of identities can also constitute arguments for political projects in their own right. This is what justifies treating them as a separate category of arguments and is precisely one of the main points we will try to show in analysing them.

While this first category of arguments deals with the question of what is the very self (or selves) at stake in issues of national self-interest, the three others concern arguments over the nature of this self-interest and how it stands in relation to the outgroup(s) and the superordinate group. Thus, the second category regroups arguments over the definition of groups and their interests. In the main, these consist in arguments whereby speakers directly define the political aspirations of Scots (e.g. do the majority of Scots want independence or not?), or define the content of ingroup identity (e.g. stereotypes, values, norms) in such a way that it has direct implications for what political attitudes Scottish people hold or should hold (see Chapter 1). Speakers also often provide arguments countering evidence which might seems to contradict their views on what the Scots want. Overall, the implication of this type of argument is to make the speaker's project representative of (and allowing the fulfilment of) the ingroup's aspirations.

Thirdly, political projects can be sustained by defining the effects of being part of Britain and/or Europe on Scotland. Indeed, granted that the relevant categories in the issue have been settled, probably the most obvious basis for argument is whether union or separation is a good or a bad thing for the point of view of ingroup's interests. Obviously, this includes economic considerations, but the arguments usually do not stop there and also define the impact of the superordinate group on ingroup identity. That is, political projects do not just pretend to champion the national interest in any narrow sense, e.g. purely in terms what can be called 'real' resources and rewards (Geertz, 1993; Sherif, 1966; Sherif et al., 1961), but, at a deeper level, they are constructed as enhancing or else undermining the national self. In fact, one could ask whether the two can really be distinguished, for it can be argued that what is seen as the ingroup's interests, including in terms of economy and real rewards, is dependent upon the definition of its identity.

Finally, political projects can be justified by arguments over the nature of the relationship between Scotland and the other national groups present in the common group, i.e. mostly England in relation to Britain, and the other European countries in relation to the E.U. That is, speakers can argue whether (and in what ways) the ingroup and outgroup(s) identities and interests converge or diverge from each other (incompatibility or compatibility). Combined with considerations about their power relationship, this determines whether they can successfully be brought together or not and whether or not they can enjoy a positive relationship under different political arrangements or projects.

To be sure, these four categories are bound to be overlapping ones, and, more often than not, extracts could be classified in several categories (this will be reflected by numerous cross-references in the analysis). Nevertheless, analytically speaking, they can still be usefully distinguished.

Thus, for instance, arguments over impact (3) and over relations (4) do of course contain many group definitions. However in these cases what matters is not so much the precise nature of group identities, but rather the way this content (whatever it is) is affected by being part of the superordinate group (3), or the way it relates to other identities (4). Another way to put it is that, in the first case, content itself and on its own has implications for political attitudes, whereas in the latter cases its implications only comes from being part of broader constructions involving other elements and/or other definitions.

Likewise, the very purpose of arguments concerning relations (4) is, as for 'impact' arguments (3), to underline the consequences, for the ingroup, of being part of a common group with the other subgroups with whom its relationships are delineated. The difference is that 'impact' arguments do not necessarily rely on an explicit account of these relationships: the national interest can be taken for granted, or a specific ingroup definition proposed, and then the negative or positive impact of union on those aspects can be underlined. On the other hand, in 'relationship' arguments, the consequences in terms of the impact of the superordinate group on the national self and its interests, though undoubtedly present, can remain more implicit. All of this will become clearer as we go through the data.

2. ANALYSIS OF ARGUMENTS

2.1.What identities are real and relevant? What is the self of self-interest?

Before analysing how arguments at this level can be used to sustain political projects, let us first look briefly at how the relevance and reality (or unreality) of categories can be rhetorically achieved, by looking at instances where explicit argumentative work is done for that purpose.

2.1.1. How is reality constructed?

In line with SCT's meta-contrast principle (see Chapter 1), it might be expected that the most common ways of establishing the reality of categories is by emphasising the homogeneous of nature of the groups (Turner et al., 1987) and/or by stressing its specificity in relation to other groups (i.e. maximising intergroup differences as well as minimising intragroup ones).

It is perhaps the Conservative candidate who provides the best illustrations of this type of argument, for amongst all others this candidate puts the most explicit efforts into constructing the reality of the ingroup. For him, however, it is mainly Britain and British identity which are argued to be real rather than Scotland and Scottish identity. For that reason, his argument is double-sided, as it is aimed at defending the reality of this British identity both against the larger superordinate group (Europe) and against subgroup cleavages within (i.e. Scotland/England). Accordingly, C emphasises both what is shared between Scots and English and what separates them as a whole from other European nations in order to establish the reality of Britain and British identity:

Extract 1

C:...what is nation, basically? It's people who've got things in common. They live in a geographically identifiable place, in our case it's easily defined, it's the British Isles. But, there's always been, you know, I mean an area where, you've got the French and the Germans, and the Italians living, and that's just, you know, those circumstances, the natural boundaries take part of it. They change obviously,

*em...but that's, ... a common language comes into it,.../*further on/*...people are different, basically. I mean, you know we have different food, different languages.../.../... we are separate nations*

In relation to the commonality between Scotland and England, C added further on that:

Extract 2

C: ... we're on the same lump of land, we've been there for, the historical connections have always been, you know France, and Scotland versus England or the rest of it, but that's, that's quite distant now. But I mean the main Commons Act is a more recent common history of 300 years of the union. And the trades and the links, em, family links, links all way down from the Crown through the parliaments into the families.

Overall, the closeness of Scotland and England is stressed by invoking a common history and culture, language, family ties, trade links, etc. and at the same time by stressing that this is not something shared with other European countries. Let us note though that the reference to links (in terms of family and trade) suggest that there might be more to the story than only a question of similarity and differences, for links might not be equivalent to similarities between people.

Nevertheless, similarities/commonalities and differences of various kinds do undoubtedly play an important role in constructing real identities. However, one can be more specific than that. For reasons we will explain below, it can be important to construct the group not only as real, but more specifically as a nation. Thus, as we can also see from the extracts above, the arguments often use specific criteria which are usually associated (or argued to be so) with nationhood: language, history, territory, etc. And through the use of those criteria, C does not only argue that British identity is real but he also explicitly claims nationhood for that identity and that Britain is a nation. In other words, it is not just any kind of similarity or difference

which is used, but similarities and differences on (conventionally) national dimensions.

It must be pointed out, however, that insisting on the reality of one category does not necessarily mean that one cannot acknowledge the reality of other identities. Thus, for instance, when confronted with the question of Scottish specificity, C does not deny such specificity - a gesture which would have obvious threatening implications for Scotland. Nevertheless, there are ways in which subgroup identities can be accommodated while keeping the level of group identity that matters for the speaker both real and most relevant. For instance, differences within a group can be made less important than similarities. This can be done in terms of 'quantity', i.e. using the meta-contrast principle, as in C's argument that despite some differences between Scotland and England "*they have more in common with each other than they do with continental countries.*". The implication is that while there can indeed be real differences within a group (i.e. intragroup homogeneity is far from absolute), this does not necessarily mean that this group identity cannot be real. That is, if intra- and intergroup similarities and differences are balanced (i.e. the meta-contrast principle), Britain vs. European countries represents a relevant and truthful way of categorising people, and thus 'British' is a real identity. Alternatively, or in combination, differences can also be downplayed 'qualitatively', i.e. made peripheral or trivial as compared to commonalities which are made central, as the following extract shows:

Extract 3

C: Well, they have a lot in common, a lot they have in uncommon, as far as you like (laugh). But yes, there are, there's a lot of arguments about Bannockburn and everything else that goes on, but it's almost an amusement.../.../...So there is, there's a danger being too fixed on what's happened in the past.../.../... And, you know, Scotland and England got on fine. When there is an outside threat, they pull together better. Lords fought together in wars, etc.../.../... So that's, we've done things together, we have the common, the British commonwealth and, together, and those things don't go away.

Moving to the next point, the corollary of arguments over reality is, as we can also see in extract 1 in relation to Europe, that deconstructing this reality and arguing

the unreality of an identity is characteristically done by denying commonalities between groups. However, it is worth noting that the argument can go further than that and posit the artificiality of an identity. Indeed, it can also be argued that the voices which propose such identities as real and relevant are not only wrong but are in fact actively trying to impose similarity on real differences and thereby to create by force an illegitimate identity, as one of C's argument against Europe (following directly extract 3) again illustrates:

Extract 4

C: *...and those things don't go away. And this creation, trying to...trying to create something, by people who aren't even elected and want to sit there and write things down and tell us how to behave, that's where it's wrong. I mean, I'm quite prepared to accept that, maybe, you know, a single Europe will develop in time, but you don't do it by going around and saying, right, there's a deadline, tomorrow, we're suddenly gonna change our passports, change our money, and everything is gonna be different. It's not real life, it doesn't work in that way.../.../...And the whole thing has just become driven by political engineering, and it's not what people want.../.../...it's the bureaucrats that sort of, be trying to harmonise everything.*

More than simply unreal, such identities then fully deserve the label of 'artificiality', in the sense of being fabricated by (interested) human hands, rather than, say, through the natural evolution of history. This also has specific implications that we will see below.

Finally, another way to deconstruct specific categories is to use an alternative set of categories. For instance, it can be argued that class categories present a better way of reading reality and thus are more real than national categories. This is illustrated by Lab's argument that frustrations with the UK government are not limited to Scotland but characterise many other parts of the UK, because it is fundamentally a class resentment against Conservative rule (see 1.2.3). This point shows that not only any particular national category, but also national categories altogether, should not be taken for granted.

However, the general dominance of national categories is illustrated by the fact that, although alternative categories are possible, they are the ones which have to

be argued over against national categories rather than vice-versa. As Billig has argued (1991), the onus of argument tells much of what is the dominant common sense.

2.1.2 Consequences of reality and unreality

As we have suggested above (see 1.2.5), the reality of (national) groups is not only a prerequisite for their relevance, and for using the kind of arguments concerning identity definitions and interests that we will explore in the next sections, but it can also be used directly as an argument sustaining particular political positions. At bottom, this is made possible by the fact that, as some research has suggested, groups to which a feeling of reality is attached tend to be likened to (collective) individuals or macro-subjects, with their own agency, desires, interests and rights (Hamilton & Sherman, 1996; Sacchi & Castano, 2000). Thus, making a group real identifies the relevant political actor or person whose agency, interests and rights matters, and it becomes not only possible, but also legitimate, to make claims and political demands based on the those interests and rights (Roosens, 1989). Indeed, once the group is seen as an agent in its own right, it is possible to invoke culturally accepted principles which dictate or regulate the rights of moral persons, such as for instance the modern ideologies of individual freedom and self-determination or of egalitarianism. Let us now look at the different ways this can used to sustain different political claims.

a) Advocating separatism

Let us start with an extract from the SNP candidate, where the reality of Scotland is taken for granted but nevertheless essential to the claim made. Following a comment that independence would allow Scotland to be an equal partner with England, S was asked whether that meant that the present distribution of power within the UK was not fair :

Extract 5

S: *It's not. I mean, if you look at it logically, the idea was well, you know, we're partner, you know, Scotland and England are equal powers and equal partners. Well, how many companies, or, you know, businesses do you know where one equal partner has only 73 votes, and the other equal power has, what, over 500 votes. It's not very equal. Every, you know, every MP from Scotland, Wales and Ireland could vote the same way against the government, and then still lose. Which means technically there is absolutely no way that we can defeat a measure.*

In this passage, the distribution of power is described as unfair by invoking an egalitarian rule, which in our societies constitutes undoubtedly a valid principle to appeal to. But that judgement of unfairness is also made possible because it presupposes that the relevant unit to consider are the national categories of Scotland and England (and Wales and Ireland), rather than, say, the individuals who compose it. That is, it relies on a group-level rather than an individual-level rule of equity (Azzi, 1992, 1994). It is Scotland and England themselves, and not the individual Scots and English, who are the 'partner' in the Union; in other words, Scotland is viewed as an individual on its own, and it is this collective subject which should be equal to other national units in the Union. In case this might seem obvious, it can be contrasted to constructions which do indeed use individuals as the relevant unit in judgements of equity. If such arguments did not appear in the interviews, it is something that came out in the feedback we obtained from participants in our survey study (see Chapter 3). Indeed, commenting on questions on the distribution of power, some participants underlined that it was only fair in a democratic context that the English get more power as there are simply more of them. Thus, the reality of the group can be used to influence the processes of distribution of resources in a way that takes categories as relevant (Klein, 1999; Klein & Azzi, 2001a). Here the resource in question is procedural, i.e. power, and thus it amounts to a claim for more autonomy.

However, this does not mean that the reality of a group is always in itself sufficient to ground the specific claim which most interests us, i.e. a claim for a separate state. The precise nature of the rights of collective individuals are also very much dependent on the specific ideology attached to them, i.e. the broader theory concerning the nature of the groups under consideration. In particular, in a world of

nations, it is through nationhood that statehood can be claimed (Billig, 1995; see Chapter 1). Thus those who makes such claims need to present the group as a (real) nation, with a real national identity, and not only as any group, however real it might be. Claims of statehood based on other groups might not be impossible, but are quite unlikely to be successful in the international arena of nation states, where it is the individual 'nation' which deserves sovereignty.

This need to be a nation in order to claim statehood appears for instance in a comparison that S made in the interview between Scotland and the English regions. At one point S underlined that, like Scotland, a lot of the English regions often complain about the British government; but that unfortunately for them there is a big difference between them and nations like Scotland:

Extract 6

S:...it's not just Scotland and Wales. Time and time again in the election, I've had this happening to me.../.../...I bump into people from say, Durham, or Cumbria, or the rest of it, and they will literally come up and say, all power to your elbow, I hope you win, and when you do, will you move the border South, so we can be in Scotland, not England.../.../...there's people in Newcastle, or County Durham, or in Liverpool, Tyneside, they're really just as hacked off as the Scots. But they don't have...the kind of... unified cloth perhaps that we have, because we are a nation. They're English regions. I mean they are England, and perhaps you feel sorry for them because they haven't the same cloth.

English regions are not nations and, though the exact reason for this is left ambiguous (e.g. whether because it would be illegitimate or undoable due to lack of unified mobilisation), what is clear is that this is why they cannot aspire to independence for themselves, despite being real entities and having good reasons to resent the British government, and why they would therefore like to do as the Scots.

By contrast, nations like Scotland and Wales do not suffer such limitations. Thus being a nation allows one to make claims based on the principle of national sovereignty, such as the following made by S in the NFU meeting: "*We have a parliament, but it has very limited powers. We stand for completing these powers. Bringing them back to Scotland and equipping the Scottish people with the same*

powers as every other modern nation." Such a claim here is more than a claim based on a general ideology of freedom and self-determination which should be applied to any real group. Indeed, what is claimed here is simply for Scotland to get what every nation deserves, and what every other nation except Scotland already has. Scotland is denied unfairly this universal good. Thus, making such a claim is only possible thanks to the broadly accepted principle of national sovereignty, and given the taken for granted fact that Scotland is indeed a nation.

b) Defending the existing (separate) state

If the principle of national sovereignty can be used to claim a new statehood, it can also be used to defend an existing one. Thus many instances of explicit use of the principle of national sovereignty and that the state should be co-extensive to the nation can be found in C's interview as well, where they aim at protecting British sovereignty against European integration. As we have seen above, for C, the existing European states match the reality of national identities and cover real differences and similarities. More than an ideological principle, it is reified in C's discourse as a natural order: "*No, I mean, looking at the big long-term, I don't think that the nation-state came around, about, by accident, I mean we're in a nation-state with groupings that we are alright, because that's natural."* In that natural-like order, the state must correspond to nations, and the nation is self-sufficient as a principle to ground separation of government. Given the reality and nationhood of British identity, it is thus the British state (and not Europe) which is legitimate and corresponds to a reality. By creating a situation where "*Britain's sovereignty is being eroded",* what Europe is attacking is the very basic principle of the nation-state, and therefore it represents a illegitimate, unnatural (and even dangerous, as we will see further) attack on a real, almost natural order.

In sum, we can see that, despite being at odds in terms of the content of their political projects, both the SNP and the conservative candidates are using exactly the same ideological principle of national sovereignty. It is used as a resource which can be applied for different purposes, depending on what the relevant level of identity is argued to be. This can be further illustrated by the fact that, in the NFU meeting, S was able to say, in reference to some of C's comments: " *Just...there is one thing that* /the conservative candidate/ *said that I can agree with, absolutely completely.*

He said we have to stand up for ourselves and control our own destiny.", before going on to argue for Scottish independence. The difference between those two candidates is of course that they apply the principle at different levels, because they construct different categories as real and national, and thus we can see why it can be important to argue directly about what are the identities which are real and national and should be taken into account. Those who make claims to statehood based on the principle of national sovereignty need to construct the ingroup as a nation, or else to take for granted that it is one.

c) Undermining separatism

Finally, yet another use of the reality of an identity can be to undermine separatism within a group which is argued to be a real nation. Thus, while C's argument concerning the reality of Britain and British identity is used to oppose Europe and its unreal identity, it is also used to argue that separatism as undermining something important, i.e. the reality of British identity. Indeed, when C was asked if he felt Scottish, he answered by the affirmative and added:

Extract 7

C:...my grandmother is Scottish, you know, so...And this is one of the, one of the, the difficulties for me in the United Kingdom, is that, there are so many families that are a cross between English and...and marriages and mixed-up, etc., and because, you know, it's a nonsense to try undo that, that's taken 300 years to get that way...

Given that there is a strong, authentic British identity, based on 300 years of history, it means that it would actually be artificial to try distinguish strongly between Scotland and England and to undo their Union, i.e. to separate them by independence ('*it's a nonsense to try undo that*'). Far from redrawing state lines in order to correspond to people's real identities, what separatism does is actually to create artificial differences and separate identities where an overlap and a common identity exist (this also applies to the Scottish parliament: see C's summary). But an important point to note here is that such an argument for Britain and Britishness does not prevent this speaker from claiming Scottishness for himself as well as speaking

in the name of Scottishness. Quite the opposite, his claim is that it is because he is part Scottish that he is sensitive to the mixed reality of Britain and Scotland. He argues that the category of Britishness reflects a crucial aspect of the reality of contemporary Scotland, and therefore that any attempt to deny that, to isolate Scotland from Britain, does violence to that reality, and undermine a key characteristic of the reality of present-day Scottishness.

More defensively, C also rejects separatism by denying that Britain has undermined the reality and the specificity of Scotland, as we will see in point 2.3. What is interesting to note here, however, is that in such an argument the principle of national sovereignty still shows its pull indirectly, by the fact that, given that he acknowledges Scottish specificity and the reality/nationality of Scotland, he is also led to deny Scotland has lost its sovereignty within Britain, thereby acknowledging that it is indeed an unalienable right of nations:

Extract 8

C:...*if Scotland really wants to be independent, then there's nothing to stop them from exercising this sovereignty, because they are sovereign. And they simply have to do it by electing 40 or 50 Scottish Nationalist MPs, who can then go to Westminster and say, we have a mandate, and we want to negotiate independence, and do it in a civilised way, it can be done. So even though, there's 300 years of Union, that doesn't mean Scotland has lost its sovereignty, and people don't understand that.*

2.1.3. Consequences of artificiality

If there are political projects which are grounded in and reflect real, authentic identities, and therefore can legitimately claim the rights which such real groups and nations are usually granted, the other side of the coin, as we have seen, is that the identities hailed by opponents can be deconstructed as unreal, with the consequence of picturing their projects as illegitimate and illusory. Yet matters can be even worse. That is, political projects can be described as seeking to create and impose an artificial identity on people in order to mobilise them for the wrong cause.

Thus, for instance, in sharp contrast with C, for S British identity is defined as an artificial construct.

Extract 9

S: We always have a little chuckle up here in...in the 1997 election, John Major tried to save this government, talked about a thousand years of British history. And we're sort of going, what is this?.../.../...I should point out right here and now, when anyone else asks me about Britishness, I say, I never have been British, I am not British, and never will be British, I am a Scot. I see myself first as Scottish, and then as part of Europe. Scotland is a nation within Europe. So I am Scottish, I'm European, I'm not British. There's no such thing as a British person. They're English, Irish, Scottish or Welsh.

In this extract, S denies any credibility and legitimacy to discourses which would be based on British identity, not only for herself and the Scots, but for everybody in Britain. Not only does she not feel British, but British identity does not exist. What is real is the level of subgroup nationality (Scottish, Welsh, etc.). So Britain is described as a fragmented country, with the implication that no one can legitimately speak for Britain as a whole. Indeed, if British identity is an illegitimate construction, it is thus also illegitimate, as the example of John Major implies, to make a discursive use of it in order to try mobilise people and pretend to speak on behalf of the British people. He might be speaking for part of Britain, but certainly not for the Scots, who in fact cannot be fooled by it ("*we always have a little chuckle up here...*").

Moreover, with this John Major example, S not only denies reality and legitimacy to British identity, she also underlines the artificial and interested character of such a creation. British identity is something that politicians like John Major try to put in the heads of people in order to serve their political purpose (here to save the British government). From there the gap is short to arguing that Britain not only does not represent but actually does violence to the reality of identities, and that Britain is not only an unreal collective self but in fact hides another self in disguise. That is, that British identity is actually a mask for English identity, and a mode of domination which undermines the right to self-determination of people, rather than a legitimate level of identification (Reicher & Hopkins, 2001). But this is going too far ahead of our argument for now (see point 2.2.2). What matters here is

that, if unreality can undermine a project, the implication of a 'forced creation' construction is that it pushes this undermining and illegitimacy a step forward, by emphasising their calculated nature and the fact that they reflect alien interests.

Furthermore, if we now look at one of the consequences that C draws from his argument concerning the artificiality of European identity (see extracts 1 and 4), another possible implication of 'artificiality' arguments also appears. What this speaker argues is that, if the lack of a real identity makes a project unrealistic, trying to overcome it by a forcing an artificial identity on people is not only illegitimate, but also dangerous and potentially catastrophic. Indeed, the fact that it is forced on naturally divergent identities (i.e. incompatibility: see section 2.4) means that conflict will inevitably surface if that will is removed and/or if we are in bad times:

Extract 10

C: *OK, and if you look at the Soviet Union, for 80 years they were run as one government, and for all the world was told that was united, wonderful place, but a lot of us doubted that, a lot of people who believed in it here, you know had the eyes open when it all came apart. And despite that political engineering, it was actually, you know they were, they were brought together by force, by political power into the Soviet Union. And when you remove that political power, you find that the Chechens are still Chechen, and the same thing in Yugoslavia, and, I mean all the other clumsy and difficulties that's happening, is <u>because,</u> this is just a reassertion of people's original identities that, those, they were suppressed. And I don't want us going to a system where, you know, where pretending that those differences don't exist, because if the cement then goes for some reason, then, the disharmony comes, and that's, I mean call a spade a spade, the French would burn British lamb, you know, and that sort of thing goes all the time. Now, if everything is wonderful in the garden and its a lovely sunny day, and we can share everything, that's great. What happens when you starts to go wrong, and, that's when your basic nationalities and identities start coming to the fore. And I don't want to see us put those into conflict, and there's no need to do that.*

2.1.4. Heterogeneous but real

In point 2.1.1, we insisted on the role that group homogeneity can play in establishing the reality of that group. However, this does not mean that homogeneity is a necessary condition for reality and that speaking in the name of a specific identity (and thus taking it for real) necessarily requires one to defines it as homogeneous. As evidence, let us look at how the Labour candidate defines Scottish identity.

In a way, Lab goes beyond the Conservative in downplaying the England/Scotland gap, in that she explicitly states that any direct definition of a Scottish character or culture is impossible, because it is fundamentally heterogeneous. Indeed, Scottish identity is precisely defined as being diverse:

Extract 11

Lab: ... *trying to decide what Scottish identity is, and I find quite difficult to define. I did, 'cos I was a literature graduate, and taught Scottish literature to European students at a summer school, I can spend the whole three weeks trying to define what Scottish identity was, and by the end just going 'oh, I give up' (laugh), it's erm, it's quite complex, I don't know, I'm not always that comfortable with kind of narrow definitions of identity, I think people are much more diverse than that, I don't think...(I: Alright) I think it's rather, there's also regional identity within Scotland, you know, em...central belt, and Highlands and Islands, there was often feelings of... I mean you've got a bit of tension between regions, it's not just between Scotland and England. I think that's the regional identities there as well.*

As with homogeneous definitions of Scottishness, constructions of heterogeneity can also have their specific consequences, which in this case are akin to 'artificiality' constructions. Indeed, the proximal consequence of Lab's stress on heterogeneity is to undermine a particular vision of Scottishness - homogeneous and stereotypical - as artificial. Thus, in another extract, Lab describes the usual symbols of Scotland as commercial stereotypes, as '*a way of selling Scotland*', i.e. as artificial rather than real and authentic:

Extract 12

Lab: *...I suppose, how you define identity, and as I say, I think it's much more diverse, it's difficult to define. And this...I suppose visitors in Scotland see representations of what Scotland is, and that's just a way of selling Scotland, really, the kind of kilts, and all that kind of stuff, those kind of images of Scotland don't really reflect...I mean as a Scot you can have quite a good kind of, a more self-reflexive approach towards that type of stuff*

As for the broader implication of Lab's argument, it is also similar to 'artificiality' arguments. That is, it is to discredit any project that wants to use such homogeneous/artificial versions of Scottish identity as the primary base to legitimise a political project and gather support for it. This can be illustrated with the next extract, which applies that logic to the issue of Scotland's linguistic specificity:

Extract 13

Lab: *if you talk about identity, I suppose language was always a kind of key issue as well.../.../...I mean, writers like James Kelman and people like that, who write in vernacular, who write in Scots, there was this feeling of, em and that's often interpreted as if it was, as difficult, you'd think your mother tongue wasn't recognised.../.../...but I'm not really, within Scottish parliament, there is this kind of real move towards, em...you know there's a group of MSPs in the parliament who campaign on Scots language, I have problems with that. I mean I think we should support Gaelic as a language, so it's recognised that Gaelic wasn't really a Scot, there wasn't a Scottish wide, it's quite concentrated in a certain area, but I mean I have no problems with supporting Gaelic medium education, and you know supporting that culture, as long as we support other diversities and cultures within Scotland as a whole. But Scots language, I can't really see, I mean Scots language is an invented language that takes...I mean, look at Hugh MacDiarmad, that takes bits and pieces of dialects and forms it into a kind of (?) Scots, which I find a bit irritating.../.../...you get sent e-mails at work from MSPs that are written in Scots, and it's like, "well, I don't understand this, you're sending me e-mails that"...You*

know, I am Scottish, I have a dialect, this isn't my dialect, you know, who...who can define what Scots dialect is and to put it down and print into...that also becomes as restrictive as what they're arguing English is.

According to Lab, 'Scots language' cannot pretend to represent Scotland and to be part of its overall identity, for it is an artificial creation, made from an arbitrary blend of regional dialects, rather than an authentic part of Scottishness. Therefore, political projects which try to promote it do not express national identity but try to impose an artificial creation. As for Gaelic, it might be more authentic, but again it represents only part of Scotland, not the whole.

Thus, at first sight, this might seems to be a deconstruction of the very idea of Scottish identity. However, if we look more closely at Lab's argument, we can see her denial of homogeneity does not in fact entail denying all reality to this identity - and this is the difference with the 'artificiality' arguments detailed in point 1.1.3.

Indeed, crucially, what also appears in the extract is that making such statements is not in contradiction with feeling Scottish or equivalent to taking an 'anti-Scottish' stance. On the contrary, the attempt at homogenisation is described as prescriptive, and therefore trying to impose uniformity indicates a lack of respect for the reality of Scottish identity and society, i.e. its diversity. For this speaker, it is as much an attack on Scottish reality than the imposition of English language is for others (perhaps even more, as there is an active and self-conscious process pushing it). '*I am Scottish*', Lab insists, and it is precisely for that reason that she can't relate to the stereotypical images and definitions of Scotland (see also in extract 12: *I mean as a Scot you can have quite a good kind of, a more self-reflexive approach towards that type of stuff).* It is by being a (true) Scot that one knows such images are artificial and do not correspond to the real Scottish identity, while a political project which respects that reality must "*support other diversities and cultures within Scotland as a whole.*" The danger of defining Scottish identity is to get trapped into stereotypical images of Scotland which do not respect the reality of contemporary Scotland. This argument also appears when she talks about traditional music, and says that it "*has always the danger of dying out, and needs to be supported. But there is very little focus on what's happening in contemporary Scotland, and the type of music that young people in Scotland today are producing, and the type of culture,*

there's less focus on that". Being too fixed in the past is actually ignoring important aspects of Scottish identity.

Thus, what Lab does is to undermine not the very notion of Scottishness but the *homogeneous* versions, and therefore the political projects based on these versions. What is then implicitly attacked through such arguments is in fact the basis on which separatists make their appeal, a stereotypical Scottish identity which is declared to be artificial (and indeed Gaelic and Scots language are amongst the aspects used by S as symbols and evidence of Scotland's distinct identity). Although she rejects the idea of identity altogether (*I'm not that into national identity*), this is because for her the term is bound with separatist nationalism. The link is made explicit at other points when she argues that the Scottish Parliament should not be seen as being about Scottish identity (*it's largely about politics, it's not about a Scottish identity.../.../...I don't think the parliament embodies Scottish identity*). She stresses that if the parliament is (mis)understood as being about identity, and if there is too much focus on these stereotypical images she rejects, it is in danger of leading to parochialism. This in turn means that the Parliament should not be seen a part of a process leading to independence. Indeed, independence is explicitly associated with a narrow-minded view of Scotland, and she suggests that it is a rather backward looking 'old fashioned' concept (see section 2.3, extract 22).

This does not mean, however, that she does not propose her own definition of Scotland and speak in the name of the reality of Scottish identity (even if she avoids that term). In sum, Lab's construction illustrates that one should be careful not to take attacks on particular versions of identity and on homogeneity as being necessarily attacks against this identity as such and its reality, for such attacks can in fact be done in the name of another content, which can include diversity. With that last point, we have moved somewhat from the basic question of what identities are real and started to see the importance of the specific content which is given to identities. We will address this point in the next section, after some conclusions concerning this section.

2.1.5. Summary and conclusions

a) Reality as pre-requisite for arguments

We will now apply the analytical outlook which has been developed throughout this section to what each speaker argues about the reality of identities. However, before we do so, a preliminary comment needs to be made, which also applies to our further attempts at systematising our speakers' use of other types of arguments (see sections 2.2, 2.3 and 2.4). As we pointed out in the introduction, it would be unpractical to support every point we will make about what each speakers argue with extended quotes. We have just gone through the details of some of these arguments, and thus these latter do not need to be repeated. As for the rest, we will often refer back to the summaries of the interviews (see section 1.2). The reader is therefore encouraged to read this in parallel to the summaries (as well as to consult the original transcripts should he/she wish to do so).

In relation to the present category of arguments, the first point to note is that all our speakers, in some way or another, argue about the reality of groups and identities. On the other hand, however, there is great diversity in the way they do so and in terms of what particular levels of identity are argued to be real, unreal, or else artificial.

In this respect, the starkest contrast is undoubtedly between C and S, and their respective constructions present an almost perfect mirror image of each other. Indeed, on the one hand, and as we have seen, C argues forcefully for the reality of British identity while S construes the very idea of Britishness as completely artificial. On the other hand, S argues strongly for the reality of Scottish identity by stressing the differences between Scotland and England (*"...We have a different history, we have a different culture, we have a different economy.* "), while C, even if he does not deny this reality, downplays its distinctivness, precisely by using the reality of Britishness and the overlap between Scottish and English identities it implies. Finally, C strongly stresses the artificiality of any idea of European identity, while S does give some reality to this identity (it is quite heterogeneous, but Europeans have some common history and are outward-looking: see S's summary) – although it is limited and comes second to Scottishness. Indeed she stresses that "*at the end of the day no matter how European you are, you want to make sure that your own people*

are not loosing out", an argument which takes for granted that the 'people' which should be seen as their own by people in Scotland (i.e. the most real identity) are the Scots rather than the Europeans.

In the middle of this contrast comes Lab and Lib who both attribute a roughly equal degree of reality to Britishness and Scottishness. Like C, they see British identity and culture as being part of the Scottish reality, and therefore the distinct reality of Scottishness (compared to England) is for them less strong than argued by S (e.g. Lab arguing that there is "*very much a shared culture*" between Scotland and England). But on the other hand, rather than simply acknowledging that there is, nonetheless, a distinct Scottish identity, they also speak in the name of this distinct identity much more than C does – especially Lib. They also have in common the fact of doubting the reality of an European identity; or at least, they argue that it is not a reality for the British and the Scots. As opposed to C, they do not denounce European identity as being artificial and constructed by illegitimate political interests, but British identity is definitely more of a reality for the Scots who do not feel very European – although Lab wishes that Scots would feel more European (arguably, this might also be implicit in Lib's argument).

Further evidence supporting this general picture is also provided by the fact that the levels of reality argued by speakers also correspond to their statements of personal identification (Scottish and then European, but not British for S; more British than Scottish for C, equally Scottish and British for Lab – unspecified for Lib).

As we can see, our data show that there is a correlation between the levels of identities argued to be real and the political projects of each speaker, although perhaps not a perfect one (e.g. C acknowledging the reality of Scottish identity). However, this empirical correlation should be interpreted carefully. Indeed, in contrast to the other categories of arguments we will go through in the next sections, we would not in fact necessarily expect to be a perfect consonance between the levels of reality and the political projects of speakers, for our perspective is that arguing for (or taking for granted) the reality of a group identity does not necessarily entail arguing for separatism or increased autonomy for that group. On the contrary, it is crucial to our argument to stress that political projects can be grounded in a particular national identity (therefore taking it for real) while not always seeking separate statehood, or even opposing it, and we will see some examples of that in the

rest of our analysis (see section 2.3). Thus we should not be led to conclude that there is a necessary correlation between the assumed reality of identities (and the level of identification) on the one hand, and political attitudes such as separatism or unionism, on the other hand.

Nevertheless, such a correlation is to be empirically expected because the reality of a group identity is, if not a sufficient condition for separatism, at least a necessary pre-requisite in order to argue for separatism, while, on the other hand, this is not the case for unionist positions. Indeed, if this latter stance *can* be advocated in terms of the subgroup identity (i.e. that it is good for the subgroup), it can also be sustained purely on the basis of the reality of the superordinate identity – a fact which is reflected in some, if not all, of C's arguments in favour of the British Union. Furthermore, if reality is only a prerequisite for speaking in the name of an identity, arguing the artificiality of an identity is, on the other hand, certainly a sufficient condition in order to undermine any project which invokes that identity. This comment leads us to our second conclusion.

b) Reality and artificiality as arguments

The second and main point to be drawn from this section, which is also another factor explaining the correlation between levels of reality and political projects, is that arguments about the reality of groups and identities can be used as more than a pre-requisite for other type of arguments. Sometimes, they can also form arguments on their own, sustaining or undermining different political projects - which is why we analysed them in a separate section. That is, what emerged from our analysis is that one does not always necessarily need to argue about the specific content or interests of identities and/or the effect of the superordinate group or of the relationship with other groups on those interests in order to make a political case. Indeed, once a group is established as real, it acquires the status of a collective agent, and the rights which are usually associated with such agents can be claimed, or the undermining of those rights by an opposed political project can be stressed. If those arguments appeal to rights which are widely accepted as valid and legitimate for collective agents to claim, things do not necessarily need to be justified further – although, of course, the controversy is going to be around which agent is real, as we have seen above.

In such cases, we would indeed expect a perfect consonance between the use of these arguments and the political projects of those who use them - although this does not mean that they will always be used, and certainly not that they will not also be accompanied by other types of arguments. Thus, we found both C (in his interview) and S (in her speech at the NFU meeting) using the principle of national sovereignty in a way which clearly supports their separatist project, vis-à-vis Europe and Britain, respectively. Potentially, any ideological principle regulating the rights of collective agents could be used, but in the context of our inquiry, the principle of national sovereignty and the democratic right of people to self-determination are bound to be strong favourites. However, there are other possibilities, and if S did not use that principle in her interview, she did use an argument relying on a rule of group-based equity in order to support her separatist project.

The possible 'self-sufficiency' of reality arguments is perhaps even more apparent in constructions of artificiality. The simple fact that a group is based on an artificial identity can be quite enough to undermine the legitimacy of any government which would pretend to represent that identity, and this, even before the negative consequences of that government on the ingroup's way of life are stressed. Moreover, the very notion of artificiality implies not only the illegitimacy and inauthenticity of that representation, but also that there is an active attempt to impose it against the will of people. Therefore, it implies that people's right to self-determination is undermined. Again, we have seen both C and S using those arguments in a way consistent with their project.

One case which is perhaps less clear-cut though, is when separatism is undermined on the basis of the reality of the superordinate group identity. We have seen C using such an argument whereby it is implied that breaking-up the real Britain is to undermine something which is a part of the reality of Scotland, and this seems to be already an argument in itself in order to reject separatism. A similar argument, though perhaps put less explicitly, can be found in Lab's discourse when she stresses that given the family links and that there is *"very much a shared culture"* between Scotland and England, and because *"we're not two separate countries"* but *"we're an Island nation"*, it would be silly for the Scots to isolate themselves from the UK through independence. However, it could also be argued that such arguments constitute a variant of the arguments which stress the undermining effect of

separatism on the ingroup's identity and interests. Whatever the case may be, what matters most is that these arguments are also consistent with their pro-Union stance.

The consonance between speakers' arguments and their projects can be seen from Table 2.1 (see below), which sums up all 'reality' and 'artificiality' arguments. In this table, cells where arguments - if they are made - would be consonant with speakers' political projects have been shaded; whereas the '+' signs represent the arguments that are actually made. That is, the shaded cells are the only ones where one should find a '+' sign - although it does not mean that all of them will have one. These 'consonant' cells are determined on the following basis: it would be consonant for supporters of separatism to use the 'reality' of the subgroup as well as the 'artificiality' of the superordinate group in order to reject union; whereas it would be consonant for supporters of union to use the 'reality' of the union in order to reject separatism. As for advocates of devolution, they could use the 'reality' of the superordinate group to reject separatism (like unionists), but they could also use the 'reality' of the subgroup against union (like separatists) - although in this latter case the argument should be qualified so as not to support full separation (in practice, however, no arguments of the latter sort were used by our speakers). By contrast with separatists, advocates of devolution would not be expected to use 'artificiality' arguments against union (as such argument can hardly be qualified).

TABLE 2.1: REALITY/ARTIFICIALITY AS ARGUMENTS

	C	Lab	Lib	S
Scotland is real (used vs. UK)				+
Britain is artificial (used vs. UK)				+
Britain is real (used vs. separatism)	+	+		
Britain is real (used vs. EU)	+			
Europe is artificial (used vs. EU)	+			
Europe is real (used vs. separatism)				

Legend:

▩ : Cells where argument would be consonant with political project (vis-à-vis Britain)

▨ : Cells where argument would be consonant with political project (vis-à-vis Europe)

+ : Argument actually made.

c) The ideological context of reality argument

Moving aside from our concern for presenting a systematic picture of our speakers' arguments, there is another important point which is illustrated by the use of arguments based more specifically on nationhood and the principle of national sovereignty. In the next section, we will see that, in order to understand the logic and consequences of political arguments, we need to consider the specific constructions of the contents of identities and of the social context of intergroup relations (e.g. power) rather than whether or not they use identity. However, the use of the principle

of national sovereignty, as a self-sufficient argument, shows that, at a broader level, we also need to consider the context of a world of nation states and its ideological dimensions, in order to understand some of the arguments made, and more generally, we would argue, the psychology of separatism and integration.

Indeed, it is because we live in a world in which nationalist ideology is available that psychological needs related to identity can be expressed more particularly in nationhood; it is thanks to the ideological and practical dominance of nationalism that they often do so; and it is thanks to the principle of national sovereignty that those needs can further translate into a quest for statehood, rather than in any other form of individual, social or political strategy to which those needs could also lead.

To put it otherwise, and using a slightly different vocabulary borrowed from the work of Geertz on nationalism: although "*the need to exist and to have a name*"(Geertz, 1993, p. 249) might be universal, it is thanks to nationalist ideology that it can transform into the wish to be a national subject and into "*the desire to become a people rather than a population, a recognized and respected somebody in the world who counts and is attended to*" (p. 237). Furthermore, it is thanks to the nationalistic nature of politics in our contemporary society that this "*desire to be recognized as responsible agents whose wishes, acts, hopes, and opinions 'matter'...a search for an identity, and a demand that the identity be publicly acknowledge as having import, a social assertion of the self as 'being somebody in the world*" often translate into a quest for a sovereign nation-state. Indeed, in a world of nation states, it is these latter which are the political units which matter and are acknowledged by others. To quote Geertz once more: "*citizenship in a truly modern state has more and more become the most broadly negotiable claim to personal significance*" (p.258).

Moreover, even if the 'search for identity' do not always equate with support for separatism and might in fact lead to support for integration in a supra-national body, Geertz's comments remains equally useful. Indeed, as we will see, membership in supra-national bodies is often argued to be sought after precisely for the same reasons, i.e. because they enhance the expression, enactment and assertion of one's national identity and allow one 'to be somebody in the world'.

2.2. What are the groups like? Definitions of group identities and interests

Having looked at the way identities are established as real and relevant, it is now time to look at what is actually done with those identities. To start with, let us consider how specific group definitions and versions of identities can be used to sustain political attitudes, in instances where the specific nature of this content matters and has direct consequences for how the ingroup should relate to others and/or to superordinate groups. The first point of this section deals with definition of the ingroup, whereas the second will consider definitions of the outgroup and/or the superordinate group.

2.2.1. What Scots are like and what Scots want

a) Establishing the content of ingroup identity

Arguments using characterisation of the ingroup in order to sustain political projects can take two slightly different forms. First of all, one can argue directly about what ingroup members want in relation to Britain and Europe, i.e. what their political attitudes actually are. One's project can then be depicted as being a mere expression of the wishes of the majority and the opposed project as going against those aspirations (e.g. S's argument that the most of the Scots want independence, or C's argument that Europe goes against what people want; see 1.2.1 and 1.2.2). Alternatively, a similar conclusion can also be reached more indirectly by attributing particular traits, values or norms to the ingroup, from which the political attitudes of its members are deduced. The advocated project is then presented as in tune with a key characteristic of Scottish identity and/or as a natural expression of it. It is what the true Scot should support. The opposed project is therefore made, implicitly or explicitly, characteristically unscottish.

Let us illustrate this latter kind of argument by using two different examples, which both use stereotypical traits for their purpose:

Extract 14

Lib: *I think that the Scots are very canny, it's a good Scot word, they are careful, cautious. And we've had a constitutional upheaval, and I do not see any real mood among Scotland, in Scotland for a further constitutional upheaval until we have digested this and seen whether it's to our liking.*

Extract 15

S: *Scotland has always been far more pro-Europe than the rest of the UK, I mean that goes back very many centuries ago, we were always a great European nation pre-Euro, with a lot of links, especially with the French, the old alliance, you know Frenchmen fighting in here, and Scotsmen going providing the King's Guard, you know, there's always been that and great links with the Hanseatic states, the Baltic, all that died down in the 18th century because of the different political triangle that came there, but we've always been far more international, we've always looked to Europe.../.../...I think it's, it's as much a cultural thing as an economic thing.../.../...It's the whole cultural mindset, we've always looked out. Scots have always been great travellers, we've always been innovators, explorers, adventurers, we've always gone out to the world, come back, there's always been that great mix. England, traditionally, for whatever reason, has always been slightly more into, you know, this island breed, you know, protect our frontiers and hell mind anyone who comes and tries to change this.*

In the first extract, which concerns the relationship to Britain, the stereotype 'canny' (shrewd and careful) is used to support the devolution status quo. It argues against any immediate change because this is not what the canny Scottish people want at the moment. Both separatism as well as a return to an union without the present devolution settlement would go against the careful nature of Scots[2].

[2] This is not to say that particular traits have automatic and necessary consequences, i.e. are necessarily tied to a particular position. They might be assumed so in the discourse, but they are nevertheless open to interpretation and argument as to their meaning and consequences. For instance, Lib also describes the Scots as 'independent', but rather than being used to argue that Scots wants political independence, as the term would seem to suggest, the trait is in fact used to support

In the second extract, by the SNP candidate, Scots are defined as more international and outward-looking, in contrast to the inward-looking English, and S sustain this characterisation through quoting 'empirical facts' (Scotland's past history with Europe, Scots being great travellers and explorers, etc.). Scots are also defined as more favourable to Europe than the English, and this pro-European attitude is an expression of these fundamental characteristics of Scottish identity; it is part of their cultural mindset of 'looking-out'. The implication is not only that the majority of Scots do support Europe, but also that Scots should support it in order to be in tune with their identity and express that cultural and psychological quality. Therefore, the implication is also that an anti-European Scot would be at odds with his/her true Scottish identity, and that everything that prevents Scots being part of and having exchanges with Europe (i.e. the Union) also prevent Scots from enacting their identity and expressing this essential quality (see points 2.3 and 2.4).

b) Dealing with counter-evidence: distinction between the essential and the contingent

The implication in S's argument that anti-European feelings would be unscottish also leads us to our next point. Indeed, an important aspect of arguments over the characterisation of the ingroup is that they often have to deal with empirical counter-evidence which could potentially cast doubt on their claims. For instance, opinion polls, protests, or the fact that the speaker's party has not won the majority in previous elections could suggest that the majority of ingroup members do not in fact support the speaker's political project and therefore do not accord with the speaker's characterisation of the ingroup. As such a conclusion would undermine their argument, it ensues that speakers often address explicitly those potential objections.

Most often, they do so by giving up the 'empirical' register of mere description of the ingroup, and by introducing an important distinction which we shall encounter in other contexts. That is, typically, they make a distinction between the essence of ingroup identity and what characterises the ingroup only in appearance and contingently (i.e. it does not truly belong to its identity). What is then argued is that the majority of Scots, in essence, do support the advocated project, while the

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devolution, by arguing that this true Scottish trait should be understood in a cultural sense rather than in a political one.

empirical counter-evidence can be discarded as mere appearance caused by contingent factors, which should not be taken at face value. Those aspects or behaviours of the ingroup which might seem to contradict the speaker's characterisation of the ingroup are the result or expression of something contingent and unscottish, in conflict with the Scottish essence, i.e. preventing its proper expression. One good illustration of this is provided by Lib, who, also arguing in favour of Europe, accounted for anti-European feelings in the following way:

Extract 16

Lib: *I think though in Scotland there is resistance to...well, Scotland has been as badly affected by the propaganda of the anti-European newspapers, as any other part of the United Kingdom, although Scotland for obvious reasons has not grown into that rather unpleasant English nationalism which has been a feature of the European Union debate south of the border.*

Though Lib acknowledges that there might be some anti-European feelings in Scotland, these latter do not belong to the essence of Scottish identity. Rather, it is the result of a contingent and external propaganda, and, moreover, not a Scottish but a UK-wide propaganda - with the use of this latter word implying that the arguments used are irrational, distorting reality. Further evidence that it is not in the Scottish essence is provided by the fact that Scots have, to a certain extent, resisted this propaganda, which takes for granted that this propaganda goes against their true, original and rational aspirations. In fact, irrational anti-European feelings are characteristic of English nationalism, i.e. they are alien to and go against Scottish identity.

Thus, the distinction between the true essence of identity and superficial appearances, affected by external and contingent influences, proves useful in allowing speakers to counter opposing arguments and seemingly contradictory evidence. The presence of anti-European feelings amongst Scots could well mean that a pro-European party would not be prototypical of the ingroup and represent the interest of its members. However, by reinterpreting the source of the Scottish anti-European feelings, the Liberal Democrat party and their position in favour of Europe can remain prototypical and able to represent Scottish's interests. In fact, only a pro-

European position is faithful to what would be the true and authentic Scottish identity, if it was not deformed by external propaganda of anti-European newspapers.

2.2.2. What the outgroup(s)/the superordinate group are like

Obviously, characterising the superordinate group often goes hand in hand with defining its impact on the ingroup, while characterising the outgroup is most often bound with characterising its relationship with the ingroup. Accordingly, we will analyse in details such aspects and their implications in points 2.3 and 2.4.

However, what should be noted here, in relation to the present category of arguments, is that the specific content used in definitions of the outgroup(s) or of the superordinate group can also sometimes be important, and have in and of itself implications for superordinate group/subgroup relations. This contrasts, for instance, with some of the arguments we will see further on, where what matters is not so much the content of specific differences but the fact that these latter creates an incompatibility of interests between the groups, or where it is argued that it is the political context and 'system' which creates a negative impact on the ingroup, i.e. there would be such a negative impact whatever the identity of the superordinate group might be (e.g. because of ingroup powerlessness; see section 2.4).

A short example can be given to illustrate this point. At one point during the interview, S defined the English as having imperialist tendencies: " *when I was there, you know, there was this whole idea of, you know, it's somehow still the Empire. And I, I've heard that said from Americans, whom I talked to, that they get the impression that England has never quite come to grips with the fact that it doesn't have an Empire anymore* ". And, in another passage, where S explained the reasons why Scots do not feel British, it was made explicit that these imperialist tendencies had implications for the impact of Britain on Scotland:

Extract 17

S: *But it's the continual hijacking, say, of England, waving the Union Jack, at say an England football team. That's England, you know, why is...or...there was always this perception that for Britain, say England. Because that was what you were talking about. I think it's one of the great military leaders in the Napoleonic wars who said,*

you know, the great job of the British Empire is to go abroad and turn the country into England.

Thus, it is not only that, by being part of Britain, Scotland is assimilated to an alien English identity through the "*sheer weight of numbers*" - an argument which is also used by S at some point, and which implies that it would happen whatever the outgroup or the superordinate group is like. Nor is it only, in terms of the relation with England, that this relation is negative simply because of incompatible interests – which does not necessarily imply attributing a negative content to outgroup identity. More than that, there is also an active 'assimilationist' imperialism at play by the English, which does imply directly a negative relationship to others countries - including Scotland - and a tendency not only to ignore others' point of view but also to try to impose its own point of view on others. As we said above, however, we will examine the implications of this type of argument in more details in the next sections.

2.2.3. Summary and conclusions

a) ingroup content accounts

In this section, we have seen that speakers can sustain their political project by arguing that it simply represents the wishes of the majority. Furthermore, they can also argue that people should support their project in order to be in tune with their identity. This point shows the importance of taking into account the specific contents given to ingroup identity, for, depending on the nature of this content, being in tune with one's identity can mean supporting integration (e.g. being pro-European) as well as segregation (see below).

Moreover, counter-evidence to speakers' arguments can be discarded by pointing that what people truly are and/or what truly people wants, in essence, can be different from what they might appear to be and/or to want, on the surface. Such apparent counter-evidence does not truly reflect their identity as it is contingent upon other factors. Far from undermining their position, the counter-evidence can then even be turned into an argument in its own rights. Indeed, it can be used as evidence that the ingroup is 'contaminated' by unscottish (but contingent) aspects which

conflict with its true identity. And, as we will see further on (see section 2.3), such contingent and undesirable aspects can be argued to be created or enhanced by the opposed project, which must therefore be rejected as it prevent the expression of the true ingroup essence (while one's own project should be supported in order to get rid of them and to allow the expression of the true identity). For the moment, however, what matters is the argumentative flexibility that this distinction between essence and appearance allows. The same 'empirical facts' (e.g. the level of support for the SNP), or the same ingroup traits, can be made sense of quite differently. Such flexibility allow for strategic work to be done, as we will now see by reviewing more systematically speakers' arguments.

b) Overview of speakers' arguments

Let us now briefly go through the arguments of all speakers about what the Scots want in relation to Britain and Europe.

In terms of independence from Britain, the picture is quite straightforward: S is the only speaker to argue that most Scots want independence, while all the others argue that they oppose it (see 1.2) .

In terms of devolution, however, matters are slightly more complex, for the arguments are more implicit and indirect, and can also depend on what is understood by devolution. Thus, S does not argue directly that Scots either support or oppose devolution, but the fact that they support independence implies that they oppose being in Britain even with the Scottish Parliament, and thus, in that sense, that they oppose devolution. On the other hand, however, it also implies that they support the Scottish parliament if its powers are completed in order to reach independence. By contrast, C does not say that Scots oppose devolution as such, but he does say that Scots would have voted against it if they had understood that it was going to lead to independence, which he argues is indeed a real danger. As far as Lib is concerned, we have seen in extract 14 how he argues that Scots supports the present devolution settlement, and therefore that they would both oppose independence as well as coming back to an Union without devolution. Finally, there are no direct arguments in Lab's interviews on that point but her arguments that Scots both oppose independence but wish for some degree of autonomy from the British government (e.g. to avoid Conservative rule; see 1.2.3) implies that they do support devolution.

As regards attitudes to Europe, S argues that Scots are fundamentally pro-European (see extract 15), whereas C argues that European integration "*is not what people want*" (including the British and the Scots). Lib and Lab's argument, however, are more ambiguous on that point: they suggest that Scots do not necessarily support Europe very much, but they also suggest (explicitly in the case of Lab) that this is not a desirable thing.

These ambiguities tend to be clarified, however, when we consider the essential/contingent distinction which appears in those arguments. Thus, if Lab and Lib do not argue directly that Scots are fundamentally pro-European, they do argue that anti-European feelings are contingent upon the British media which distorts the facts (see extract 16 for Lib). The implication is that, should this contingency be removed (and thus the essence of Scots be expressed), then indeed Scots would be pro-European, or at least more than they presently are. Likewise, S acknowledges that there are also some anti-European feelings amongst Scots, but also argues that such feelings are contingent – although in here case it is contingent on the fact that Scotland is poorly represented by the UK in Europe. Thus, on this issue, all speakers contrast with C for whom opposition to Europe is indeed an expression of the essential identity of the British and the Scots.

The reverse applies for attitudes to Britain, where it is S who is in opposition to everybody else. For her, it is clear that most Scots do want independence in essence, while the desire for independence is made contingent by all others. For C, it is contingent on the parliament itself and on the rhetoric of the SNP, which unnecessarily serves to "*make nationalism stronger*" and "*fuel the move towards independence*". It is also contingent on the dissatisfaction with the economy and with incompetent British governments, by which he means Labour governments. Lib and Lab agree with C that it is contingent on particular British governments, except that the British governments towards which Scots are resentful are the ones which were led by the Conservatives. Moreover, rather than fostering the desire for independence, they both stress that the Scottish Parliament has the opposite effect. Thus, Lib stresses that *"It's often said that Mrs Thatcher was the most compelling recruiting sergeant for the Scottish National Party.../.../...during the Thatcher period, then, there's no doubt there was a very strong strand of political thought which was.../.../...anti-Whitehall, anti-Westminster. I hope that home-rule will provide a safety valve for that.*" Likewise, Lab stresses that the resentment towards

Britain and the ensuing wish for more autonomy '*came out of how Scotland fell under Conservatism*' and that "*the Scottish parliament has been a long way to resolve that*".

The 'contingency' arguments are summarised in Table 2.2 (see below). Taking into account this dimension in interpreting our speakers' arguments on what the Scots really want, the (essential) attitudes of these latter can then be summarised as shown by Table 2.3 (see below). A few comments are necessary in order to interpret these tables – comments which also apply to the tables which will be used in further sections. First of all, speakers' arguments or accounts have been symbolised by using '+' and '-' signs (the meaning of these depending on the table; see legends). The shaded cells are the cells where accounts symbolised by '+' signs (if they are made) would be consonant with speakers' political projects - although this does not mean that all of these cells should have '+' accounts. There is however a slight difference with Table 2.1 (see 2.1.5): in order to support the hypothesis of perfect consonance, the crucial point here is not so much that there cannot be '+' accounts in other cells (although this is unlikely), but that there cannot be '–' accounts in the shaded cells.

Secondly, for reasons of simplicity, the position of 'undevolved' union in Europe (i.e. federal state) has been omitted in the tables, as all speakers agree in rejecting that option (accordingly, the unionist position which is represented in those tables has to be understood as a qualified, devolved union). It also has to be noted that the position of 'separatism' regarding the EU argued by C does not imply a total withdrawal of the EU, but for more power to be given to the nation states (basically, that the EU should be limited to a commercial body).

In sum, we can see from Table 2.3 that there is a remarkable consistency between all speakers, as they all argue that Scots' essentially support their project, both vis-à-vis Britain and Europe. Furthermore, although not all of the arguments were stated explicitly, what matters most is that, all the arguments used, be they explicit or implicit, are consonant with the political projects of each speaker[3].

[3] Furthermore, some of the arguments categorised as implicit were only so insofar as they were phrased negatively rather than positively (e.g. what Scots do not want rather than what Scots want), or vice-versa.

TABLE 2.2: CONTINGENT ATTITUDES TO THE UK AND THE EU

	C	Lab	Lib	S
Wish for independence	+	+	+	-
Resistance to Europe	-	+	+	+

legend:

▩ : Expected to be argued as contingent (vis-à-vis Britain)

▨ : Expected to be argued as contingent (vis-à-vis Europe)

+ : contingent

-: not contingent

TABLE 2.3: ESSENTIAL ATTITUDES TO THE UK AND THE EU

	C	Lab	Lib	S
Scots' attitude to independence	-	-	-	+
Scots' attitude to devolution in Britain	+/-	+	+	+/-
Scots' attitude to Union (without devolution)	+	-	-	-
Scots' attitude to 'separatism' from EU	+*	-	-	-
Scots' attitude to EU	-*	+	+	+

legend:

▩ : Scots expected to be in favour of project (vis-à-vis Britain)

▨ : Scots expected to be in favour of Europe (vis-à-vis Europe)

+ : Scots support the project

-: Scots oppose the project

+/-: Ambivalence

Faded fonts indicate implicit or indirect arguments (e.g. converse of argument; see footnote 3)

* In relation to Europe C talks about what British people want but in a way which includes the Scots.

2.3. Impact of political projects/arrangements on ingroup identity

2.3.1. Arguing separation or more autonomy

a) The repression and dilution of ingroup identity

We have seen in point 2.2.2 how definitions of the superordinate group can determine the way in which its impact on the ingroup is conceived, so let us start our analysis of impact arguments by looking at a separatist argument which involves another example of how such definitions can be used.

This is an argument made by C against Europe, and indeed, despite his views on the non-existence of an European identity (see section 2.1) and thus the absence of any definition of it, C presents a strong definition of Europe understood as the E.U. institutions and its leaders. It is depicted as basically lead by "*a lot of un-elected bureaucrats*" who are "*sitting down with what they think is a wonderfully academic perfect rule-book*" which "*doesn't suit all circumstances.*", and who have the tendency to be prescriptive and to put everything in binding treaties. As a result, the E.U is presented as being, by its very nature, insensitive to the particular cultures and way of life of each people:

Extract 18

C: *What Europe is doing, is saying, right, you have a social* [speaker slams the table] *chapter signed there, from now on everybody has got to be, ...cannot work more than 40 hours. Now, you know, what if we, and so what, if we want to work more than 40 hours, why should somebody else tell us we can't. If it's a good rule, we'll do it ourselves. You know, why, why tell us not to. And it does get in big mistakes, as we are told you can't call your cheese, cheese, and all these kind of thing, and our chocolate is not allowed to be called chocolate, because it's got a different amount of cacao in it than somebody else. What, you know, mind your own business, it's our chocolate, we eat it the way we like it. We're not gonna, you know, gonna go out and tell Germany what sauerkraut is or isn't, you know, it's...I mean the whole beauty of having different nations is so you can have you separate cultures and do what, things*

the way.., but it's the bureaucrats that sort of, be trying to harmonise everything, I don't want to be harmonised. I want to be free.

In this example, C makes quite clear that the EU threatens several aspects the British way of life, such as its working practices or the labelling of chocolate and cheese. Those are in danger of disappearing (or have already been lost) under the rule of the EU which is trying to impose a different, harmonised, way of life.

However, what also appears in this extract is that the problem is not just that the EU does not respect these specific aspects of the British way of life because on these particular aspects other European countries would have a different view. Rather, it goes further than that. Indeed, when C was asked if what he said in the above quote meant that the problem was that Europe was more socialist than Britain, he added:

Extract 19

C: *Yes I mean, yeah, we can be, we can be out of step politically at anytime. Em...we went for privatisation, we were alone when we stopped going down for privatisation. Now, it's become all the range across, across Europe, and everybody is privatising, etc, it's become accepted. And you wouldn't have that kind of thing happening if you've got...everything, you know, you happen to have, predominantly, say socialists in when a treaty is written, and it binds you on that socialist track. If you have a predominantly Conservative people when the treaty is written, then that binds you on that track, you know, that's that binding business which is absolutely wrong. We've got to...the British parliament is sovereign, and can change anything that the previous one has done, em...but the system to develop, developing in Europe is that, you know, once you've written something down, that's it, you can't change it ever, and that's a lot of rubbish. Because, you've become so inflexible, that eventually people will buck the system.*

Though it might not be innocent, from a Tory point of view, that one of the primary examples of inappropriate policy from Europe concerns the social chapter, this latter is nevertheless not primarily attacked for its specific political content as

such, but more basically for being prescriptive. The fundamental issue is that the E.U., by its binding nature, fails to respect *any* differences and thus prevents the ingroup from expressing its identity in its way of life, whatever the content of that identity might be.

This is indeed a more radical critic of Europe than one which would only focus on specific differences with Europe (although, for C, there are such differences, which only makes matters worse), for the attacks on the British way of life are therefore not necessarily contingent on the content of those specific differences - which could always change if, for instance, the political taste of the day in Europe or in Britain were to change. Rather, because of its tendency to harmonise everything and its denial of national sovereignty, which are essential traits of the E.U., this latter cannot but threaten national identities and their specificity. It makes the undermining of Britain and its identity an inevitable outcome of European integration.

Thus, the fundamental picture we see here is one where British identity cannot follow its own path and cannot be fully expressed within the superordinate group, whatever it wishes to express. The consequence of this repression is that this identity and the ingroup's way of life are in danger of being lost altogether in the long term.

This is why the issues of power and sovereignty are crucial. Indeed, by far the most salient complaint towards Europe in C's interview is the loss of national sovereignty and of (legitimate) power that it entails. We will come back to issues of power in point 2.4, but what should retain our attention here is that power is important, not just because it constitutes a good in itself, but because it guarantees the possibility for the ingroup to follow its interest and express its identity in practice, i.e. in its way of life. As C argues: "*...in this election there are lots of other things very important, like, you know, what should be done for the Health Service, what should be done for education, and everything else. But, the point is, I'd like first to remain in a position where we can actually make those decisions. And that, that's why the sovereignty issue is the crucial.*" Powerlessness (and the repression of identity it leads to) means not only that aspects of ingroup identity are being eroded right now, but, perhaps more importantly, that any aspect of this identity and of the ingroup's way of life is in danger of being lost in the future

b) enhancing separatism

Just as one can argue that union will undermine ingroup identity, so one can make the case that separatism (or limited autonomy for advocates of devolution) would enhance ingroup identity. More specifically, the corollary of constructions of identity repression is that separatism is the political project which would allow the expression of ingroup identity and its essence. That it, it is not just that such a project would enhance particular aspect(s) of this identity, but, more fundamentally, that it will enhance the very ability of expressing any of its aspects. Hence it will allow the fulfilment of the group's interest, whatever it might be.

This can be seen, for instance, in the main slogan of the SNP, which, at the time this chapter was written, was "RELEASE OUR POTENTIAL". Likewise, in the NFU meeting, S argued that:

Extract 20

S: *Independence can release the energy, potential and the opportunities needed to transform our country and develop a vibrant, exciting future for our children. We have a vision of Scotland that is just, caring, an enterprising nation where individuals are able to get on regardless of where they have come from.*

What this says is that Scots clearly have the resources to do well, a positive potential which only need to be released and expressed in practice, i.e. in the actual way of life of the nation. Independence is the political project which would allow this potential to be expressed in order to build a better Scotland, in tune with the Scottish essence (i.e. outward-looking and enterprising).

2.3.2. Arguing unionism: The enhancement of ingroup identity

As we argued earlier, however, separatism does not have the exclusivity in pretending to defend the Scottish interest. It is quite possible to speak for Scottish identity while seeking other or even opposed aims to statehood. Doing so involves using the same constructions of identity undermining or enhancement – only with a mirror representation of what is undermining and what is enhancing. The point can

be illustrated more briefly, with a quote by Lab which argues both for the enhancing effect of union and the undermining effect of separatism:

Extract 21

Lab: *...I'd like to think that being part of Europe also gives you a different outlook on life, that you feel part of a wider society than just Scotland. Which is maybe what I think England manages to do as well...that's again being a wee bit concern about the parliament leading towards a parochial, unchanged Scotland...because there is so much focus on the parliament, there isn't a recognition of what the UK government does, and what kind of policies introduced by UK government, and how that benefits several interests across the UK and become very inward looking. That kind of concerns me, a wee bit.*

Thus, one of the benefits of both the union with England and within Europe is to give Scottish people '*a different outlook on life*'. It might be that it enhances the positive potential of the Scots, expressing and reinforcing their outward-looking tendency; or else, to put it the other way round, it might be that it prevents the development of a negative tendency towards parochialism, which Scots might also have (see 2.3.3). The extract is not clear on this point (and it might be both), but what is clear is that it is a psychological improvement in terms of what people are.

The implication of that argument is that, by contrast with S's argument in relation to Britain (see extract 20), it is separatism which would in fact have a negative impact on Scottish identity, by making Scots more inward-looking and parochial. The explicit target in this extract is the Scottish parliament but we have already suggested how the occasional attacks of Lab against the parliament are bound up with her argument that the Scottish Parliament should be dissociated from identity needs and thus from a move towards independence (see section 2.1.4). Thereby, the implicit target is separatism rather than the parliament itself. This is witnessed by the fact that one of the dangers with the Parliament is precisely that the merits of the UK might tend to be forgotten, i.e. to think that Scotland could do as well, if not better, on its own. Moreover, the link between inward-looking and backward-looking (rather than forward-looking) tendencies on the one hand and separatism on the other is made explicit in another extract:

Extract 22

Lab*: I don't agree with the debate that's going on at the moment that is pushing for extra powers for the parliament at the moment, I think it's too soon. I think we have a valuable relationship with the UK, and I do think Scotland benefits from being part of the UK, as well as what I think England. I think the whole, because we're an Island nation, I think it would be silly to start, there's lots, I mean there's economical benefits, but there is also social benefits.../.../...I mean, I don't think there is a need for us to progress towards independence, I think it's quite an old-fashioned concept, really.../.../...it's quite isolationist.../.../...When other countries are moving towards devolution, regional assemblies, it's...you know working in partnership with different layers of government, rather than cutting ourselves off from a layer of government, I can't really see the benefits of that.*

Taking both extracts 21 and 22 together, what Lab argues is then that separatism is both an expression of isolationist and inward-looking tendencies and in danger of reinforcing this tendency. The parliament itself might play this role, if it deviates from its original purpose and is used to push towards independence. However, Lab also argues that devolution is in fact a good thing when it is a matter of *"working in partnership with different layers of government"*, i.e. when it is devolution in the context of the Union.

Thus, Britain provides economic and social benefits and enhances Scottish identity by making people more outward-looking. However, as we have seen with S when she argued for the enhancing effect of separatism, what is at stake in enhancement arguments is often not just the enhancement of particular qualities, but the idea that the general ability of the group to express any aspect of its identity and to act on its terms will be enhanced. This appears to some extent in Lab's argument insofar as it could be said that, rather than just being a good in itself, being outward-looking is the condition for enjoying the benefits of the UK and Europe, while being isolationist is to cut oneself off from any potential benefit. However, in order to support this point, let us add another extract, where S argues in favour of Europe, and where this is made more explicit:

Extract 23

S: *I think that is the biggest difference that it would make as an independent member. Confidence, self-belief, being able to be part of it. At the moment, I suppose it's like being, being the perpetual, perpetually on the substitute bench. You know you're a good player, and you had plenty of practice with your mates, but you never get the opportunity to actually go out there and show what you can do. Being an independent member of the European Union would give us a chance to get up off the substitute bench, and show what we can do.*

Of course, rather than being just about Europe, this extract is also a plea for independence. It refers to the fact that, for S, another undermining effect of Britain is precisely that it has cut down the historical, cultural and economical ties with Europe, and that, at present, Scotland has no voice in Europe because the UK cannot speak for Scotland and can only misrepresent its interests (see point 2.1 and 2.2).

But the important point in relation to our present argument is the idea that being in Europe (as an independent member) will give self-confidence to Scotland. The metaphor of the substitute player on the bench implies that, at present, the qualities of the Scot (who is indeed a 'good player' and deserves to be on the field) are repressed and cannot be expressed. Being independent, but also being in Europe, is what would allow the ability and confidence to express these undeniable qualities.

In the same spirit, perhaps the main point of the argument is not even that traits such as confidence and self-belief can be enhanced by being in Europe. Indeed, the specific meaning of these terms is also important to consider. Self-confidence implies having the strength and the means of asserting oneself, one's identity and one's aspirations. Therefore the use of these characteristics implies that independence is not only a question of restoring these qualities alone and for their own sake, but that doing so will, more generally and more fundamentally, allow Scotland to restore, assert, and control other aspects of its identity.

In fact, it is not guaranteed that the E.U. is a political project which will always serve the Scottish interest, for, as S also stresses, "*You're never gonna agree on everything, I think it's quite unrealistic, that's why I don't think a federal Europe will ever happen*". However, being part of it, and having an independent voice in it, will allow Scots to "*be able to directly input*" and "*to say, yes that's good, no that's*

not so good, this is why we think it's not so good, this is what would be better for us." In other words, being part and having a voice in Europe is a condition for being an agent which can express its interests, and thereby for being able to both enjoy the benefits of the positive impact of Europe as well as to protect its identity against any of its possible negative consequence.

b) Enhanced agency

In both this last SNP extract as well as in the Labour extracts above, one aspect which is also implied is that one advantage of being part of a superordinate group is not only that it allows the ingroup to express its identity in the running of its internal affairs, but also that it allows a better expression of this identity on a larger scene by giving the ingroup increased power and voice in the international arena. That is, it allows this identity to be expressed in front of others and its import to be acknowledged by them.

This point can be shown more clearly by using another example from C's interview. Although C argues that independence simply undermines that part of Scottish reality which is Britishness (see point 2.1.2), he also provides examples where the enhancing effect of the Union is sustained by more direct and concrete advantages. Talking about the prospect of Scottish independence, C stated:

Extract 24

C: *...I don't think it would be to Scotland's advantage, to do that, because we get more by being part of Britain, out of the whole global scene, and we can contribute more to overseas as a Union.../.../...we have a bigger voice in that...as a nation-state Britain, you know, is one of the second great level world powers.../.../...we do have a seat on the security council, we are, you know top players and have a large history of that, and I think by and large the contributions that Britain has made in that respect is good, and it slurs the very good reputation, people want to come here exactly for that reason, a model of democracy, etc. And we gain from being able to lead the world, and Scotland wouldn't be able to play that same, same role. So if you want to be a little bit more inward looking, and, you know, go ahead, but I think it's*

a dream to think that we'd maintain the same standards of living for very long, if we didn't had that kind of influence.

Scotland got more power abroad by being part of the Union, but there is more than just the gain of power in itself, for this power is what allows Scotland, through its membership in Britain, to express some of her essential values in the world. The only example that is provided is 'democracy', which is presented as a universal value, but one assumed to be British (in fact prototypically British) and Scottish as well. Moreover, this is only used as an example in order to suggest that what is more fundamentally at stake is simply the capacity to express any value.

The implication is also that breaking up the Union, far from allowing Scotland's self-expression of its identity, will in actual fact prevent Scotland from expressing (through Britain) those values which are also hers within the world. In direct opposition to S's argument, but in agreement with Lab on this point, it will make Scotland more inward-looking.

Thus, the key role of power appears again, albeit in a slightly different way than before. It might not be surprising, after all, that in a world of nations, one of the main attraction of joining with others within a supra-national body is the greater power such a group provides on the international scene. But what the extract also shows, once again, is how power is not just merely sought after as a good in itself, but is a crucial locus of argument at least in part because of its link with identity issues. Indeed, one of the main attractions of such power comes from the fact that it is argued to enhance the capacity to express ingroup identity and to follow the interests of that identity.

Moreover, adding this qualification also helps to explain why there might be resistance to supra-national bodies, despite the promise of greater power. For, rather obviously, whether the objectively stronger power of the supra-national body is seen as actually enhancing this capacity will depend upon the construed ability of the ingroup to voice its identity *within* the supra-national body, and thus to see the supra-national body as representing the ingroup and its interests (i.e. to see this power as *our* power). We will deal with this aspect more in detail in point 2.4.

c) denial of undermining

The other side of these pro-Union or anti-independence arguments is to deny the fact that Scotland and Scottish identity has been diluted in the UK, and we will use C again in order to illustrate that point. In fact, two slightly different ways in which he denies undermining can be distinguished here. First of all, the implication of some of the arguments we have seen above about the commonalties and links between Scotland and England, and the existence of a strong British identity, is that, in such a context, the question of identity dilution and the possible imposition of an alien culture or way of life does not pose itself. Britain is an intrinsic part of Scottish society and it is on the contrary independence which is going to dilute Scottish identity because it is going to break links which are important for Scots and Scottish identity. It is also going to make people more inward-looking.

However, when Scottish specificity is acknowledged, as C also sometimes does, then there is a need to develop arguments aimed at explicitly denying a loss of this identity. Thus C states that "*Scotland hasn't lost its identity*" in the Union, and argue that "*it doesn't mean that, because we are united with England, that, you know there is anything wrong in being patriotic as a Scot, the Scots have their own Rugby teams and Football team so you don't lose your national identity in the process.*"

2.3.3. The enhancement or repression of negative traits

There are still two important points to make in relation to undermining/enhancement arguments. First of all, our starting hypothesis, which we have illustrated in this section, was that opposition to political projects or arrangements should be linked to the idea that this project leads to a repression and to the potential loss of valued and positive aspects of ingroup identity. However, it should be noted that such projects can also be argued to create or enhance negative aspects of ingroup identity. Likewise, if a proposed project can be argued to enhance positive aspects, it can also be argued to repress negative ones.

As regards the creation of negative aspects by an opposed project, this might be what is implied in Lab's argument, when she suggests that a separatist outlook on the parliament is in danger to make people more inward-looking and parochial. However, such a construction appears with more clarity in one of Lib's argument in

support of devolution, when he stresses that the Scots "*have often had a sense of inferiority because they were dominated by a much larger English population in what is a Union, not a federation.../.../...But I hope that home rule will have an effect, will make Scotland more self-confident, more self-possessed, less concerned about its relationship with England.*"

Of course, what this says is that, rather than being an endemic, inherent and essential feature of Scottish identity, the negative trait, i.e. the 'sense of inferiority', was created by the domination of the English in the Union. It was the contingent result of a specific intergroup context marked by a difference in power, in a political context which was not even one of federation - which would have allowed for a certain degree of Scottish autonomy. In other words, it is contingent upon the opposed political arrangement (an Union without parliament). Thus, the implication is that changing the power context would allow one to 'cure' or get rid of this 'complex of inferiority', i.e. to change Scottish identity for the better and to allow the full expression of its positive aspects. This last point is made by the use of terms such 'self-confident' and 'self-possessed' which has already been commented upon, and thus the point does not need to be repeated here.

However, arguments speaking in the name of the ingroup interest can also make use of negative traits which are not described as contingent, but as being in the essence of ingroup identity. What is then argued is that the opposed political project, if it does not create such negative traits, has this time the effect of contributing to enhancing them and to encouraging their expression, whereas the proposed project is argued to repress this negativity. In order to illustrate this point, we need to anticipate arguments we shall expand on in section 2.4, by using an extract by Lib which mainly describes the relationship between England and Scotland:

Extract 25

Lib: *I think the relations, the relationship is an evolving one. I think during, during the time of Mrs Thatcher the relationship between Scotland and England was abrasive, antagonistic. It's often said that Mrs Thatcher was the most compelling recruiting sergeant for the Scottish National Party, because she was three things: she was bossy, dictatorial, she was English, and she was a woman, and...to so...to be a dictatorial English woman was something the Scots find rather difficult to cope with.*

The Scots are chauvinist, still I think to a very substantial extent, they don't like being told what to do, and they particularly don't like being told what to do by a partner in Great Britain of whom they have some apprehension. So during the Thatcher period, then, there's no doubt there was a very strong strand of political thought which was, if not anti-English, at least anti the existing...anti-White hall, anti-Westminster. I hope that home rule will provide a safety valve for that.

What is interesting to note is that negative traits (here chauvinism) can be used to defend a position in favour of more autonomy. Indeed, such data seems to runs against the idea that this type of claim (and, more generally, speaking in the name of ingroup identity) should necessarily be linked with a pervasive ingroup favouritism. If, for instance, such a definition of the ingroup had been measured by or was likened to an answer on a trait scale (i.e. if it had been taken out of its argumentative context), it could well be taken as evidence of ingroup denigration. Moreover, if abrasive relations with England and the wish for separatism are not in the essence of Scots, but contingent upon Thatcher's rule (see also section 2.2 and 2.4), chauvinism is indeed described as being in the essence of Scottish people. Even worse than this, Lib seems to imply that Scots are somewhat prejudiced against women (or at least English authoritarian ones!). Thus the use of negative traits is not limited to contingent traits, and it cannot be argued that a 'positivity bias' is nevertheless maintained at the essential level.

However, if this definition is taken in the context of the broader construction developed by Lib, we can easily see how it makes sense. That is, the negativity of this definition should be understood in relation to how the proposed political project is assumed to impact on this trait. The use of negative and essential stereotypes to support autonomy (here, a moderate one) is possible because the proposed political project claims to be able to bring some positive change in this identity, to eradicate the negative trait, or at least to repress its expression and their undesirable consequences. If devolution is hoped to provide a safety valve against any potential future English dictatorial oppression, it is equally hoped to play the same role for the rather enduring tendency of Scots towards chauvinism. In other words, what matters in such a definition is not so much its description of the present state, but its place in a picture of how things should be.

The second important point to note concerns the differences in arguments between advocates of full separatism and advocates of devolution. Of course, one obvious difference between them is that these latter can argue that there are both negative and positive effects of being part of the Union and also that they stress the undermining impact of separatism. But there is also a difference in the way they construct the negative effects of the Union, when they argue in that direction. That is, what they argue is that the negative impact on Scottish identity is in fact contingent on some other factor, which can be confounded with the Union, rather than being due to the Union as such (i.e. a necessary consequence of being in the Union). Thus, in Lib's extracts, both the Scots 'sense of inferiority' and the expression of their chauvinism are not to be blamed on the union as such, but on a contingent political context (the domination of the English and the rule of the Conservatives), which can then be both solved by devolution, rather than making independence necessary.

2.3.4. Summary and conclusions

a) Impact accounts

In this section, our main purpose has been to show that political projects concerning union or separation are argued over by constructing the impact of these projects on the national self, i.e. whether it undermines or enhances this self and its interests. More specifically, however, as people are not merely concerned with possessing a positive and distinct identity 'cognitively', but are also concerned by having the means to express and enact this identity in practice (see Chapter 1), we have seen that arguments of identity undermining tends to focus on the repression of this expression by the opposed political project, whereas arguments of identity enhancement tend to stress the realisation and expression of ingroup identity by the proposed project.

Indeed, what our speakers argue is not so much that the opposed political project undermines any particular ingroup interest or aspect of its identity, but, more fundamentally, that it undermines its very ability to pursue any of its interests and to act on the terms of its identity and values; or, in other words, its capacity to express its self in practice. This also raises the threat of loss of identity; however, it is not so much the actual loss of any particular aspect which is the most threatening, but the

fact that the repression of ingroup identity entails a process whereby every aspect of ingroup identity could potentially be lost in the long term. Likewise, an enhancing political project (whether it is a separatist or unionist one) does not so much relate to any particular ingroup aspect or interest as to the general capacity to realise and express any ingroup norms and values in practice.

Furthermore, our analysis has also lead us to bring a slight nuance to our original argument. Indeed, although we have argued that identity undermining/enhancement could be used to defend quite different political projects, we have also implied that opposed political projects or arrangements will always be argued to lead to an undermining of identity and the advocated one to an enhancement of this identity. However, we have seen that speakers can also argue for a project that entails a repression of ingroup identity or oppose a project which facilitates the expression of that identity. Of course, the trick is that it simply depends on the valence of the content attributed to that identity, i.e. speakers will argue for a project that leads to loss or repression of negative aspects, and/or oppose one which enhances them. But what it shows is precisely that this content must be taken into account, and also that it ought to be put within its argumentative context in order to understand its consequences. Thus, for instance, while it might not be empirically the most common case, 'ingroup derogation' can be used to defend autonomy.

This can also be seen as reinforcing our point concerning the strategic nature of identity constructions. Indeed, we can that see the strategic variability of identity constructions is in fact not limited to arguments for different projects using constructions of the same identity process with a different target in mind, i.e. applying undermining to the opposed political arrangement project and enhancement to the supported one. The same project can be sustained by the fact that it enhances positive aspects or undermines negative ones, allowing for 'extra' flexibility in arguments (e.g. negative aspects can be acknowledged and even capitalised upon in order to argue for autonomy).

b) Overview of speakers' arguments

Let us now provide an overview of the arguments of all speakers concerning the impact of Britain and Europe on Scotland.

In relation to Britain, we have seen how C, in line with his unionist project, argues that the UK has an enhancing impact on Scotland (see extract 24) and also denies explicitly that it has undermined Scottish identity and prevent the expression of Scottish patriotism (see section 2.3.2). By contrast, the separatist S stresses that Britain has been damaging to the Scottish economy (e.g. on manufacturing, on the steel and coal industry, etc.) and that as a result it has made the Scots more inward-looking, corrupting or repressing their '*basic nature*' which is to be gregarious and outward-looking ("*we've been forced, perhaps, over the last years, to look inwards, again, because of the problems that have started to face us*", referring to these problems created by the Union). Although she does not argue that the specific Scottish culture and way of life has been lost under the Union, she does stress that it is not represented at the UK-level and thus cannot be expressed properly. She argues that "*the only way to cure these ills, is to get control about our destiny again*" and that independence would allow a release of the repressed potential of the Scots. She also turns the argument the other way round and denies that the Union has had an enhancing effect on positive aspects of Scotland (e.g. on the ship building industry in Scotland and on the Scottish Enlightenment).

As for the advocates of devolution, Lib and Lab, they underline that the UK can have both positive and negative effects on Scotland, but while the positive side can be unconditional, they both always argue, as we have seen above, that the negative is contingent upon specific political circumstances rather than being due to the UK as such. Under Thatcherism and the Conservatives, and without a Scottish Parliament (one of whose effect will precisely be to protect Scotland from Conservative rule), the UK has indeed had some negative impact on Scottishness, either by undermining positive aspects (e.g. self-confidence) or by enhancing negative ones (e.g. chauvinism). However, the UK also brings many good thing (e.g. as we have seen, for Lab, it provides economical and social benefits and makes Scots more outward-looking) and it is the role of devolution to ensure that it is possible to enjoy the essentially positive side of the UK while avoiding its contingent negative ones.

Lab also argues directly that independence will make Scottish people more inward-looking. This could be interpreted either as stating that independence undermines the expression of a positive aspect of identity (outward-looking tendencies) or as enhancing a negative aspect of identity (inward-looking) – what is

in the essence of the Scots on that point is not detailed (C also links separatism with being inward looking, but in his case it is not clear whether separatism is an expression of that aspect or whether it will enhance it). As for Lib, he does not explicitly point to the dangers of independence, but of course it is implicit that independence will have a negative effect insofar as it would withdraw the benefits of being in the UK.

Both C and Lab further argue that even devolution and the Scottish Parliament can have negative effects. However, the difference between the two is that for Lab this is conditional, i.e. *if* it is seen as leading to independence, so that what it means is that it is not devolution as such which is undermining but separatism; whereas for C, as devolution is already a separatist move which is very likely to take the road of independence anyway, there is little distinction between the two.

In relation to Europe, it is, as we have seen, C who stresses the undermining impact of the EU on the British/Scottish way of life. By contrast, all others candidates argue that Europe can have a positive impact on Scotland, although their arguments do not always come unqualified.

S stresses how the fact that the UK has severed the ties between Scotland and Europe prevents the Scots from expressing their outward-looking and pro-European nature. She argues that Europe can have both negative and positive effects, but the negative mostly arise out of the misrepresentation of Scotland by the UK in Europe, so in fact this argument defends Europe by denying that Europe as such is essentially undermining. Like Lib and Lab's arguments concerning devolution in Britain, it is the role of independence to ensure that the positive can be enjoyed and the potentially negative resisted.

Lab equally stresses the benefits from Europe, which, amongst other things, contribute to make Scots more outward-looking (as does the union with England). As mentioned in the summary of her argument (see 1.2.3), she denies that Europe has diluted any important aspect of the British/Scottish way of life, by arguing that the aspects which are claimed to be diluted are trivial (e.g. metric system). But, although she explicitly denies that Europe has had any negative impact, she recognises that there are several aspects of Europe which need reforms. However, the best way to deal with that as well as enjoying the potential benefits of Europe is to have a British government which is open to dialogue with Europe, unlike the Conservatives. Thus,

like S, the beneficial impact of Europe on Scotland is contingent, but for her it is contingent on which particular political party runs the UK, not of being part of the UK as such.

As for Lib, he argues that Europe "*most definitely*" benefits Scotland, but his argument seems to suggests that he sees this impact purely in economical terms. Indeed, he denies that Europe has had any negative or positive impact on the cultural side of life in Scotland.

Speakers' arguments are summarised in Table 2.4 for the impact of political projects/arrangements relating to the UK and in Table 2.5 for the impact of political projects/arrangements relating to the EU. Following the above discussion, the impact of being part of the UK and the EU can be divided into 'contingent' (i.e. impact not due to UK/EU as such) and 'essential' impacts, as this distinction is necessary in order to interpret some of the arguments (in particular those made by advocates of devolution). As before, we have omitted arguments relating to Europe as a federal state (as all speakers agree on this point), and therefore the impact of the EU refers to a 'devolved' EU (see 2.2). What comes out quite clearly from Tables 2.4 and 2.5 is that, as with previous level of arguments, all speakers' account are consonant with their political project.

TABLE 2.4: IMPACT OF UK ON SCOTLAND

	C	Lab	Lib	S
Contingent impact of the UK		-	-	
Essential impact of the UK	+	+	+	-
Impact of devolution	-	+	+	+/-
Impact of separatism	-	-	-	+

legend

▩ : Impact expected to be argued positive

+ : Enhance positive aspects (or undermine negative aspects).

- : Undermine positive aspects (or enhance negative aspects).

Faded fonts indicate implicit or indirect arguments

TABLE 2.5: IMPACT OF EUROPE ON SCOTLAND

	C	Lab	Lib	S
Contingent impact of the EU		+/-		-
Essential Impact of the EU	-	+	+	+
Impact of 'separatism'	+	-	-	-

legend

▨ : Impact expected to be argued positive

+ : Enhance positive aspects (or undermine negative aspects).

- : Undermine positive aspects (or enhance negative aspects).

Faded fonts indicate implicit or indirect arguments. In the case of Lib, it indicates that his argument is made purely at the economic level.

2.4. Group relationships under different political arrangements

The arguments which belong to our fourth and final category are quite close to the arguments which we have just seen in the preceding section, as they also dwell upon the consequences of membership in Britain and in Europe for the Scots. However, the difference is that they do so by relying on a more articulated picture of the relationships with outgroups. That is, ingroup and outgroup identities and interests are made more specific, and argued to be either convergent or divergent. Combined with constructions of the power relationship between the groups, this determines whether they can successfully been brought together under the same political arrangement.

2.4.1. Arguing separatism: incompatibility and powerlessness

Let us start by illustrating how separatist arguments rely on constructions of incompatibility and powerlessness in order to create a picture of undermining of the national self. In fact, we could begin by referring back to an extract by our SNP candidate already used in section 2.2 (extract 15). In that extract, we could see S establishing a difference between an inward-looking England and an outward-looking Scotland. If this was used in order to explain the more pro-European attitudes of the Scots, a further implication of that argument, suggested by S, is that because Scotland is represented by the UK in Europe, it is the inward-looking and rather anti-European attitude of the English (or the British, which for S is the same), who see themselves "*as somehow separate from the rest of Europe*", which prevails in dealing with Europe – thus preventing Scotland from expressing its outward-looking identity and pursue its interests in Europe. Indeed, criticising "*the lackadaisical attitude to Europe from Westminster*", S argues that:

Extract 26

S: *Well, the British way has always, has always...been more 'I'm alright Jack' , I mean, it was, you know right through the Thatcher and the Major days, it was almost like they were standing on the outside throwing stones, saying we don't like this, we don't like that.../.../...I mean, there's always such a battle, such a fight, such a*

resentment. Whereas we feel, the only...you know, the only way to make Europe work is to be in there.../.../...unless you have a more pro-active co-operative approach towards Europe, then when there's something you really need to put your foot down on and say [she snaps her fingers] *no, you're not gonna get the understanding, the co-operation, you're not gonna be able to have a meaningful dialogue with any of the other members states, because they're just so used to you, I think to use an English term, being a stroppy bugger.*

This different attitude to Europe, and the different interests it represents, is why for instance John Major "*sold out the fishing rights in order to get an opt-out from the social chapter*", given that "*UK-wide, the farming and the fishing sector make up such a small percentage of GDP, they've never really been very high on the priority*". But *"in Scotland they are very important, we want to be able to fight for them"*. Still in relation to Europe, S also provides another concrete example of incompatibility of interests between Scotland and England:

Extract 27

S: Scotland has always been far more pro-Europe than the rest of the UK.../.../...The big issue, you know, it's the single currency. Most people in Scotland want it, most people in the rest of the UK don't. If we have a referendum under the Blair government, the UK as whole, will probably at the moment vote against, but Scotland will vote for, and that again will cause resentment, because our economy works on a different basis than the English one, we're ma...we're based on tourism, manufacturing and the service sector, which is being hammered by the high pound and the high interest rates, and we would really benefit from joining the single currency.

The practical incompatibility is especially clear in the case of the Euro because it is a clear-cut zero-sum game: either we join or not, but it is not possible to have both at the same time. And given the nature of Scotland's economy, the Euro would profit her, whereas it is implied that this might not be the case for England. Or at least, what is certain is that the English will vote against it, and that, given their

dominance in Britain, it is their view and their different interest which will prevail and be imposed on Scotland, preventing her from following her interests. Thus, it is the enactment of English identity which makes impossible the enactment of Scottish identity. Not only is an anti-European stance unscottish (see section 2.2), it is in fact characteristic of the English point of view, and thus the Union is acting on the terms of an alien identity, which will always prevail because Scotland is powerless. It is this combination of incompatibility and lack of power which undermines Scotland's identity and interests.

The lack of power of Scotland in Britain, in the eyes of S, has already been illustrated in section 2.1.2. (extract 5): "*every MP from Scotland, Wales and Ireland could vote the same way against the government, and then still lose. Which means technically there is absolutely no way that we can defeat a measure...*". This states that not only is Scotland not listened to by Westminster, but moreover that it has not the power to make itself heard and to resist British rule when British policies do not suit Scotland. But the fact that incompatibility, on its own, is not sufficient, and needs the power dimension in order to lead to an undermining of ingroup identity, is illustrated by another example used by S in order to underline Scotland's powerlessness. This example focus on the Poll Tax introduced by the Conservatives under Thatcher, and S argues that the Conservatives "*introduced the Poll Tax in Scotland, a year before they introduced it in England, of course there were massive riots, which were completely ignored, and we had a year of the Poll tax, the Poll Tax was introduced in England, lo and behold there was riots on the streets of London and the Poll Tax was scrapped within eighteen months. ".* The point is that, while it is possible for the British government to implement policies judged inadequate by the English as well as by the Scots, the crucial difference is that the English, unlike the Scots, have the power to resist such policies. Thus, it is not just incompatibility, but also powerlessness, which justifies seeking independence, because it makes 'inside resistance' ineffective.

Moreover, although S suggests that the Conservatives have been particularly harmful to Scotland, she also argues that the problem of being ignored does not lie with any particular British government. Indeed, even when you have a Labour government "*which you would think would be sympathetic to Scotland"*, in fact "*they're not listening, because they're doing things that are completely against the kind of political ideas and community ethos always went here.../.../...so again you're*

seeing that even where the government that you would have got would have been more in tune with the Scottish thinking, we have very little power to say that's not what we want." Rather than being contingent on the particular political profile of the party in charge in Westminster, the problem of being ignored and having alien policies imposed lies in the very essence of the Union and its political system.

This point, and the reasons why this is so, are made more explicit when S implies that irrespective of the individual character of politicians (i.e. whatever the party they belong to and even if they are Scottish), the very nature of the British political system means that whoever goes to Westminster will betray Scotland:

Extract 28

S : *I think it's the seduction of Westminster, you know. That they're wanting to, you know, to be this big fish in the big pond, and...because they recognise that if they go to Westminster, and if they...and if they get, you know, if they win the government, you know...if they don't look after the vested interests down there, if they don't play the game by the rules, then they're not going to survive. Because in order to win a general election, you have to win the English folk.../.../...you've got to play to them, you've got to put in the policies, you've got to look to the economy of what is politely called Middle England, which means you've got cut adrift from your own constituency base, you've got to cut away your own background, in order to appeal to these people.*

What this extract says is that the very system of the Union fosters incompatibility and creates a zero-sum game, which can only go against Scotland's interest. Either politicians listen to the English interests or to Scottish ones; in practice, however, only the former can happen, for listening to England is necessary to win the elections. Those Scottish politicians who would try to stay in touch with Scottish people would simply be side-lined. Thus the very fact of being a Westminster politician requires one to follow English interests and therefore to go against Scottish interests. It is not only that politicians *are* 'corrupted' to English interests, it is that they *can only be* corrupted. The desirability of independence is therefore not contingent upon the Conservatives or another particular political party being in power, but is necessary in any case.

What this also shows, however, is that the problem does not lie in the differences per se with the English but in the fact of having to live together under the same political arrangement, which raises the practical issues of having to take common decisions and to share procedural power. Thus, in this type of separatist argument, it is not necessarily the outgroup (the English) which is attacked, but rather the British state which binds the ingroup and the outgroup together. Indeed S explicitly denies that the Scots and the SNP members are anti-English, and add that "*We just don't want to be ruled by them, which is completely different to hating them.*" In fact, if anything, it is the Union which poisons the relationship with England, whereas separatism would promote a better partnership: "*There is, you're always going to get that niggle, and I think that's because of the resentment, I think that's one of the thing that independence would cure. Because the resentment would go, we would be able to become really good neighbours, equal partners, rather than this...you know, you're always complaining about us, we're always complaining about you.../.../...But it's come out all the time, all the time, you just hate the English, which is untrue. We just don't want to be ruled by them, which is completely different to hating them.*"

2.4.2. Arguing devolution: some incompatibility but power

If, as we have just seen, incompatibility and lack of power are both necessary to lead to undermining and separatism, this also means that it is possible to recognise differences, and even a certain degree of potential antagonism between groups without advocating total separation. More than that, this antagonism can even sometimes be taken as evidence of closeness between groups. To illustrate that point, let us look at how Lib describes the Scotland-England relationship, through the use of a powerful metaphor:

Extract 29

Lib: *The relation between Scotland and England, how do you define this relationship? Well it's famously described by an eminent Scottish author called Sir Ludovic Kennedy, as like being in bed with an elephant. Essentially, you have a*

symbiotic, emotional and other relationship, but the other partner is infinitely bigger and stronger, and is occasionally, just to continue the metaphor, when the other partner turns over in bed, sometimes it does so without having regard to the fact that they crush (laugh slightly), they may crush the partner that's in bed with it.

At first sight, the metaphor might seem to describe a rather negative relationship with England, where Scotland occasionally ends up being crushed. However, though a certain degree of antagonism is indeed present, a closer look reveals that this negativity is very much qualified. The metaphor as interpreted here carries the implication that while it is true that England might harm Scotland, this does not happen every time that England 'turns over in bed' (i.e. behaves according to its desire or interests), and when it does happen it is without any really bad intentions on its part. It is just a consequence of its bigger size and power, a fact that England, like an elephant who does not choose his biological makeup, is not really responsible for.

Lib also insists on the fact that, however potentially harmful for Scotland, the relation is first of all a relations between *partners*, and a symbiotic and emotional one: after all, being in bed with someone else can carry this implication that there we have an intimate (maybe even a marital) relationship. In fact, it could be argued that it is implied here that such a close relationship is the very condition that make possible the 'crushing', for if the two groups were not partners, they would not even share the same bed at all.

In order to better understand how much the conflictual aspect of the relationship is softened in this extract, let us leave for once the core material of our data and contrast the extract with another use of this same metaphor, where it is used to make the case for independence . This other interpretation of the metaphor can be found in a separatist pamphlet by P.H. Scott, which takes its very title from it: "*In bed with an elephant: The Scottish experience*" (Scott, 1985). According to this author, for Scotland to live with England is also "*like a man having to share a bed with an elephant.*" (p.5). But his explanation of the metaphor is quite different to the one presented above and leads to different implications:

Extract 30

It is an experience which can be dangerous or very uncomfortable and lead to pressures which are difficult to avoid or resist. The elephant can use its sheer bulk and weight to flatten resistance altogether. This can happen even by accident or without any malicious intention. If there is a conflict of interests or of tastes, weight is liable to predominate. This sort of experience is common whenever a country has a neighbour much larger and wealthier than itself. (p.5)…|further on|…*It was the misfortune of Scotland to have on her border a country which was not only larger, and therefore more powerful, but which was, for centuries, particularly aggressive and expansionist.* (p.6)

In this case, there is no reference whatsoever to a partnership or an emotional relationship with the elephant. The situation of 'being in the same bed' does not imply that it is because Scotland and England are partners, but simply flows from the fact that they are neighbours, a situation where all element of choice is removed (a fact indicated by Scott's wording: it is "*like a man <u>having</u> to share a bed with an elephant...*")

Secondly, although Scott argues that the 'crushing' *can* also happen *even* by accident, in fact this statement carries as a correlate the implication that it can also happen intentionally, and the definition of England as aggressive and expansionist suggests that this what England has been doing, at least in the past. Again, this is subtly different from Lib's version, where the hypothetical element was about whether there will be any crushing at all (which only happens occasionally), while the fact that this happens without malicious intentions was not put into question.

Finally, Scott's version also implies that the 'crushing', even when unintentional, is nevertheless inevitable because conflicts of interests between the countries will necessarily arises at some point (especially with an expansionist neighbour). In fact, the 'crushing' is not just about crushing the other who is in the bed, it is about crushing its resistance, which takes for granted that the elephant will use its power not in every situation, regardless of the interests of the other (which might be similar or different), but precisely when the other is in disagreement. As a result, the whole point of the pamphlet is to argue that independence is the only possible solution.

By contrast, to come back to Lib's interpretation, its implications seems to be that a solution should be found and changes be made in the organisation of the relationship, but that change is like solving an internal quarrel in a close relationship, where the very existence of the relationship is not put at stake. This is not put explicitly in this extract, but we have seen above that Lib's solution for the Scottish-English abrasive relationship is not in independence but in a devolved parliament (see extract 25). Though there might be some incompatibility, what was said then is that the abrasive relationship should disappear with devolution and the end of Thatcher's rule. In other words, undermining was dependent on Scots' powerlessness, but with devolution giving back this power to the Scots, these latter can resist and get on with the Elephant, and possibly even benefit only from its strength (i.e. enhancement by the Union, see section 2.3). Or, to put it otherwise, devolution might not erase differences of identities and interests, but it takes away the practical incompatibility. True incompatibility is contingent on the opposed project of a non-devolved Scotland.

Thus, if Lib is somewhat similar to S in establishing some differences and tensions between the two groups, the implication they draw from this state of affairs is quite different, mainly because what is identified as the source and nature of incompatibility and tension is quite different. This is an all important difference for, rather obviously, it is the source and nature of incompatible difference which identifies the solution, i.e. the political project to be defended. If it is contingent on aspects which are not essential but external to the Union itself (for Lib, the Conservatives and centralised power, or, in the case of Labour, Conservatives and poverty), the solution is to stay in the Union but get rid of conservatives and have a devolved system. By contrast, if, as in S's case, it is the Union in itself rather than any party or other contingency which is the cause of problems, the solution must be independence.

2.4.3. Arguing for the Union

a) compatibility or complementarity

What about supporting union and integration on the basis of constructions of intergroup relations? As we have just seen, emphasising ingroup power, even within

a potentially incompatible context, can go towards that aim to some extent. However, things can go further than such a defensive argument.

Thus, one possibility, exemplified by C, is to emphasise similarities and common identity so that the question of the relation between English and Scottish people simply does not pose itself in intergroup terms. It is assumed they are all part of a single group which cannot be divided without doing violence to reality and people's feelings (see section 2.1.2). In that context, it is in fact separation which can potentially create incompatible interests, as C's argument on the effects of the Scottish parliament demonstrates (see C's summary in 1.2.2).

Alternatively, when some differences between the Scots and English are explicitly acknowledged, these latter, as we have already seen (see section 2.1.1), can be made superficial and secondary to shared interests. It is worth repeating here the extract which made that point:

Extract 3

C: Well, they have a lot in common, a lot they have in uncommon, as far as you like (laugh). But yes, there are, there's a lot of arguments about Bannockburn and everything else that goes on, but it's almost an amusement.../.../...So there is, there's a danger being too fixed on what's happened in the past.../.../...And, you know, Scotland and England got on fine. When there is an outside threat, they pull together better. Lords fought together in wars, etc.../.../...So that's, we've done things together, we have the common, the British common and, together, and those things don't go away...

When there is a common outside threat, that is when things become serious rather than the 'amusement' of arguing over differences, those latter are overcome and Scotland and England help to reinforce each other. This very fact shows that, beyond the superficial quarrels, at bottom they do share compatible interests; it is also evidence of their deep bond and their essentially good relationship which comes out when needed. Moreover, not only do differences not entail incompatible interests, but the fact of having two different groups is in fact a positive thing, for it provides mutual strengthening.

Such a case for complementarity between groups is perhaps made clearer by S in relation to Europe. We have already seen earlier (see section 2.2, extract 15) that, for S, Scotland has enjoyed in the past (i.e. before the Union) positive relationships, economic and cultural exchanges with other European countries. In the next extract, S argues that Scotland could enjoy again the benefits of closer relationships with those countries, but this does not mean that such positive relationships simply flow from similarity. In fact, S explicitly denies that all Europeans are very similar to Scots ("*I didn't say we were similar*"). However, what they do share, i.e. the only really necessary similarity to make it work, is the fact that, unlike the English, they have a certain openness to others and a willingness to discuss and interact, "*because, you know, they've got all these land borders, they had to learn to live with each other*". For that reason, in contrast to the UK, the differences, which do exist with other European countries, do not especially equate to incompatibility. It could even be the opposite:

Extract 31

S: *...the sort of the fancy term for it used these days is cross-fertilisation, and exchange of ideas, and I don't think that can ever be a bad thing. You know, no one nation and no one idea is perfect, you can always learn from others' experiences. I never see any harm in that, because that's the way to avoid conflict, that's the way to learn to live together. It's when you close yourself off from other cultures, when you close yourself off from other people and other countries, and get set in your ways.../.../...that is the slow route to conflict.../.../... I think that, that is the good thing about Europe.../.../...You don't have to behave like them, but as long as you can get along with each other. And I think that's the good thing about the exchange of cultures and views.../.../...You're never gonna agree on everything, I think it's quite unrealistic, that's why I don't think a federal Europe will ever happen.../.../...But I think, it's a good thing on the whole.*

Though the other is indeed different, this is not necessarily a bad thing and can even have positive effects, where you can learn from others. More importantly perhaps, S denies that there should be incompatibility and conflict between different groups, provided that they are open and outward-looking. In fact, it would be a

'separatist' attitude towards Europe which would potentially create incompatibility and conflict – although, at the same time, the sovereignty of the nations should be preserved, for a federal state would create a contingent situation where incompatibility would come to the fore again.

b) Power

Unionist positions also typically underline that the ingroup has a significant voice within the larger group and is thus able to influence the direction it takes. Thus, in parallel to the above extract, S also denies that Scotland, provided it is independent, would be powerless within Europe, and would in fact increase its weight by being out of the UK: "*Well I mean I think, I think you see that since the Nice summit, and the Treaty there, much more, more weight, and much more prominence is given to the small nations.../.../...You know, the small countries are not sidelined within Europe. You look at Denmark, they held up Maastricht for quite some time, until they got the deal they wanted. The whole point is, at present, we have no power at all.*"

Likewise, coming back to C's argument that the Union with England is beneficial to Scotland, this is also made possible because he argues that Scotland is far from being powerless in Britain. Indeed, although he acknowledges that Scotland has less power than England in Britain, C stresses that this power is nevertheless significant and can make a difference: "*But we're still in a situation where, you know, we have the perfect right to kick out, or help to kick out a government of Westminster if we want to. And it's possible for that to happen, based on what happens in Scotland. So, although our ability, Scotland's ability to control that is less than England's ability, but nonetheless there is a significant amount, you can't have a Labour government without the support of, in England, without the support of Labour seats in Scotland, so it's a pretty significant player in that Union so we can help steer its direction*". Furthermore, and perhaps more crucially, C argues that Scotland has not lost the 'essence' of its power, i.e. its sovereignty (see extract 8: "*if Scotland really wants to be independent, then there's nothing to stop them from exercising this sovereignty, because they are sovereign*"), even if such sovereignty is not actualised in a separate state, and even if Scotland had no parliament.

2.4.4 Summary and conclusions

a) Relationship accounts

What we have analysed in this section are arguments which end up in providing the same conclusions as in section 2.3, i.e. that ingroup identity and interests are either undermined or enhanced by being part of Britain or Europe. However, because these arguments define explicitly the relationships between groups inside those bodies, their analysis allowed us to make some important additional points.

The first point is that what is important in the way intergroup relationships are constructed is not so much whether identities and interests are described as similar or different, but, more fundamentally, whether they are made incompatible, compatible or even complementary. In other words, whether being part of a common political project permits the enhancement of both groups identities and interests, or else leads to a situation where following one's group aspirations will be at the detriments of the others'. Depending on constructions of power, this determines whether the ingroup is practically able or not to enact its identity and to follow its interests in the context of a Union.

Of course, empirically, there might be (and one would even expect to be) a correlation between the incompatibility/compatibility aspect and the fact that interests are similar or different in nature. But the point is that this is not a necessity. For what matters here is the practical meaning given to those similarities and differences, and, as a consequence, there are cases where differences can be seen as a positive asset (theoretically, there could as well be cases where similarities are construed as a negative one, but this did not come out in the data). What we have seen is that incompatibility or compatibility are not a question of comparing of the nature of the groups in the abstract, i.e. independent of the (practical) political context. Rather, the nature of the relationship between identities and interests is defined as dependent upon particular political arrangements which determine to what extent common decisions are to be taken or not, as well as how decisional power is distributed. What is then argued is, at bottom, that positive relations and compatibility depend on one's own political project/arrangement, whereas negative ones and incompatibility are created by the opposed project/arrangement. In other

words, this inseparability makes the point that what we are dealing with is a question of incompatibility/compatibility in practice more than a question of incompatibility/compatibility between the characteristics of the groups per se, as if their essences were themselves incompatible in all circumstances.

However, if there is one crucial point which comes out from this section, as well as from section 2.3, it is probably that it has shown us the key role of questions of power - but also how the issue of power has to be understood in relation to identity concerns. Indeed, arguments concerning power are almost omnipresent; but, on the other hand, the concerns of these nationalist arguments is not some sort of machiavellian quest for power for its own sake. What matters for them is the possession of power understood as a capacity for agency and as the ability to express the national self and to pursue its specific interests. The argued attraction or threat posed by the superordinate groups is then determined by the extent to which this group is seen to undermine or to enhance this capacity and thereby the ability for the ingroup to impact on the course of actions and decisions at the superordinate level as well as to live by its identity in practice.

Moreover, in section 2.3, we have also seen that power can be important in a slightly different respect, i.e. the argued attraction of a superdordinate group can also be that it helps one being a more significant player amongst the world of nations, and thus allows the ingroup to express its identity on the world stage. Overall then, the inclusion in a superordinate group can be sought after in the name of ingroup identity because it can go hand in hand and even support the quest for identity, i.e. the '*need to exist and to have a name'* and to be *'a recognized and respected somebody in the world'* (Geertz, 1993; see conclusions on section 2.1). However, this inclusion in an objectively more powerful group can also be argued to go against this quest for identity (i.e. to raise the threat of identity undermining), because of the need for a people to see its government as embodying their identity. As Geertz put it, the main task of nationalist ideologizing "*consists in defining, or trying to define, a collective subject to whom the actions of the state can be internally connected, in creating, or trying to create, an experiential 'we' from whose will the activities of government seems to spontaneously to flow...It is a question of immediacy, of experiencing what the state 'does' as proceeding naturally from a familiar and intelligible 'we'* " (1993, p.240 and p.317). However, when the potentially incompatible interests of other groups are seen as dominating the running of the superordinate group, what becomes

missing, as is illustrated by S's argument that Scotland will be powerless in Europe as long as it is part of Britain, is the sense that the supra-national group represents 'our voice ', and in fact that the power of this group is 'our ' power. As our own SSP candidate put it in his interview:

> *But if you don't, if you don't actually feel that power is being exercised on your behalf, then you don't have the power, do you? I mean power is a peculiar thing, isn't it? I mean, a lot of it is what you think of it. I mean, you may actually objectively get more out of being part of a larger, a larger formation.../.../...but if you don't think you've got any more, then you've actually got less, haven't you? As far as a feeling of powerlessness is concerned. And so I think that.../.../...the key thing will be the extent to which you feel there's some way in which your will is being expressed, and in that sense, there'll be more people feeling power and they will be more confident in trying to, trying to express their, their aspirations.*

Thus, the inclusion in an objectively more powerful group can potentially lead to an increased subjective sense of powerlessness and of incapacity to express the group's aspirations.

b) Overview of speakers' arguments

In relation to Britain, we have seen in this section how S argues that Scotland and England have incompatible interests and priorities and that Scotland is powerless in Britain to make its specific interests matters, with the consequence that this specific Scottish interest is undermined in Britain. By contrast, C not only denies that there is such incompatibility but suggests that on the contrary Scotland and England may reinforce each other (see extract 3, repeated in this section 2.4) - when he does not simply take it for granted that, as Britain, Scotland and England want the same things. In terms of power, we have also seen how for C Scotland is far from being powerless in Britain. In fact, C implies that Scotland has now too much power with the Scottish parliament, as the devolution settlement was unfair for English who

didn't had a say in the matter and do not enjoy the same kind of autonomy for themselves (see C's summary in 1.2.2).

As for Lab, she argues that people Scotland and England share very much the same needs and priorities ("*the problems of people living in Glasgow can be much the same as the problems of people living in Manchester...*"), i.e. a similarity which implies a compatibility of interests. If there are some differences, they are due differences in systems (which is why the parliament was established) and not to inherent cultural differences, i.e. there is no essential incompatibility between the Scots and the English. She also stresses that the feeling that Scots are powerless and "*being ruled by a distant parliament*" was an illusion also created by the Conservative government and that "*the Scottish parliament has been a long way to resolve that*" (see Lab's summary in 1.2.3). If she does not argue that there is complementarity between Scots and English, she does argues for such complementarity between the Scottish Parliament and UK government (e.g., on the issue of poverty, "*it's only by the two parliaments in the process of working together, that you can tackle those kind of problems.*")

Likewise, Lib stresses that Scots and English have basically the same interests ("*I doubt if their interests are significantly different from anywhere else in the United Kingdom...*"; see Lib's summary in 1.2.4). Although, as we have seen, Lib argues that there can be some incompatibility between the two countries, it is one which was very much contingent upon the Conservatives and upon the lack of power of Scotland which has been resolved by the Scottish parliament (i.e. Scotland is not powerless in a devolved Union).

Overall, then, Lab and Lib tend to agree more with C than with S, and share the same conclusion that being in the UK essentially benefits Scotland's interest. However, the difference with C is that they acknowledge that there might be some legitimate feelings of incompatibility and powerlessness, but those are made contingent upon the Conservatives being in power and upon the absence of devolution.

In relation to Europe, C's argument on the consequences of the absence of European identity (see extracts 1, 4 and 10) relies on and makes clearly the point that there is a strong incompatibility between Britain (including Scotland) and the other European countries, and his main concern vis-à-vis Europe is the loss of power for Britain it entails, which has already gone too far. Thus, directly following the above

quote about the control Scotland has in Britain, C added: "*But in the European context, you start getting to the stage where, because we're different peoples, you're not going to be able to have a kind of identity and that kind of control. If everyone in Britain agreed, within a federal Europe on, you know a particular point, and then say that's important to us, we want to do that, everyone here said that, but the rest of Europe didn't want to do that from a federal state, that would be it, we couldn't do it. And that's that kind of loss of identity, that I think it's unnecessary to go down that route.*" This quote illustrates quite well how incompatibility and powerlessness combines to create a concern for the repression and the loss of ingroup identity.

By contrast, we have seen how S argues that there is no inherent incompatibility between Scotland and the other European countries and that, on the contrary, differences might sometimes lead to '*cross-fertilisation*' and to '*exchange of ideas*' where '*you can always learn from others' experiences*'(see extract 31). It is true that she does acknowledges that these differences might also sometimes be incompatible: "*You're never gonna agree on everything I think it's quite unrealistic*" which is "*why I don't think a federal Europe will ever happen. 'Cos I don't think anyone will ever completely integrate in such a manner that would make it feasible*", but, provided that Scotland is independent, its interests will be heard and respected in Europe. In fact, S argues that Scotland has little power at the moment in Europe but that is because it has no power in the UK and therefore is misrepresented at the European level. Thus, Scotland will have more power in Europe by being independent.

Like S, and in opposition with C, Lab argues for complementarity with European countries, which works in both directions: "*I think there's a lot to be learned from the relationships with other countries.../.../...the way in which countries like France balance working life and how they see the family and how they treat working mothers, and all those kind of issues, I think, I suppose, I mean I'm thinking that the UK can learn about from those countries, and that type of European thought on those issues.../.../...But at the same time it's...kind of, I mean there's still not a high level of women political representation in Europe either, within, in a lot of European countries. And Scotland is one of the best examples of what can be achieved within the Scottish parliament and the representation of women, so there's maybe, they can learn that from us, I suppose.*" One difference with S, however, is that this complementarity also plays at the UK level.

As for Lib, although he argues that Europe benefits Scotland (see section 2.3), he does not really put forward any argument stating more explicitly the compatibility or incompatibility with European countries.

Where both Lab and Lib disagree with S, and agree with C, is that they argue that the UK gives Scotland a stronger voice in Europe, and that Scotland would therefore have less power in Europe by being independent. Thus Lab underlines that: "*I don't have a problem with the UK being at the big table so it speaks on behalf of Scotland.../.../...because UK is, UK is such a major player within Europe. I think for Scotland to be a small independent nation, especially with the enlargement of Europe, the SNP fantasies that we're gonna be this, you know strong country who will be better heard, I think are a wee bit misplaced. I don't see why Scotland would be better heard than other smaller countries...*". Likewise, Lib stresses that "*Scotland is better represented by the fact that this is done on a UK-EU basis rather than a Scotland-EU basis*" (see Lib's summary in 1.2.4). The same point is implied in C's argument, although it is not made specifically in relation to Europe but in relation to the international scene in general (see extract 24). All these arguments rely on and illustrate the fact that the UK can speak for Scotland, i.e. the power of the UK is also the power of Scotland.

Speakers' argument on relationships and power are summed up in Tables 2.6 and 2.7. In Table 2.7, two lines represent Scotland's power in the EU, depending on whether Scotland is independent from the UK or not. As with previous level of arguments (see 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3), both tables show that all speakers' account are consonant with their political project.

TABLE 2.6: RELATIONSHIPS AND POWER IN THE UK

	C	Lab	Lib	S
Relationship with England under Union (without devolution)	+	+/-	-	-
Relationship with England under Union (with Devolution)	-	+	+	-
Relationship with England under Independence				+
Power of Scotland in UK	+	+/-	-	-
Power of Scotland in UK with devolution	++	+	+	-
Power of independent Scotland				+

Legend

▢ : Project under which it is expected that the relationship will be positive / that the ingroup has power

Faded fonts indicate implicit or indirect arguments

Relationship

+ : Compatibility or complementarity

- : Incompatibility

Power

- : Powerless

+: Has power

++: Too much power

+/-: Lab does not argue that Scotland was powerless under the Union because of the lack of devolution as such, but because of the Conservatives.

TABLE 2.7: RELATIONSHIPS AND POWER IN THE EU

	C	Lab	Lib	S
Relationship with other European countries under Union	-	+		+
Relationship with other European countries under 'separatism'	+			-
Power of Scotland as UK in the EU	-	+		-
Power of independent Scotland in the EU	- -	-	-	+
Power of Scotland (as UK) 'separate ' from EU	+			

Legend

▨ : Project under which it is expected that the relationship will be positive / that the ingroup has power

Faded fonts indicate implicit or indirect arguments

Relationship

+ : Compatibility or complementarity

- : Incompatibility

Power

- : Powerless

+: Has power

- - : C argues that Scotland as UK is powerless in the EU, but would be even more so if independent.

2.5. Summary of all level of argumentation

Having been through all possible different levels of argumentation, we can now provide an overview of what is argued by each speaker at each of these different levels, and how their accounts and arguments relate to all possible political projects or arrangements (see Table 2.8 for the UK and Table 2.9 for the EU).

TABLE 2.8: ARGUMENTS TOWARDS UK

	C			Lab			Lib			S		
	U	UD	S	U	UD	S	U	UD	S	U	UD	S
1. Reality/artificiality as arguments (see 2.1.5.b)			-			-				-		+
2. Content accounts (see 2.2.4)	+	+/-	-	-	+	-	-	+	-	-	+/-	+
3. Impact accounts (see 2.3.4)	+	-	-	-	+	-	-	+	-	-		+
4. Relationship accounts (see 2.4.4)	+	-		+/-	+		-	+		-	-	+

Legend

□ : Political project advocated by speaker

U : Union without devolution

UD : Devolution or Union with devolution

S : Separatism (independence)

+ : Argument supporting or account consonant with the project

- : Argument undermining or account dissonant with the project

+/- : Ambivalence

Faded fonts indicate implicit or indirect arguments

TABLE 2.9: ARGUMENTS TOWARDS EUROPE

	C		Lab		Lib		S*	
	U	S	U	S	U	S	U	S
1. Reality/artificiality as arguments (see 2.1.5.b)	-	+						
2. Content accounts (see 2.2.4)	-	+	+	-	+	-	+	-
3. Impact accounts (see 2.3.4)	-	+	+	-	+	-	+	-
4. Relationship accounts (see 2.4.4)	-	+	+				+	-

Legend

▨ : Political project advocated by speaker

U : 'Devolved' Union (i.e. not federal state)

S : 'Separatism' from EU (though not withdrawal)

+ : Argument supporting or account consonant with the project

- : Argument undermining or account dissonant with the project

Faded fonts indicate implicit or indirect arguments.

* S's accounts of impact and relationship reported in the table are provided that Scotland is independent.

As can be seen from Tables 2.8 and 2.9, although speakers do not always argue at every level and in relation to each possible project, all the accounts which they do provide are consonant with their position, both in the context of the UK and the EU. As we have illustrated extensively, what makes this possible is the fact they rely on very different constructions of identities and of the intergroup context; because they are different in their specifics, these accounts sustain different political projects, despite the fact that they all appeal to identity. We can even see that it is possible for the same speaker (in this case, for C and S), to use systematically opposed constructions, depending on whether it is question of Britain or of Europe.

Nevertheless, beyond this variability at the level of speakers' accounts, what we find is a remarkable consistency at the level of the relationship between their accounts and arguments on the one hand and their projects on the other. More than that, it is in fact the very possibility of variability in identity constructions which permits this consistency. In sum, this finding provides support for our hypothesis that these accounts are active constructions used strategically in order to gather support for their political project.

3. INTRA-INDIVIDUAL VARIABILIY

So far we have grounded our claim for the strategic dimension of identity constructions in the presence of inter-speaker variability and the pattern of consonance of this variability with the political projects advocated by the different discourses. However, such evidence is still open to one potential criticism. That is, it could be argued that this variability only reflects cognitivo-perceptual differences between our politicians. Rather than being involved in strategic business, what they would do is simply to describe their views, as explanations for their political attitudes. Thus, it could be their perceptions of group identities and their relationships which would explain, cognitively, their political attitudes, rather than vice-versa.

This is a valid point to raise and, before answering it, it must be first be acknowledged that such a perspective must be true *to some extent*. Indeed, we cannot escape the question of what are the reasons for leading politicians to defend particular political positions in the first place, and the answer must lie at least in part in their view of social reality (Spears, Jetten, & Doosje, 2001). In our view, there is little doubt, for instance, that most supporters of independence, whether they are politicians or not, do really believe that Britain has a negative impact over Scotland and Scottishness, and vice-versa for supporters of Union (see Chapter 3) – and this, however much they might perhaps over-emphasise it discursively beyond their personal belief.

Nevertheless, this is not to say that politicians' discourses on identities are *only* a reflection of their perceptions, cognitions and beliefs, and a first answer to that criticism lies in the fact that such a view would have great difficulty in explaining the perfect consistency between arguments and projects which we found in our data. An overall correlation between the two would indeed be expected, but a few inconsistent arguments could also be present, only in a lesser proportion. In fact, it would be quite unlikely if they were none, for social attitudes are rarely (if ever) perfectly neat and clear-cut phenomenon. Thus, this sustains the idea that there must be at least *some* strategic dimension to our politicians' arguments.

Secondly, while it is true that, on the basis of our data, we cannot answer the question of how much is cognitive and strategic in their arguments (a question which would be, in any case, at best quite a difficult one to answer), what we can do, as an

empirical answer to the criticism, is to show that there is definitely a strategic dimension involved in them, even if it might not be the only one. Concretely speaking, this means that we can try to complement our evidence of inter-individual variability by evidence of intra-individual variability. Indeed, if we could show the same politicians using quite different and contrasting views in order to sustain the same political project, it would lend even stronger support to the idea that it is the latter which helps to shape the former. Given that the present analysis has already been rather long, however, we will limit ourselves to give a couple of illustrative examples amongst many which would have been possible.

According to discourse analysis (Edwards & Potter, 1992; Potter & Wetherell, 1987), intra-individual variability is likely to appear as a function of changes in the communicational context, such as changes in the type of audience, diachronic changes in the strategic context (e.g. pre or post-elections discourses), etc.. These changes can make different arguments more or less appropriate in order to achieve the same goal. In our case, however, the only analytically available source of variability lay in potential changes in the immediate rhetorical context of arguments. That is, in order to sustain the constant broad political objective, different arguments with different proximal purposes can be used, depending for instance on which specific issue is at stake or which implicit or explicit counter-argument these arguments aim to answer (e.g. an advocate of devolution arguing against independence or against an Union without a devolved parliament).

To illustrate that point, let us look at our first example of within-speaker variability. As we illustrated in section 2.4, at several points during the interview with S, this candidate underlined the different, incompatible interests and priorities of England and Scotland (e.g. on the Euro, on fishing) and the fact that Westminster follows these different English interests which do not suit Scottish interests. However, this account contrasts with a point she makes in another of her arguments:

Extract 32

S: *So...we have a different history, we have a different culture, we have a different economy. Now...that's why we would be better off as an equal partner with England, within the whole European concept. I mean, it's also common sense, you know, at the moment, what...the UK has 29 votes. Now, if we became independent, we get 7 votes,*

these probably reduced by 2 or 3 votes. But we'd end up, the British Isles, having more influence in Europe, than we have now, because there'd be more votes, more ministers, but I am sure there are, the vast majority of issues within Europe we would agree, we would have similar needs and priorities as the ones for the UK.

Although that extract starts by another reminder of the differences between Scotland and England, it ends up arguing that Scots would in fact have very similar interests to the rest of the UK in relation to Europe. This is not necessarily to say that there is a contradiction between the two arguments – and this also goes for the other examples we will see below. Indeed, as Billig (1987) points out, the question of whether there is a contradiction between arguments or not can in itself be a matter of argument, and, should the candidate have been accused of being inconsistent or contradictory, she might quite well come up with an answer allowing her to reconcile the two assertions.

Nevertheless, it remains that there is a striking change of argumentative emphasis, and that this change can be understood both as a function of the specific rhetorical purposes of the two different arguments and the constant political project sustained by S. On the one hand, the incompatibility arguments make the point that only independence from Britain can allow Scots to pursue their legitimate interests. On the other hand, the purpose of the similarity argument could be to counter the idea, advanced by C and Lab for instance, that by breaking up with Britain, Scotland would lose its place as a major international player, including its influence in Europe. In particular, it is argued that being independent in Europe is not going to lead to a loss of power within Europe, quite the opposite (see also section 2.4.3.b where S implies that Scotland's power in Europe can only increase by being independent, as the fact that it is represented by the UK means that "*at present, we have no power at all*"); nor is it going to lead to conflicts of interests with the English neighbour (as they would have similar interests on the majority of issues in relation to Europe; see also section 2.4.1 where S argues that it is by being independent that Scotland would have a better relationship with England). The purpose could also be to convince outgroup members of the rationale for Scottish independence, by showing how they can also benefit from it (Klein & Licata, 2003) - although this has to remain a hypothesis. In any case, what matters is that, beyond this variability, what remains constant is that both arguments are clearly used to sustain independence.

A second example of intra-individual variability can be taken from Lab's interview. Let us contrast the two following extracts, paying particular attention to how the attitude of Scots towards public services is defined in both of them:

Extract 33

Lab: *I think when the, before the parliament was established, there was this big feeling that Scotland is a more progressive, a more tolerant, a more socially inclusive society, it treasures its public services more, you know there was this whole idea that we were this, more European, all these kind of descriptions. I'd like to think that Scotland was, but I don't think it is. I think the Scottish parliament, the concern of the Scottish parliament is that Scotland is actually become more insular, more parochial, rather than being forward looking.*

Extract 34

Lab*: But I think the Conservative government was.../.../... extremely damaging to the Union, the years under Thatcher. You know that it did bring frustration and resentment, that caused problems and the introduction of things like the Poll Tax, and, because Scotland holds its public services quite dear, cuts to the public services all that kind of thing, was quite difficult. I think it's a reaction against the Westminster government rather than a reaction against the English, so to speak.*

In the first extract, the stereotype that Scotland would treasure its public services more (implicitly, in comparison with England) is explicitly denied, whereas, in the second extract, this same idea is used in order to explain why the Conservative government was harmful to Scotland in particular. Again, this change of emphasis can be understood both as a function of Lab's constant political project and the specific rhetorical purposes of the two different arguments. The first extract constitutes an argument against independence which denies the usual stereotypes on which separatist discourses sometimes rely, including Scotland's attitude to public services. It is part of her argument associating independence with parochialism and with a narrow vision of Scottish identity (see section 2.1.4. and 2.3.2). The second

argument, which followed a question about the relations between England and Scotland, is also an argument against independence (and in favour of devolution), but in a different rhetorical context. It aims to explain the counter-evidence of Scottish resentment against the UK, given that the UK is argued to be good for Scotland. By stressing that it is the Conservatives who have hurt Scotland and not the UK as such, and that the resentment is against that particular government rather than against the English, it thus allows Lab to reject the necessity of independence, for the proper way to deal with this problem is therefore to have a Scottish Parliament, but not independence: "*I mean I think the need for a Scottish parliament really draws out of the 18 years of Conservative government, and out of the Thatcher government. I think that kind of focused the need that we didn't really want that to happen again. But I think it all .. I think it's quite related to recent history, rather than.../.../...a gradual drive for Scotland to be independent.*" (see Lab's summary in 1.2.3).

DISCUSSION

1. Overview of the results and conclusions

In the first chapter, we argued for an interactionist view of social psychological phenomena which takes into account both psychological and social factors in order to predict social attitudes and behaviour. In this respect, one of the main purposes of the present analysis was to show how such a view is necessary, empirically speaking, in order to make sense of the phenomenon of attitudes towards national integration/separation, at least at the discursive and argumentative level. Indeed, although the political discourses we have seen appeal to notions which might be psychologically universal, such as the concern for ingroup identity, we have shown how we also need to take into account the specific constructions of the content of identities and of the social context which accompanies those appeals if we are to understand their implications, i.e. how the arguments which are made actually sustain or oppose particular political positions. Rather than having a separation between those who would appeal to national identity and the others, we have seen how all our speakers use national identity, but also how they give very it different contents and very different definitions of the social context, as a function of their political project. Thus, as we stressed in Chapter 1, if the locus of identification and the concern for ingroup identity do not in and of themselves explain differences in political projects or attitudes, this is not because identity is unimportant, but on the contrary because it is pervasive (Paterson et al., 2001). It is used by all political projects which underline different (or even opposed) ways of being Scottish (or British) and to protect/enhance this identity and the ingroup's interests, norms, values and way of life.

More specifically, we have analysed different types of arguments in which the importance of content and context play in different ways. In section 2.2., we have seen how the attribution of specific contents to ingroup identity can be used as arguments aiming to mobilise support for both separation or integration. Through such definitions, speakers' political projects are constructed as representing the aspirations of the ingroup. Moreover, by making a distinction between the essence of identity and what is only contingent and external appearance, speakers can maintain their definitions (as well as the representativeness of their party and project) in the

face of possible counter-evidence. Should their definitions be accepted by the audience, the prediction would be that a higher degree of identification would not necessarily lead to increased support for separatism, but that the direction of support would depend on their specific content.

Secondly, in sections 2.3 and 2.4, we have seen that political projects concerning union or separation can be argued over by constructing the impact of these projects on the national self, i.e. whether they undermine or enhance this self and its interests. The same general notions of identity undermining or enhancement, which are assumed to correspond to existing psychological processes in the audience, can be used to defend different political positions, i.e. unionism as well as separatism, depending on how they are applied. A political project of integration can be argued to enhance the national self and separation to undermine it, as well as the opposite. If the general process is that what or who endangers the self is viewed negatively and reacted against (and vice-versa), it is the specifics of constructions which determine the nature of this who or what. That is, the political project which should be supported depends on how the impact of specific superordinate groups on ingroup identity is defined.

As we have seen in 2.3, such constructions of impact can rely on defining the specific nature of the superordinate group itself. They also rely, implicitly or explicitly, on how ingroup identity and the nature of the national interest are defined - for this is what is argued to be affected positively or negatively by the different political projects. Thus ingroup identity content matters at this level of argument as well, but here its meaning and consequences have to be understood in relation speakers' broader construction of how the different political projects impacts on this content. The best illustration of this was provided by the data showing that speakers can attribute negative traits to the ingroup (often contingent, but not necessarily so). Such apparent ingroup derogation makes sense when it is related to speakers' political projects. That is, the national self can be described negatively in the present, because it is described in comparison to a future ideal (i.e. in comparison to what it *can* and *should* be) which the propose political project will bring about, while the opposed project will maintain or reinforce such negative traits. In other words, negative aspects are argued to be undermined by the advocated project, and enhanced by the opposed project (van Knippenberg & van Oers, 1984; Spears, Jetten, & Doosje, 2001).

Arguments over the impact of political projects can also rely on a more explicit account of how ingroup identity and interests stand in relation to other subgroups. The constructions we saw in section 2.3 put their argumentative stress on underlining the nature of the impact, so that these latter aspects were often taken for granted. However, in section 2.4, we have seen how 'impact' constructions can also involve more explicit definitions of the relationship between the ingroup and the outgroup(s), in terms of the practical incompatibility or compatibility of their identity and the interests they define, as well as in terms of power. In turn, the definition of group relationships as compatible or incompatible can rely on the active constructions of specific identity contents, or those content can be taken for granted. Thus, while power arguments show the importance of how the social context is construed, compatibility/incompatibility arguments shows once again the importance of content, but also that, in this type of argument, specific contents need to be considered in relationship to other contents in order to understand their implications.

Finally, we have seen in section 2.1 that in order to understand some of the arguments encountered, we also needed to consider the ideological context in which they take place, i.e. the specific ideology of nationalism. This suggests that the fact that concerns for the ingroup national identity can translate into attitudes of political separatism or unionism might also depend on that specific nationalist context, i.e. that national identity is at stake rather than any other source of identification. It is quite possible that, in other contexts, different attitudinal or behavioural responses might be deemed more appropriate. As Geertz (1993) suggests, "*there are many other competing loyalties.../.../...in any state - ties to class, party, business, profession, or whatever. But groups formed of such ties are never considered as possible self-standing, maximal social units, as candidates for nationhood. Conflicts among them occur only within a more or less fully accepted terminal community whose political integrity they do not, as a rule, put into question.*" (p.261). One of the particularities of disputes over national identity, which makes them more than just another instance of intergroup conflict, is then that they can involve more than groups trying to get their way against the conflicting interests of the outgroup. More fundamentally, through the fights for separatism or integration, they involve a struggle to define the very terms and political context within which intergroup relations, competition, and the pursuing of group's interests take place.

Overall, although the present analysis replicated many of the findings of Reicher and Hopkins' research (Hopkins & Reicher, 1996; Reicher & Hopkins, 2001; Reicher et al., 1997b), it has also extended them in several ways. First of all, it has provided a more systematic classification of the different types or levels of arguments used by separatist and unionist political projects, illustrating their differences but also their relationship with one another, as well as their common purpose (i.e. in terms of political mobilisation).

Secondly, our analysis has investigated in more depth the arguments concerning the reality/artificiality of identities as well as the consequences of these arguments. Moreover, by doing so, it has stressed the role that nationalist ideology can play at this level. In turn, this has illustrated the more general point that nationalist ideology and the political context of the nation states are necessary to understand the political projects centred on national identity. Amongst other things, it explains why seeking separate statehood is an available option as an identity-related collective strategy of social change in the area of national identities.

Thirdly, it has helped clarify and/or to put more emphasis on some specific points concerning other level of arguments. For instance, we have paid particular attention to the fact that identity undermining/enhancement arguments generally take the more specific form of identity repression vs. identity realisation. This has allowed us to stress the fact that what underlies these arguments is a concern for the expression of identity in practice, rather than being limited to a concern about 'having' a positive and distinct identity at the intra-psychic level. Likewise, our analysis has also helped to clarify and systematise the interplay between incompatibility and power constructions in arguing about the positive or negative impact of superordinate groups. Yet other examples are the distinction we made between the necessary and contingent aspects of identity, as well as the use of positive vs. negative traits and its related distinction between actual and ideal identity. Without taking into account these rhetorical devices, the full meaning of some arguments cannot be understood.

Finally, our analysis has attempted to provide a systematic mapping of our speakers' arguments at each different level of argumentation. The conclusion of this attempt can be dealt with briefly, as it has already been repeated several times throughout the analysis. That is, we found a perfect consonance between speakers' arguments and their political project at every level. This finding confirmed the

strategic dimensions of such arguments. Our analysis has also shown that political projects or attitudes to Britain and to Europe can differ for the same speaker, and that, as a result, the constructions surrounding each of these body systematically vary in order to sustain these different positions.

Apart from the potential criticism of selectivity which we mentioned in the introduction, the results of this systematic review of speakers' argument also helps us in defusing another possible objection. Indeed, discourse analysis looking at the functionality of discursive constructions could be criticised for the fact that the strategic purposes followed by speakers, which are assumed to explain the meaning of the arguments, are often deduced from the arguments themselves. In theory, as with the norm explanation of the MGP (see Chapter 1), this would leave open the possibility of postulating at will any ad hoc purposes in order to suit any argument which is encountered. The interpretation could then also be accused of being tautological and to be no more than a description of the data (as in the famous example that a soporific makes people sleep because it has sleeping properties). However, in our analysis, the arguments encountered were all interpreted in the light of the broad and constant political objectives of our speakers, which were determined a priori, and our concern for the systematic mapping of these arguments means that we could not discard those arguments which would not fit with that objective. Furthermore, these broad political objectives were not deduced only from our speakers' discourse but also relied on an 'independent' source, namely their party line.

Lastly, before we start considering the limits of our analysis, another of its strengths is worth pointing out. That is, our findings can be argued to have a high external validity, given that the data was collected within a quasi-natural context, where 'participants' were for the most part themselves in charge of the meanings. In the context of a social psychology dominated by laboratory experiments where meanings tend to be imposed on participants, and where concerns are therefore sometimes raised about the extent to which the results of these experiments can be generalised outside the artificial conditions of the laboratory, this is no small advantage. Should our further studies, which will use more orthodox methodologies, be criticised on that point, the present analysis would provide a case for the applicability of our general approach and finding in understanding the 'real' world outside the research context.

It must be acknowledged, however, that this was only a 'quasi' natural framework, i.e. the data was collected in the context of interviews rather than, say, from the naturally occurring discourses of these politicians addressed to the general public. It is true that these interviews were not strongly structured and worked with rather general questions, but it is also true that we cannot be definitive about the spontaneous occurrence and characteristics of identity constructions in natural political contexts, for the answers of our politicians must have been framed to some extent by the questions. However, we do not believe that they were entirely so and that this can fully account for the characteristics of these constructions. Some evidence from our data can help to support this view. For instance, it is true that questions asking the interviewees to describe the Scots and the English, if they leave open the particular way of doing so, do indeed presuppose the use of national categories in order to answer them, and even might tend to suggest that the question of differences between them is at least a relevant one. Nevertheless, in contrast to what would happen with questionnaires, speakers were quite able to resist such questions and to refuse to answer in the terms they were posed if they wished to do so, as the use of class categories in some of Lab's arguments in order to deconstruct national ones shows (see 1.2.3 and 2.1.1). Thus, the fact that national identities, and arguments over them, were nevertheless generally dominant in the discourses cannot entirely be reduced to the influence of the interview questions.

2. Limits and future directions

The major limits of this study, however, are also bound up with its specific methodological choice. First of all, there is the fact that our data was based on the very specific case of politicians. Not only does this make it a sample from an elite population, but it could also be argued that, due to their position, politicians might have specific concerns not shared by ordinary people, or not to the same extent. For instance, the cynic might say that politicians live in a different realm out of touch with the reality of ordinary people and that the concerns of these latter might be of a different nature altogether. On the other hand, the elitist might say that they hold a more sophisticated view of the social world, and that perhaps ordinary people would react in the more stereotypically narrow-minded way, where a higher degree of ingroup identification would indeed directly lead to more support for separatism

(thereby undermining our content-based perspective). In all cases a gap is open between the politicians and the rest of the population. Therefore, a central question remains unanswered: are non-politicians concerned with the same type of issues (such as identity undermining/enhancement) and are these concerns indeed associated with their political stances towards supra-national bodies?

Furthermore, even should we assume that there is no qualitative difference between politicians and ordinary people, it can still be argued that, in this chapter, we have focused on the relationship between identity accounts and political attitudes at the argumentative level. Although we would assume, in line with the politicians making these arguments, that these latter can have a psychological impact because they correspond to psychological processes in the audience, our own claim at this level has not yet been directly and empirically established. Does the same logic and the same relationships found in those arguments play at the cognitive and motivational level? In other words, do identity definitions and construals of the social context have a psychological impact affecting people's political attitudes and beliefs, in the way which is assumed by political arguments, as well as being strategically used to sustain these projects? This is of course is not to say that all arguments are always efficient in doing so, but that, if the accounts of identity and social context in a specific argument are accepted, then this should lead to the consequences aimed at by the argument (i.e. to support the project it sustains), and that such an effect should be underpinned by psychological processes of identity. It might perhaps sound unlikely that politicians (or at least successful ones) would spend so much effort in arguing over identity and the way it is affected by supra-national bodies if it did not have such potential psychological impact and did not affect the attitudes in the general population; nevertheless, this remains a theoretical argument, and our discursive data does not allow us to reject the possibility that politicians might be wrong in what they think is moving people's opinions and attitudes.

Thirdly, our evidence so far has been of a qualitative nature. Amongst other things, this methodological choice has allowed us to do justice to the complexities and richness of arguments and to make a number of points which might have missed with more traditional quantitative methods of enquiry. For instance, as noted above, we have seen how some identity accounts (such as stereotypical traits) needed to be put in their rhetorical context and be tied to broader constructions if we are to understand their meanings and consequences. However, if, as the questions raised by

the limits of our analysis suggest, we are aiming to make a more general claim about the importance of identity accounts in relation to political attitudes amongst the general population, then we need to reinforce our qualitative data with quantitative data.

These limits will be addressed in the next studies, and, at the very least, the analysis presented in this chapter has set the relevance of the concepts which will receive our attention in those studies, as well as provided preliminary evidence as to the nature of the relationship which might exist between them (in line with the hypothesis made in Chapter 1).

Thus, in the survey study presented in the next chapter, we will focus on the quantitative relationship between conceptions of identity undermining, incompatibility and powerlessness on the one hand, and support for separatism on the other. More specifically, following the present findings, we will investigate two main hypothesis. One the one hand, we will ask whether the relationship between identification and support for separatism is moderated by perceptions of identity undermining, such that only when high identifiers also have a high sense of identity undermining should they support separatism more than low identifiers. On the other hand, we will test the idea that perceptions of incompatibility and powerlessness are also important in explaining support for separatism, but only insofar as they create perception of identity undermining; this means that these variables should be a strong predictor of identity undermining and that this latter should mediate their effect on support for separatism.

In Chapter 4, we will present an experiment attempting to manipulate directly perceptions of identity undermining and measuring the effect of this manipulation on support for separatism. This will constitute a more direct test of whether these perceptions can have a psychological impact on political attitudes.

Finally, two of the limitations raised above also apply to our point concerning the strategic nature of identity constructions. That is, we have shown that these latter can be used strategically by politicians and using qualitative (though systematic) evidence. However, our view is that strategic business on identity is not the monopoly of politicians (even if they might show a particular interest in doing so). Should that be the case, our approach would indeed be elitist, offering a picture whereby politicians consciously construct versions of the world which the public passively consume and act upon. Thus, in order to counter that view, in Chapter 5,

we will attempt to show the impact of strategic factors on group judgements, amongst 'ordinary' people. Moreover, as there is no reason why the strategic could only be investigated through qualitative means, we will do so using experimental and quantitative means.

CHAPTER III

IDENTITY UNDERMINING AND SEPARTISM : A SURVEY OF SCOTS' ATTITUDES TO BRITAIN AND THE E.U.

INTRODUCTION

In relation to the main tenets of our model, the findings from our first study may be summarised as follows. We have seen that the difference between speakers and their respective political projects could not be explained simply by distinguishing between those who use identity and make related claims and those who do not, for all speakers work with identity constructions. Rather, as predicted, differences in political projects (or attitudes) are clearly associated with accounts of identity undermining (conceived of as the repression or dilution of ingroup identity) or else identity enhancement, such that support *and* opposition to supra-national bodies are both sustained by claims of representing and protecting the interests of ingroup identity and of realising the national self.

Our first study has also shown how the establishment of these constructions depicting the undermining or enhancement of identity relies on the use of varying definitions of identities and their relationships. Yet as Reicher and Hopkins (2001) point out:

> *To analyse the cultural battles over the definition of national identity without understanding how people come to assume and inhabit such identities, and how the identity then shapes what they do, may be an interesting exercise in its own right, but it does not get us very far in understanding nationalism.* (p.3).

In some respects, our analysis already went beyond this potential limitation. Rather than being simply an account of the variability in identity constructions, aiming only at emphasising their fluidity and controversial character, our understanding of this variability was shaped by and related to our theoretical understanding of what should be the consequences of identity definition in terms of social action. It is these potential consequences on social actors (which are underpinned by general identity processes), as well as the constant political projects pursued by speakers, which give meaning to the variable arguments and their particular forms as these speakers try to direct social action through specific identity constructions.

Nevertheless, if we are to fulfil the demands of the above statement, we must still go further than that. For one thing, we would need to investigate more directly the consequences of identity definitions and of the psychological identity processes involved in political attitudes. That is, we ought to provide direct evidence that these definitions and processes actually impact on people's political attitudes in the way postulated by our model – otherwise our speakers might just have been arguing in vain. In other words, this means that we need to address the other side of our model, and to ask whether accounts of ingroup identity and its relationship with the superordinate group can be more than rhetorical tools in the service of political attitudes, and whether they can also act as beliefs which play a key role in explaining those attitudes.

The study presented in this chapter, as well as the experimental study presented in the next chapter, were designed towards achieving this purpose. More particularly, the present study, which used a web-based survey design, focused on Scottish people's concern about the undermining of Scottish identity, and the relationship between this concern and their attitudes to Britain and to the EU. It measured views on identity undermining and on the intergroup context (i.e. lack of ingroup power and incompatibility with the English), and, analytically speaking, these views were treated as perceptions or beliefs which, in combination with the degree of identification, were expected to determine participants' political attitudes.

In addition, and as stated at the end of the last chapter, this study also aimed to address two further limitations of the discursive study. First of all, it aimed to reinforce our qualitative evidence by quantitative data. Secondly, it aimed to show

that the importance of our concepts can be generalised beyond the world of politicians. Accordingly, the study used a sample composed mainly of university students. Though the aim was not to recruit a sample which would have been exhaustively representative of the Scottish population in terms of class, age, geographical location, etc., this sample did fulfil the main criterion of being constituted of participants not formally committed to politics.

Hypotheses

Drawing upon our theoretical model, the following predictions were made. First of all, perceptions of the undermining of ingroup identity within a supra-national body (i.e. Britain or Europe) was expected to moderate the relationship between national (Scottish) identification and attitudes towards this body (**H1**). More specifically, this means that:

a) When identity undermining is high, there should be a positive relationship between ingroup identification and separatist political attitudes. The more people identify with the ingroup, the more they should oppose membership in the supra-national body and support increased autonomy and/or independence.

b) When identity undermining is low, there should be no relation between identification and political attitudes, i.e. high identifiers should not differ from low identifiers in their political attitudes.

Secondly, insofar as perceptions of identity undermining in a supra-national body can vary according to the nature of the body under consideration, it is quite conceivable that support for membership in different supra-national bodies (British state vs. European Union) may be uncorrelated or negatively correlated (**H2**). In fact, in the case of Scottish people's attitudes towards the UK and the EU, if their attitudes reflect official political parties lines (see Chapter 2), we might expect a moderate negative correlation.

Thirdly, our theoretical model also provides us with hypotheses about the origins of feelings of identity undermining. That is, feelings of identity undermining should be dependent on perceptions of incompatibility with the outgroup and lack of power of the ingroup (**H3a**). Furthermore, because powerlessness and incompatibility are assumed to influence political attitudes insofar as they determine perceptions of identity undermining, the impact of those two variables (combined

together) on political attitudes and intergroup attitudes should be mediated by perceptions of identity undermining (**H3b**). In order to limit the questionnaire's length, however, those concepts were measured only in relation to Britain (and the English) and thus were not tested in relation to attitudes to Europe.

Finally, we were also interested to look at the effect of identity undermining in relation to intergroup attitudes. Indeed, it is in that context that the content-free view of SIT has most often been either put forward or criticised, most notably around the hypothesis of a straightforward link between ingroup identification and ingroup bias (Turner, 1999; see Chapter 1). By contrast, our own hypothesis regarding this link mirrors our prediction for political attitudes. That is, we would expect identity undermining to moderate this relationship in such a way that identification will lead to ingroup bias only when the degree of identity undermining is high (**H4**)

METHOD

Questionnaire design.

The questionnaire contained the following scales, designed to test our hypotheses (see Appendix 3.2 for full details):

I. Independent variable:

a) Scottish identification: strength of Scottish national identification (4 items); this scale was composed of a compilation of identification items which have been used in earlier research (Doosje, Ellemers, & Spears, 1995; Haslam, Oakes, Reynolds, & Turner, 1999; Mael & Ashforth, 1992; reviewed in Haslam, 2001).

II. Intervening variables:

b) Incompatibility: perception of compatibility/incompatibility between Scottish and English people (6 items).

c) Powerlessness: perception of the lack of Scotland's power within Britain, in comparison with England and English people (6 items).

d) Identity undermining in Britain: the perceived extent to which Scottish national identity is undermined by inclusion within the Britain (6 items).

e) Identity undermining in Europe: the perceived extent to which Scottish national identity is undermined by inclusion within the E.U. (6 items).

III. Dependent variables:

f) Political attitude towards Britain - separatism vs. unionism (9 items):

This scale measured the support for independence or for the Union in Britain, with or without a Scottish parliament. Indeed, given the present political context of devolution, where the abolition of the Scottish parliament does not figure in any of the major political parties' agendas (including the Conservatives; see Chapter 2), it was anticipated that such a position might be too strong even for the many supporters of the Union. Accordingly some of the union items included the proviso that this support was conditional on Scotland keeping its devolved parliament.

g) Political attitude towards Europe - separatism vs. unionism (9 items):
This scale measured support of or opposition to membership and integration in the European Union. The separatist position was operationalised as a position arguing for Scotland to withdraw from the European Union. Some of the unionist items measured the support for Europe as a new federal super-state. However, given that - as with attitudes to Britain - this position is not supported by any major political party in Scotland and Britain, some of the items also measured support for the EU on the condition that the latter would respect the sovereignty of the existing nation states.

h) Intergroup attitudes:
- Stereotypes of the Scots, the English and the Europeans: participants were asked to rate each of these groups on a set of 6 different qualities (e.g. hard-working, creative, unfriendly, etc.), half of which were positive in connotation and the other half negative. Negative items were reverse coded in such a way that participants' answers reflected the degree to which they positively evaluated each group. Two composite scores of ingroup bias were then computed by subtracting the rating of the English or of the Europeans from those of the Scots.
- Attitudes to the Scots, the English and the Europeans: participants were asked more directly about their attitudes to these three groups (i.e. how much they like, admire and trust them). As for stereotypes, a composite score of ingroup bias was computed by subtracting the rating of the English or of the Europeans from those of the Scots. Both intergroup attitudes scales were taken and adapted from Gonzalez (2000).

All items in the scales were Likert-type items with 7 points (from 'strongly disagree' to 'strongly agree', or from 'not at all' to 'very much'). About half of the items in the incompatibility, powerlessness, and identity undermining scales were formulated in a negative way and, accordingly, they were reverse coded in the analysis of results. Similar scales relating to Britain and Europe used similar items, with the exception of the political attitude scales where some variation in the items was inevitable. A summary of the above measures with sample items is provided in Table 3.1 (see below).

The questionnaire also contained additional measures which were not directly relevant to testing our main hypotheses (as stated above) and which were therefore

omitted from further analysis. Full details of these measures as well as of the items used in the scales described above can be found in Appendix 3.2.

TABLE 3.1

Summary of measures and sample items

Measures	Examples of item
a) Scottish identification	1. Being Scottish is very important for me. 2. I feel strong ties with other Scottish people.
b) Incompatibility	1. The Scottish way of life is basically out of tune with the English way of life. 2. Scottish and English people are like pieces of a jigsaw puzzle. They may differ, but they fit together well. (*reverse coded*)
c) Powerlessness	1. The Scottish interest plays a part in determining British government decisions. (*reverse coded*) 2. When push comes to shove, the English always get their way in British policy.
d) and e) Identity undermining in Britain/in Europe	1. By being part of (Britain/the E.U.), Scottish values are corroded by alien values which are imposed on them. 2. Being part of (the UK/the European Union) has undermined the Scottish way of life.
f) Political attitude towards Britain (separatism vs. unionism)	1. Scotland should become an independent country, separate from the rest of the UK. 2. Scotland should have its own parliament but remain part of the UK. 3. Scotland should remain part of the UK but without a separate parliament
g) Political attitude towards Europe (separatism vs. unionism)	1. Scotland would be best off being totally independent of the European Union. 2. Scotland should remain part of the European Union, but the nation states should retain their sovereignty and their veto on important matters

	3. I support the idea of an European Union as a new state in which the old nation-states would cease to exist as such
h) Intergroup attitudes: Stereotypes of the English, the Europeans and the Scots	I think that (the English/the Europeans/the Scots) are in general (Hard working, Unsociable, Intelligent, etc…)
h) Intergroup attitudes: Attitudes to the Scots, the English and the Europeans:	How much do you (like/admire/trust) (the English/the Europeans/the Scots)?

Pilot study

Apart from the identification and the intergroup scales, the other scales mentioned above were not borrowed from existing research but were created anew for the purposes of the present research. Accordingly, they were first submitted to piloting in order to ensure they constituted valid and reliable measures (by the same token, this pilot also allowed to test if the reliability of the existing scales could be confirmed). A pilot questionnaire was therefore designed, which contained more items than the final questionnaire described above (usually 50 to 100 % more, depending on the scale), so that a process of item selection would be possible.

First, a pool of items was generated through conversational exchanges with Scottish people, by adapting statements by Scottish politicians reported in Reicher and Hopkins' analyses of political speeches (Reicher & Hopkins, 2001), or simply by inventing new ones. Those items were then submitted to a first selection based on face validity and clarity of the questions, before the pilot questionnaire was designed and distributed to volunteers for completion.

21 participants (13 males, 8 females), aged between 18 to 56 (M = 30.6), were recruited among the student and staff body of the university of St Andrews and asked to fill this pilot questionnaire. They were told that the study was about Scottish people's attitudes towards Britain and Europe. Besides answering the questions, they were also encouraged to freely comment on their clarity and their validity.

Cronbach's alphas were calculated for each of the measures. On the whole, the results of this were quite good: for the scales which will be used in the following analyses, and with two exceptions, all alpha scores were higher than .80, ranging from .80 to .89.

The two exceptions were the 'attitudes to the English' and 'political attitude to Europe' scales, whose alphas were unsatisfactory (α = .57 and α: = .59 respectively). In the case of 'attitudes to the English', part-whole correlations indicated that this was clearly due to one particular item which was then subsequently withdrawn from the scale (together with its equivalent in the 'attitudes to the Scots' and 'attitudes to the Europeans' scales). As for 'political attitude to Europe', part-whole correlations indicated that the low alpha was mainly due to the items which measured support for the EU on the condition that the nation states kept their sovereignty. It seemed that these items were, in fact, measuring more a separatist stance rather than an unionist one. Indeed, recomputing the scale reliability with those items considered to measure support for separatism (i.e. not reverse coded as previously) yielded an alpha of .86. Accordingly, it was decided to treat them as such for the subsequent survey study.

As for the remaining scales, though they yielded good alphas, it was nevertheless necessary to make a second selection of items, in order to make the questionnaire more manageable in terms of length, thereby ensuring that the attention of the participants would not diminish dramatically towards the end. This was done according to several criteria. First of all, part-whole correlations between each item and its respective scale were calculated. Any item that failed to correlate significantly at $p<.01$ with the scale was immediately discarded. For those which did correlate significantly, the items were selected by trying to keep those with the highest correlations, but which also met three other criteria. Those other criteria were: a) keeping a balance between normal and reverse-coded items; b) keeping similar items in the different versions of the same scales applied to different targets (Britain vs. Europe), for which correlation with their respective scales sometimes differed; c) discarding those items which participants' feedback pointed to as being ambiguous. Despite these criteria, it was possible to ensure that the great majority of the remaining items in the final questionnaire (see Appendix 3.2) had a correlation with their respective scale of above 0.7.

Procedure and participants in the survey.

Participants were recruited amongst the student body of the Universities of St Andrews and Aberdeen, and invited to take part in a web-based survey. In St Andrews, the survey was advertised to students by way of e-mail; the advert was inserted into one of the messages sent periodically by the Student Union to all students about general student events. In Aberdeen, it was advertised on the university website, within the campus news, an abstract of which also appeared when computers were started in classrooms (see Appendix 3.1 for the text of the advert).

The research was presented as an opinion survey on Scottish people's attitudes towards Britain and Europe. Students interested in participating were invited to click on a link which directed them to an electronic version of the questionnaire. Based on the pilot study results, it had been estimated that filling in this questionnaire would take about 20 minutes of their time. 234 questionnaires were received back by way of e-mail, but 5 of them were discarded because they were only very partially filled in (i.e. less than 50 % of questions answered), and 2 more because the participants admitted to not being Scottish. This left us with 227 participants (115 males, 107 females, 5 participants did not report their gender), aged between 17 to 60 ($M = 21.8$).

RESULTS

The following analysis of results will be structured as follows. The first section will re-appraise the reliability of our scales with the newly collected data. Then, section 2 will test hypothesis H1 concerning the moderating role of identity undermining in the relationship between identification and participants' attitude to Britain, while section 3 will test the same hypothesis in relation to participants' attitude towards Europe. Section 4 will appraise the relationship between attitudes to Britain and to Europe (H2). Section 5 will check the hypotheses concerning the impact of powerlessness and incompatibility on identity undermining, and the role of the latter in mediating the effects of powerlessness and incompatibility on political attitudes to Britain (H3). Finally, section 6 will look at the effect of identification and identity undermining on ingroup bias (H4).

1. Scale reliability

Cronbach's alphas were computed for each scale in order to evaluate their internal reliability. The results were quite satisfactory: for the scales which will be used in the following analyses, alpha scores ranged from .80 to .93, thus indicating that all scales had a high internal consistency. Only one post-hoc modification was made, regarding the incompatibility scale. Although this scale had a more than satisfactory overall alpha (α = .82), one item in the scale (item 1) was withdrawn from the analysis because it failed to show any substantial correlation with the other items in the scale. Subsequent analyses were performed on the reduced scale.

2. Political attitude to Britain

The aim of this section is to test our main hypothesis H1 in relation to participants' attitude towards Britain, i.e. that identity undermining in Britain would moderate the impact of Scottish identification on this attitude. According to Baron and Kenny (1986), moderation relationships between variables can be conceptualised as interaction effects: that is, the effect of an independent variable on a dependent one is conceived of as being dependent upon the level of another independent variable. In line with their guidelines to test such an effect, when using continuous

variables, a multiple linear regression (MR) was run with Scottish identification, identity undermining, and the product of those two variables (representing the interaction) as predictor variables, and with separatism (vs. unionism) as the dependent variable. Aiken and West (1991) also recommend that predictor variables should first be centred in multiple regression involving interactions, and thus such a transformation was performed beforehand (this operation will be repeated for all further moderation analyses).

The results of this MR analysis showed significant average effects for both Scottish identification ($B = .301$, $SE = .067$, $\beta = .258$, $t_{222} = 4.50$, $p < .001$) and identity undermining ($B = .628$, $SE = .059$, $\beta = .574$, $t_{222} = 10.70$, $p < .001$). These effects, however, were qualified by a significant interaction between the two predictor variables ($B = .117$, $SE = .045$, $t_{222} = 2.59$, $p = .010$), thus providing preliminary support for our hypothesis. However, it remained to be seen whether this significant interaction was working in the expected direction.

Aiken and West (1991) have detailed the procedure to follow in order to interpret significant interactions in multiple regressions. Briefly stated, it consists in calculating a set of regression slopes ('simple slopes') representing an estimation of the relationship between the IV and the DV at different levels of the moderator ('conditional values' or CVs), in order to appraise how the relationship between the IV and the DV evolves as a function of the moderator. The usual practice, which we will follow here, is to choose as CVs the mean, one standard deviation below the mean, and one standard deviation above the mean of the moderator (Cohen & Cohen, 1983). However, we also computed the simple slopes at 2 SDs below and above the mean of the moderator, in order to illustrate more fully the evolution of the relationship between identification and political attitude across the range of identity undermining[1]. For reason of convenience, these five conditional values of identity undermining used in the analyses were labelled as 'very low', 'low', 'medium', 'high' and 'very high'. The results of our analysis are summarised in Table 3.2 (see below).

[1] This was done only for illustrative purposes, because the technique used can only represent linear interactions - that is, the relationship between the IV and the DV changing uniformly as a function of the moderator - , meaning that simple slopes will always differ by the same amount when they are computed at similar intervals. Therefore, computing these additional simple slopes does not provide any new information as such.

As those results show, the pattern of the interaction matched our expectation. At a very low CV of identity undermining, the relationship between identification and separatism was not significant at all (β = -.002, *ns*). However, as the level of undermining increased, this relationship became significant and increased dramatically in strength accordingly (e.g. on the mean, $\beta = .258$, $p < .001$; at high CV of undermining: $\beta = .388$, $p < .001$).

TABLE 3.2

Relationship between Scottish identification and support for separatism as a function of level of undermining in Britain

		Conditional values of identity undermining in Britain				
		Very low (= 1.50)	Low (= 2.80)	Medium (= 4.10)	High (= 5.40)	Very high (= 6.70)
Simple slopes (regression of separatism on identification)	B	-.003	.149	.301	.453	.605
	SE	.111	.070	.067	.104	.155
	β	-.002	**.128**	**.258**	**.388**	**.519**
	t (222)	.026	2.12	4.50	4.35	3.90
	p	.979	**.035**	**<.001**	**<.001**	**<.001**

B = unstandardised regression coefficients

β = standardised regression coefficients

3. Political attitude to Europe

To test our hypothesis H1 in relation to political attitude to Europe, a similar MR procedure to the one in section 2 was run, using Scottish identification, identity undermining (both centred) and their product as predictors of participants' attitude to Europe. The interaction in this analysis failed to be significant (B = -.063, SE = .039, t_{221} = 1.61, p = .109). There were, however, significant and positive average effects for both Scottish identification (B = .160, SE = .045, β = .207, t_{221} = 3.59, p <.001) and identity undermining (B = .380, SE = .046, β = .473, t_{221} = 8.18, p <.001).

Thus, these results failed to confirm our interaction hypothesis H1 in relation to political attitude to Europe. Nevertheless, they showed that identity undermining was a significant predictor of support for separatism, even once the effect of identification was controlled for.

4. Relationships between attitudes to Britain and to Europe

To test our hypothesis H2, i.e. that attitudes to Britain and to Europe can be uncorrelated or even correlate negatively, a Pearson's correlation coefficient was computed between support for separatism towards Britain and towards Europe. It was found that there was no significant correlation between the two variables (r = .087, p = .190), a fact which provided support for our hypothesis - though only in its weaker form.

However, it could still be objected that a content-free interpretation of SIT would only predict a positive correlation between separatist attitudes to different superordinate groups in the case of high identifiers. In order to reject that possibility, participants were divided into three groups (low, medium, and high identifiers), according to their level of identification (by means of a split on the third and two-third percentiles), and correlations between political attitudes to Britain and Europe were calculated separately for each of those groups.

This analysis revealed very few changes compared to the overall correlation. In the medium (n = 64) and the high (n = 80) identification groups, the correlation between attitudes to Britain and to Europe was still not significant (respectively, r = -.009, *ns* and r = .075, p = .507). The only change occurred for low identifiers (n = 82) where a marginally significant correlation was found (r = -.197, p =.077), but this correlation was in fact negative. Thus, if anything, this analysis provided further support for our hypothesis, while contradicting the prediction of a content-free link between identification and separatism.

5. Identity undermining in Britain: predictors and mediation

The first part of H3, concerning incompatibility and powerlessness, stated that these two variables should be significant predictors of identity undermining. In order to test this hypothesis, identity undermining in Britain was regressed on both incompatibility and powerlessness in the same regression equation. Confirming our expectations, both regressions coefficients were significant (for incompatibility, β = .371, $t_{224} = 6.16, p < .001$; for powerlessness, $\beta = .345$, $t_{224} = 5.73, p < .001$)

The second part of H3 was that the effect of incompatibility and powerlessness on political attitudes should be mediated by perceptions of identity undermining. According to Baron and Kenny (1986), a variable can be considered as a mediator between an independent and a dependent variable when the three following conditions are met: a) the IV significantly predicts the mediator; b) the mediator significantly predicts the DV, even when the effect of the IV on the DV is controlled; c) the IV significantly predicts the DV when it is considered on its own, but this relation becomes non significant, or is at least significantly reduced, when the effect of the mediator on the DV is controlled.

In the present case, identity undermining was our potential mediator, and separatism the dependent variable. As far as the IV is concerned, our model prescribes that this variable should be a combination of incompatibility and powerlessness. Accordingly, a new variable, composed of the product of incompatibility and powerlessness, was computed in order to be used as the independent variable in the analysis[2]. It should be clear, however, that the term 'incompatibility*powerlessness', which will be used to designate this new variable, does not represent the interaction between the two variables but simply their multiplication.

Following the recommendations of Baron and Kenny (1986), the conditions stated above in order to establish mediation were checked by computing a series of regression equations. First, the potential mediator was regressed on the IV; second, the DV was regressed on the IV; and third, the DV was also regressed on both the IV and the mediator. The results of these analyses are summarised in Figure 3.1 (see below), which represents the mediation model together with the β weights of all possible paths. Figures without brackets represent weights in the equations where the IV was entered alone, while figures in brackets represent weights in the equation where both the IV and the mediator were entered together and thus controlled for each other.

As it can be seen from Figure 3.1, the results supported our mediation hypothesis. First of all, the IV (incompatibility*powerlessness) significantly predicted perceptions of identity undermining (β = .604, t_{225} =11.37, $p < .001$).

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[2] It should be pointed out, however, that the mediation analyses which will be presented here were also run with both powerlessness and incompatibility alone as independent variable and that such analyses yielded highly similar results to the ones reported here, in terms of level of significance.

Secondly, identity undermining significantly predicted separatism even when the effect of the IV was controlled for ($\beta = .572$, $t_{224} = 9.72$, $p < .001$). Thirdly, although the impact of the IV on separatism, once controlled for identity undermining, was still significant ($\beta = .203$, $t_{224} = 3.45$, $p = .001$), it was nevertheless substantially reduced compared to when it was entered alone in the equation ($\beta = 548$, $t_{225} = 9.83$, $p < .001$), and substantially weaker than the controlled effect of identity undermining on separatism.

FIGURE 3.1

Identity undermining as a mediator between powerlessness/incompatibility and political attitude to Britain



All figures represent β Weights

Figures in brackets: effect controlled.

The success of this mediation analysis was more formally confirmed by the use of Sobel's test (Sobel, 1982), which provides a significance test for the indirect effect of the IV on the DV via the mediator, and thus indirectly assesses if the reduction in the link between the IV and the DV is significant (MacKinnon, Warsi, & Dwyer, 1995). This test was highly significant ($z = 7.40$; $p < .0001$). Given that the link between the IV and the DV, once controlled for the mediator, nevertheless remained significant, we can therefore conclude that there was partial mediation of the effect of powerlessness and incompatibility on separatism by identity undermining. This suggests that these variables affect political attitudes in large part because they affect and relate to identity perceptions.

6. Intergroup attitudes and ingroup bias

In order to test our hypothesis H4 regarding intergroup attitudes, similar MR procedures to the ones in section 2 and 3 were run but with intergroup attitudes (rather than political attitudes) as dependent variables.

To start with the British context, the analyses revealed a significant interaction of identification and identity undermining on the first measure of ingroup bias, calculated on the basis of ingroup and outgroup stereotypes (B = .116, SE =.051, t_{218} = 2.29, p = .023). Thus, simple slopes at different CVs of identity undermining were subsequently calculated. The results of these analyses can be seen in Table 3.3.

TABLE 3.3

Relationship between Scottish identification and ingroup bias (stereotypes measure) as a function of level of undermining in Britain

		Conditional values of identity undermining in Britain				
		Very low (= 1.50)	Low (= 2.80)	Medium (= 4.10)	High (= 5.40)	Very high (= 6.70)
Simple slopes (regression of ingroup bias on identification)	B	-.019	.138	.289	.440	.592
	SE	.125	.079	.076	.118	.175
	β	-.014	.139	**.291**	**.444**	**.596**
	t (218)	.109	1.73	3.82	3.71	3.37
	p	.914	.084	**<.001**	**<.001**	**<.001**

As can be seen from Table 3.3, the pattern of interaction did confirm our expectation. At a very low level of identity undermining, the relationship between identification and ingroup bias was non significant (β = -.014, p = .914), but this relationship became significant and increased in strength as the level of identity undermining increased. It was marginally significant at a low level of identity undermining (β = .139, p = .084) but fully significant on the mean (β = .291, p<.001) and at high (β = .44, p < .001) and very high (β = .596, p < .001) levels of identity undermining.

On the second score of ingroup bias, computed on the basis of attitudes to the Scots and the English, the MR analysis did not yield a significant interaction (B = .075, SE =.063, t_{219} = 1.19, p = .235). There were, however, significant average effects of both identification (B = .630, SE = .094, β = .433, t_{219} = 6.70, $p < .001$) and identity undermining (B = .443, SE = .083, β = .326, t_{219} = 5.41, $p < .001$).

As far as the European context is concerned, MR analyses revealed no significant interaction of identification and identity undermining on either the first measure of ingroup bias (B = .025, SE =.044, t_{216} = .58, p = .565) or the second one (B = .05, SE = .051, t_{219} = .98, p = .327). As above, there were nevertheless significant average effects of both predictors on both measures (for the 'stereotypes' measure, identification: B = .154, SE = .050, β = .199, t_{216} = 3.07, p = .002; identity undermining: B = .183, SE = .052, β = .228, t_{216} = 3.49, p = .001; for the 'attitudes' measure: identification: B = .381, SE = .059, β = .369, t_{216} = 6.51, $p < .001$; identity undermining: B = .386, SE = .061, β = .361, t_{216} = 6.34, $p < .001$).

Thus, taking together the British and the European contexts, full support for our moderation hypothesis was found only in one case out of four (i.e. on one of the four dependent measures). However, as for political attitude to Europe, the key role of identity undermining in predicting intergroup attitudes was nevertheless confirmed in all cases.

DISCUSSION

1. Summary of the results

As far as the Scotland-Britain relationship is concerned, the general picture which emerged from the results of this survey provided strong support for our perspective and hypotheses. First of all, and most importantly, concerning participants' political attitude to Britain, the expected interaction between identification and identity undermining was found, and this interaction behaved according to the logic of our model. Secondly, a similar interaction was also found on one of the measures of ingroup bias, where increased identification led to an increase in ingroup bias only when the level of identity undermining was moderate to high. Finally, concerning the antecedents of identity undermining in Britain, our hypothesis that this would be dependent upon perceptions of incompatibility with the outgroup and of lack of ingroup power within the supra-national group was confirmed, and the hypothesis that identity undermining would mediate the effects of those two variables on separatism was also strongly supported.

Of course, the significant interaction we found on political attitude does not preclude the possibility that, overall, there might be more high identifiers within those who advocate separatism than amongst unionists (Abrams, 1994). In our study, this was reflected by the significant average effect of identification on separatism. Such a result is not surprising, and perhaps should even be expected, given the asymmetry between separatist and unionists positions to which we pointed to in Chapter 2. That is, while both separatist and unionist positions can be advocated on the basis of ingroup identity, unionist positions can also be advocated in the name of the superordinate identity. This means that subgroup identification is a necessary pre-requisite to a separatist stance, but not to an unionist one. At the subgroup level, we would expect separatists to be high identifiers, while unionist can potentially be low as well as high identifiers. However, our point, which is supported by our data, is that there is no logical and inevitable relationship between the two, and that supporting union in a superordinate group is not necessarily at the exclusion of ingroup (subordinate) identification. Again, for those who do identify with the subgroup, all depends on how the impact of the superordinate group on that subgroup is perceived.

Likewise, a potential concern relating to the results of our interaction analysis could be the significant correlation (r = .494, p < .001) which was found between ingroup identification and identity undermining in Britain. However, even if it would have been very compelling for our purposes to find those two variables acting totally independently of each other, our claim is not that such a relationship can never exist. Rather, what we are claiming is that there is not a logical relationship between the two variables, i.e. that high identification does not lead automatically to a feeling of undermining and therefore to separatist tendencies in the field of political attitudes. In fact, a more detailed analysis of this result confirmed this idea by showing that this correlation was mainly due to a tendency of low identifiers to score low on identity undermining, rather than being due to the opposite tendency of high identifiers to score high on identity undermining. Indeed, correlations between identification and undermining in Britain calculated separately for the three groups of low, medium, and high identifiers (see section 4 of the results) revealed that only in the low group was this correlation significant (for low identifiers, r =.355, p < .001; for medium, r =.151., *ns*; for high, r =.177, *ns*).

Thus, in the British context, the general message coming out of our data is quite clear. That is, it is far too simplistic to deduce political (and intergroup) attitudes from identification alone, and identity undermining is at least one of the crucial variables that must be considered in the equation. This is not to say that identification is not an important factor, or even a less important one than identity undermining. Indeed, the interaction results could as well have been interpreted the other way round, i.e. as showing that identification plays a crucial role in moderating the effects of identity undermining. Moreover, the very concept of identity undermining underlines the importance of identity processes. However, what we have tried to achieve with this research, and by choosing to interpret the results in that way, is simply to provide a powerful reminder that identification processes *per se* do not lead to specific attitudinal results unless we know what feeds into those processes, and take into account other factors related to the meaning of identities and identity relationship, of which identity undermining constitutes, after all, only one example (although in our view a particularly important one).

As regards political attitudes to Europe, however, our results were less clear and did not support our interaction hypothesis, on both political attitude and intergroup attitudes. There might be several reasons for this. First of all, given that

Scotland is a member of the EU through its membership in Britain, it could be that concerns relating to British identity and its potential undermining in Europe might have been more relevant to some of the participants than questions regarding Scottishness - or at least such British-related concerns might have interfered with their concerns for Scottish identity (see also Rutland & Cinnirella, 2000). However, as the survey did not include measures of identity undermining in relation to British identity in Europe, it was not possible to test this post-hoc explanation.

Secondly, it is also possible that our measure of political attitude to Europe needs to be revised. Indeed, we have already mentioned that the political option of an European federal state is not a very relevant one in the Scottish political context; but it is also true that the opposite position of withdrawal from the EU is not frequently advocated either, and, by contrast to independence from Britain, does not represent such a politically available and credible option (see Chapter 2). This was reflected in our data, since the mean score for the items measuring support for independence from Europe within the political attitude scale was quite low ($M = 2.57$, $SD = 1.47$), as was the mean for the items measuring support for a federal state ($M = 2.49$, $SD = 1.47$). All in all, this did not leave much room for an interaction to appear on both these subset of items.

As for the items measuring support for the EU with the provision of respect for national sovereignty, these might have yielded more balanced scores, but although their inclusion as separatist items in the scale was justified on the basis of reliability analyses, their relationship with either total separatism or total unionism was, in fact, not entirely clear. Indeed, though as a whole they correlated negatively with the 'federal state' items ($r = -.384$, $p < .001$), they also correlated negatively with the 'independence' ones ($r = -.217$, $p = .001$). In other words, participants' answers on those items might have been determined by two opposite and interfering pulls of arguing against too much integration and arguing in favour of some limited form of integration, and, though one of these pulls might have been stronger, it still means that the meaning of these answers was not entirely clear.

Thus, should we wish to run further research in this area, there would be a need to develop a more sensitive measure which would reflect the fact that the political debate around Europe is perhaps less clear-cut than the one around Britain, and is more about determining the extent to which there should be more or less

integration in Europe, in what forms and in what areas, rather than whether or not there should be integration at all.

Nevertheless, it remains that identity undermining was found to be a significant predictor of political attitude to Europe, at least as much (if not more) than identification alone, and this even when the effect of the latter variable was accounted for. This is especially meaningful given that, in the case of Europe, the correlation between identification and identity undermining (in Europe) was only marginally significant (r =.115, p = .086), and in fact quite weak in absolute terms. It means that we would know at least as much of participants' attitude to Europe by looking at their perception of identity undermining than by simply looking at their degree of identification. Thus, even if the results failed to provide support for our interaction hypothesis in the European context, they nonetheless demonstrated the importance of this concept in understanding political attitudes.

2. Limitations and future directions

Despite our positive results, this survey, as with every piece of research, has a number of limitations which must also be pointed out. First of all, the data relating to the identification scores must be treated with some caution. Indeed, as the median of Scottish identification scores (*median* = 5.875) indicates, the distribution of this variable was negatively skewed, denoting a general tendency for participants to score quite high on that scale. It is not impossible that this pattern might reflect a general tendency in the Scottish population, but it might also be due, in part, to the procedure which was used to recruit participants, for their motivation to answer the questionnaire could have stemmed from their involvement with issues of Scottish identity, especially in a situation where this recruitment was made by way of e-mails and advertising on websites (although it must be noted that the identification median in the pilot study, were the recruiting procedure was different, was also quite high: *median* = 5.5).

Practically, this means that the survey is best considered as mainly depicting the response patterns of medium to very high identifiers, whereas no sound conclusions can be drawn about low and very low identifiers (these labels were used in the analysis of results, but only in a relative way). Indeed, only 33 participants out of 227 scored on the midpoint or below on this scale - although it could also be

argued that scoring below the midpoint can be considered as more than expressing low identification, namely as an active rejection of this identity.

But if this is clearly a limitation of the data, it also suggests another way of looking at it which brings further support to our general claim. Indeed, if we consider that, with very few exceptions, all participants were fairly high identifiers, then it is even more surprising that we still managed to obtain the expected interaction on political attitude to Britain, despite the reduced variability in identification scores. Even in that context, we can see that, for these medium to high identifiers, their political attitude to Britain clearly was very much dependent on their level of identity undermining. In that respect, whether or not this holds for low identifiers is relatively less important in order to make the point that identification is not sufficient on its own to predict political attitudes, and to stress the importance of the meanings associated with identity relationships. Furthermore, the median statistic for the scores of identity undermining in Britain (*median* = 4) shows that the distribution on this latter variable was quite balanced, proving that high identification can lead to low as well as to high levels of identity undermining (see also the pattern of correlations mentioned above between identification and identity undermining).

Nonetheless, another concern relating to the representativeness of our sample must also be mentioned. Participants were almost all recruited from a young, student population, which, of course, raises questions about the generalisability of the results to other parts of the Scottish population. Although, as mentioned in the introduction, our aim in this study was not especially to achieve a thorough representation of this population as a whole, further research should address this issue.

There are three remaining limitations to this research which we would like to underline here and which also point to directions for future research. First of all, although we went some way towards exploring the antecedents of identity undermining through the concepts of incompatibility and power, more could still be done in order to understand how feelings of identity undermining relate to the meaning of identities, of their relationships, and of perceptions of socio-structural features. On the one hand, there might be other socio-structural features which might be worth considering, such as the legitimacy of power distribution or the permeability of intergroup boundaries (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; see Chapter 1). On the other hand, for the sake of a survey design implying quantification and closed questions, measuring incompatibility involved formalising the relationship between

identities into a somewhat dichotomised concept. In order to address our concern with identity contents more directly, it would be necessary to show that such perceptions, and hence feelings of identity undermining, are rooted in the interplay of concrete and specific meanings associated with identities and their practical implications. Though this point was addressed in the discursive study of Chapter 2, it remains to be addressed quantitatively, and this concern should be part of any further research in this area.

Secondly, one obvious lacuna is that the present research only addressed concerns for identity undermining, whereas our theoretical framework also suggests the hypothesis that, when people go further than denying identity undermining but actually think that ingroup identity is enhanced by being part of a superordinate group, then an increase in long-term identification or in the contextual salience of ingroup identity should lead to a stronger support for membership in that superordinate group. Further research will be needed to address this point. If evidence could be found for the relevance of identity enhancement, it would allow to demonstrate an even stronger moderating relationship (i.e. that depending on content, identification can lead not only to different but to antithetical results).

Finally, given the correlational nature of our data, any assumption about the causal links between variables and about the directions of such links must remain highly hypothetical. The status of 'independent' and 'dependent' that was attributed to our variables in the analyses was drawn from our theoretical reasoning, and if the empirical data seemed to be consistent with those assumptions, they cannot be used as conclusive evidence supporting them. This triggers the need for further investigations of an experimental nature, where identity undermining and meanings of identities would be directly manipulated in order to see if it is possible to influence political attitudes in this way. This is where our attention is going to turn to in the next chapter.

CHAPTER IV

CHANGING ATTITUDES TO SUPERORDINATE GROUPS : AN EXPERIMENT ON THE IMPACT OF BRITAIN ON SCOTLAND

INTRODUCTION

It has been stated many times by now, but let us summarise again the core idea of this thesis' research. To put it simply, we believe that political attitudes are influenced by the way in which being part of a superordinate group is seen to impact on ingroup identity, its norms, values, its way of life, and its capacity to express those norms and values. In Chapter 2, we worked on the assumption that this is precisely the reason why the nature of this impact is argued about by those who wish to shape political attitudes, while in Chapter 3 we provided evidence of a quantitative relationship between how this impact is perceived and political attitudes, thereby suggesting that such beliefs have indeed an influence on people's attitudes. However, given the correlational nature of this last study, this influence still remains to be shown directly. The usual way to achieve this is through experimental manipulation.

Thus, this chapter will present the results of an experimental study in which the main purpose was to make a first step within that line of enquiry, by manipulating directly perceptions and feelings of identity undermining or enhancement in order to appraise if and how this can affect political attitudes - which is, after all, what our politicians in Chapter 2 try to achieve.

To be more specific, the present research attempted to manipulate those feelings through confronting people with a specific and very concrete example of Scottishness being undermined or enhanced by the fact of being in Britain. That is,

our participants were given an account of a policy emanating from the British government which, depending on the experimental condition, was said to affect Scottish identity in different ways. In a first condition (*neutral*), there was no explicit reference to its specific impact on and relation to Scottish identity. In a second condition (*dissonant*), however, the policy was described as being dissonant with a key Scottish value and aspect of the Scottish way of life, while in a third condition (*consonant*), it was presented as protecting this way of life and therefore consonant with Scottish identity. Our expectation was that the change in the presentation of the policy would affect not only attitudes towards that particular policy, but would also make salient for participants the undermining or enhancing effect of Britain in general, and would thereby also affect their more general political attitude towards Britain. To put it in another way, our reasoning was that there would be a generalisation from the effect of the policy to the effect of being part of Britain in general.

Hypotheses

On this basis, our hypotheses were as follows. First of all, we expected that the experimental manipulation would impact on attitudes towards the policy itself, i.e. that participants in the dissonant condition would disagree more with the policy than participants in other conditions, while participants in the consonant condition would agree more with the policy than participants in other conditions (**H1**). Though this hypothesis was not key to our main argument, it constituted a preliminary test of whether the 'manipulation' arguments based on identity consideration would have an impact at least on the specific level of attitude towards the policy, i.e. whether they would succeed in inducing a more positive or negative perception of it.

Our second, and main, hypothesis was that, at a more general level, the manipulation would also impact on the political attitude towards Britain. More precisely, it was hypothesised (**H2a**) that participants in the dissonant condition should show a stronger separatist (or less unionist) attitude than participants in both other conditions, whereas participants in the consonant condition should show the strongest support for the Union (or the least support for separatism). Furthermore, it was expected that any differences in political attitude between conditions should be due to change of perceptions concerning the relationship of Scotland with Britain and

whether Scottish identity is enhanced or undermined by being part of Britain. In other words, the manipulation should impact on perceptions of identity undermining/enhancement, and the effect of the manipulation on political attitudes should be mediated by these perceptions (**H2b**).

METHOD

Participants.

Participants were recruited amongst the student body of Elmwood College in Cupar (Scotland). 70 participants took part in the experiment, but 19 participants had to be excluded as they were not of Scottish nationality, answered (ambiguously) that they were British when their nationality was asked, or else failed to answer the question on their nationality altogether. A further 4 participants were excluded because they failed to answer to more than one dependent variable. Of the remaining 47 participants, 10 were male and 37 female (*age range* 16-48 years, $M = 23.32$, *median* = 17)

Design.

The design was based on the manipulation of one between-subjects factor (account of the policy), with three levels: neutral ($N = 12$) vs. dissonant ($N = 17$) vs. consonant ($N = 18$).

Procedure.

The experiment was run in 5 sessions, during class time (one session per class, groups of 7 to 21). Participants in all conditions were first told that they were going to take part in a study about attitudes towards policies in Britain. They were told that they were going to be given a questionnaire which contained a written account of a particular British policy, concerning access to the countryside, the text used being taken (allegedly) from the BBC news Website. Then, they would have to answer some questions about their reactions to and opinions about that policy. They were also specifically asked to read the policy account very carefully, as there would be some memory questions at the end of the questionnaire.

At that point, the questionnaires were distributed. The assignment of participants to one of the 3 conditions was determined by the type of questionnaire they received. Questionnaires were distributed randomly within each session by the experimenter, who was blind to the type of questionnaire he was distributing. The

first page of the questionnaire gave some general instructions, after which came the account of the policy. Having read that text, participants then filled in a number of dependent measures (see below) including, critically, their attitudes to Britain and the Union. Once all participants had finished, the questionnaires were collected and participants were given a full debriefing in which the experimenter explained the real purpose of the experiment and answered any of the participants' questions.

Material: the policy and its presentation

In terms of content, the policy proposed a licensing system which would restrict and control access to the countryside throughout Britain, for outdoor activities such as walking or cycling (see Appendix 4.1 for the full texts of the three different versions). Needless to say, this policy as well as its account were not real but were designed for the purposes of the experiment.

The account first established who was proposing the policy, i.e. it was said to emanate from "*an All-Party Environment Select Committee of the Westminster Parliament*". This 'all-party' reference was designed in order to avoid the policy being associated with the particular political party in power at Westminster at the time of the study (i.e. the Labour Party) which, rather than Britain itself, could then be held responsible for the policy. It also allowed explicit outlining of the fact that the policy was very likely to be applied soon given that it had political consensus.

The text then described the content of the policy, i.e. the details of the licensing system, and outlined briefly some of its advantages and disadvantages. On the one hand, it was said that "*it has been argued that such steps are absolutely crucial if we are to maintain the environment and to protect wildlife.../.../...The proposals will make the countryside a much more attractive place for everyone to enjoy.*". On the other hand, it was also said that "*Others have suggested that the proposals are an attack on one of our basic freedoms: the freedom to enjoy our national countryside. They are a means by which landowners can restrict the ability of ordinary people to access the land...*"

Such an account was designed, and piloted (on a sample of the student body at the university of St Andrews, $N = 18$), in order to be balanced in terms of pros and cons, that is, yielding, on its own (i.e. without the additional manipulation, see below) a balanced mixture of agreement/disagreement on the policy rather than

polarised answers in one direction or the other. Thus, one of the pilot question was "*how much do you disagree or agree with this policy*", and the mean of participants' answers on that question were approaching the middle of the scale (on a scale of 0 to 10, $M = 4.5$, $SD = 2.46$).

This part of the text was present in all conditions, and, in the neutral condition, the text actually ended there. However, in both other conditions, a paragraph was added which introduced the manipulation. Basically, this took the form of quotations by two ingroup members (so that their arguments would sound convincing) taking a position in favour of or against the policy because of its consonance or dissonance with Scottish identity.

In relation to that point, the specific topic of the policy was actually chosen because the Scottish countryside is, stereotypically, an important aspect of Scottish identity, and attachment to the countryside an important value of Scottishness. This fact ensured that participants should feel concerned by the issue. However the topic was also chosen because it was possible and plausible to argue both that the policy was consonant with or dissonant with this important value. Thus, in the dissonant condition, the additional manipulation paragraph read like this:

> *In Scotland, where the policy would have particular relevance, it has been argued that the proposal would destroy something that is central to Scottish life and to what it means to be Scottish. In the words of one Scottish campaigner: "Scotland is a big and beautiful country with a small population and so we have always had a special relationship with the land. Many of our symbols are of the land – the hills and the moors and the lochs and the glens. Our countryside is unique, in terms of landscape, vegetation, and wildlife. It is known and admired throughout the world. It is a precious heritage which should be available for everybody in Scotland to enjoy. So if you keep us from the land you take away an important part of who we are. What's more, since we understand and we care about the land, we certainly don't need a law to tell us to respect it". Indeed, another Scottish activist has said: "this proposal takes no account of the situation in Scotland; if it goes through, it would mean changing our traditions and undermining an essential part of the Scottish way of life".*

While in the consonant condition, the paragraph read like this:

> *In Scotland, where the policy would have particular relevance, it has been argued that the proposal would support something that is central to Scottish life and to what it means to be Scottish.../*same as above/.... *So if you damage the land you destroy an important part of who we are. What's more, since we understand and we care about the land, we, more than anyone, appreciate the need to take steps to protect it". Indeed, another Scottish activist has said: "this proposal is sensitive to the situation in Scotland, if it goes through, it would enhance our traditions and protect an essential part of the Scottish way of life".*

As we can see, both manipulation paragraphs first established the countryside and the concern for the land as unique and keys aspect of Scottish identity. However, in the dissonant condition, the practical consequence of such a value was that the unique and precious Scottish countryside should be available for everybody in Scotland to enjoy, and that preventing such access was therefore dissonant with the Scottish value of attachment to the land. By contrast, in the consonant condition, the consequence of the same value was that Scottish people care about protecting this unique and precious countryside and thus the policy was construed as expressing and being consonant with this value. In other words, the ingroup members being quoted were siding with one of the two the general arguments outlined in the common part of the text, but this time in the name of a specific Scottish value and based on the more specific Scottish concerns. In both cases the value was the same, for using different values would have run the risk of having one being seen as more important than the other. What changed is how this value should apply in the particular case under consideration, and therefore how it should translate in attitudes towards the proposed policy. The fact that the same specific aspect (Scottish countryside) and value (attachment, care for it) were used in both cases also allowed for the design of the texts to be as similar as possible, with the exception of the variations required for the manipulation.

Dependent measures

The experimental questionnaire comprised the following measures, described in the order they were presented to participants (see Appendix 4.1 for full details). First of all, participants had to answer a few questions on their reaction to the policy itself:

a) *Attitude to the policy* (4 items): Participants were asked to indicate how much they agreed/disagreed with the policy and with the idea of more control on access to the land, and whether they thought the policy would protect the land or undermine the ability to enjoy it.

Then the main dependent variable was inserted:

b) *Political attitude to Britain - Separatism vs. Unionism* (10 items): This scale was composed of the same 9 items used in the survey study, plus a single additional item which asked participants to indicate whether they wished the Scottish parliament to be given more or less power in the future (the extremes of the scale being defined as total union in Britain vs. independence). This item was added with the purpose of increasing the discriminatory power of the scale.

Afterwards came measures assessing the perception of the relationship between Scotland and Britain. These measures used items taken up from the scales of the survey study (see Chapter 3):

c) *Identity undermining* (2 items): the undermining effect of Britain on Scottish identity. In particular, the 2 items used were "*Being part of Britain has allowed Scotland to keep its specific and separate identity.*"(reverse coded) and "*Being part of the UK has undermined the Scottish way of life.*" ('strongly agree' to 'strongly disagree')

d) Powerlessness (2 items): The (lack of) power of Scotland within Britain compared with the English. In particular, the 2 items used were: "*The Scottish interest plays a part in determining British government decisions.*" and "*Decisions in Britain are*

based on what the English want irrespective of what others want." ('strongly agree' to 'strongly disagree').

The rest of the questionnaire was composed of various measures fulfilling different purposes. This included a manipulation check on the account of the policy itself:

e) *Memory questions*: towards the end of the questionnaire, 5 multiple choice memory questions (4 in the neutral condition) were asked on details of the policy account (e.g. who is proposing the policy, etc.), in order to ensure it was read and understood properly. Most importantly for what follows, the fifth question, which was only present in both experimental conditions, for it concerned the additional manipulation paragraph, asked '*according to the text, what is the effect of the policy on the way of life*', with the available answers including that it will undermine vs. it will protect the Scottish way of life.

There were also other variables which, should our main hypothesis (H2a) be confirmed, would potentially need to be tested and controlled for possible alternative explanations. Thus, the following measures were added:

f) *Presentation of the policy*: Participants were asked to indicate to what extent they thought that the presentation of the policy was fair, convincing, and clear (3 items).
g) *Nationality and National identification*: Participants were asked to indicate their nationality and then to fill in a scale of Scottish identification (non Scottish participants were instructed to answer the questions according to their own nationality). This scale was identical to the one used in the survey study (4 items).
h) *Political orientation*: Participants were asked to indicate how much they defined themselves as left-wing or right-wing, and the parties they intended to vote for in the next Scottish and Westminster elections.

All scales were composed of likert-type items running from 0 to 10, except the Scottish parliament item in the Political Attitude scale which ran from 0 to 20, and the memory questions. Scores on the Scottish parliament item were subsequently divided by two in order to make them in the same range as the other items of the scale.

The questionnaire also contained additional measures which were not directly relevant to testing our main hypotheses (as stated above) and which were therefore not used in subsequent analyses. The only exception to this is the measure of powerlessness which, although it did not relate to our main and a priori hypotheses, was mentioned above as it was used in order to perform post-hoc analyses (see below). Full details of these additional measures as well as of the items used in the scales described above can be found in Appendix 4.1.

RESULTS

1. Scale reliability

Standardised Cronbach's alphas scores were calculated for all scales. Three scales yielded a good index of reliability ($\alpha > .80$: Attitude to the policy, Political attitude to Britain, and Presentation of the policy) and two others a very satisfactory index ($\alpha > .70$: Power and Identification).

One important scale, however, yielded a more problematic result: the scale of identity undermining, whose alpha was unsatisfactory low at .37. As this indicated that the two items of the scale were measuring substantially different ideas, it was therefore decided to treat those items separately in the analyses of the results. In order to account for multiple tests, the level of significance for analyses involving either one of those undermining items was lowered a priori according to a Bonferroni type correction ($p <= .025$).

2. Manipulation check

A first step in our analyses was to check if the texts had been read and understood properly (i.e. as they were intended to be understood) by the participants, through looking at their answers to the memory questions. Overall, the results on these questions showed there had been few problems of attention or of understanding: on the first 4 memory questions, common to all conditions, only 3 mistakes were made in total (2 mistakes on question 1, and 1 mistake on question 4; these were not made by the same participants so none were excluded from the analyses).

However, the fifth memory question (i.e. 'according to the text, what is the effect of the policy on the way of life') revealed an unexpected and quite striking result. Though in the dissonant condition all subjects but one were 'correct' in identifying the policy as undermining the Scottish way of life, in the consonant condition, only 3 out of the 18 participants answered this same question 'correctly', i.e. that the policy was protecting the Scottish way of life, while all the others answered that the policy was described as undermining it.

Thus, it seemed quite clear that participants in that condition did not accept the description of the policy as it was intended. On the contrary, it suggested that they might have interpreted the policy as undermining as much as participants in the dissonant condition. It is slightly unfortunate that, although the memory question asked participants to answer 'according to the text' rather than according to their opinion, it is not possible to determine with certainty whether they remembered wrongly the text and were biased by their own opinion of the policy, or interpreted the question wrongly and voiced their own opinion in all awareness (see discussion). But in any case, there was no doubt about the nature of this opinion, and, before we even needed to check whether or not the policy accounts did indeed induce or not a general perception of identity undermining/enhancement (which will be appraised below, in testing H2b), it showed unambiguously that our consonant manipulation simply failed to achieved its intended purpose, i.e. leading participants to see the policy as enhancing for Scottish identity. More than that, it suggested that participants in the consonant condition saw this policy as undermining rather than as enhancing.

Accordingly, our main hypothesis (H2a) needed some revision. In such circumstances, and following the logic of our main hypothesis (rather than the partly unsuccessful operationalisation of its testing), one would certainly not expect more pro-Union attitudes from the 'consonant' participants. Quite the opposite, given that they perceived the policy as undermining, we should expect that, as for participants in the dissonant condition, they would then hold more separatist views than participants in the neutral condition. Likewise, they should also disagree more with the policy than participants in the neutral condition (H1).

In consequence, as our revised prediction now formulated similar expectations for both experimental conditions, it was decided to collapse them together ($N = 35$), and to compare them as one group with the control condition, in order to simplify the analyses and increase their power.

3. Effects of condition on attitudes to the policy

That our prediction concerning the consonant condition needed to be reversed in direction was confirmed by the results of analyses aimed at testing our secondary hypothesis H1, regarding the effect of condition on attitudes to the policy. A T-test

using this latter variable as the DV and the experimental condition as the IV (with the consonant and dissonant conditions collapsed) revealed a marginally significant effect of condition ($t_{45} = 1.84$, $p = .072$): participants in both experimental conditions tended to support the policy less ($M = 4.62$, $SD = 2.21$) than participants in the control condition ($M = 5.90$, $SD = 1.60$). Thus, these results provided some support for our first (revised) hypothesis and confirmed that the manipulation arguments had an impact at the specific level of attitude towards the policy. It also confirmed the more negative perception of the policy by participants in both experimental conditions, i.e. including participants in the consonant condition. It remained to be seen, however, if our manipulation would also have a similar impact at the general level of political attitude to Britain.

4. Effects of condition on political attitudes

The first part of our main (revised) hypothesis (H2a) was tested by running a regression analysis with the experimental condition as the IV and political attitude to Britain (or separatism) as the DV (a regression procedure rather than a T-test was used here because it was in any case required for the subsequent analysis of mediation). This analysis revealed a significant impact of condition ($B = 1.52$, $SE = .591$, $\beta = .358$, $t_{45} = 2.57$, $p = .014$). Participants in both experimental conditions showed a more separatist attitude ($M = 6.21$, $SD = 1.88$) than in the neutral condition ($M = 4.70$, $SD = .1.33$), thus providing support for our hypothesis H2a.

Complementary analyses were also run on the data in order to see if the manipulation had had an effect on other variables measured in the experiment, which could serve as a basis for possible alternative explanations for our results. Thus, T-tests revealed that there were no significant differences due to experimental condition on 'Presentation of the policy' ($t_{45} = 1.44$, $p = .157$), on the scale of national identification ($t_{40} = .82$, $p = .417$), nor on the extent that participants saw themselves as left or right-wing ($t_{40} = .061$, $p = .923$). This ruled out that the effect of condition on political attitude to Britain could be explained by differences in the presentational aspect of the varying accounts of the policy (i.e. that one account might be seen as more or less convincing, fair and clear than the others), to differences in the level of identification amongst participants, or even to differences in their political orientation. Of course, this does not exclude the possibility that some of these

variables might have been correlated significantly with the scores of political attitude to Britain, but it does guarantee that these variables were balanced across conditions and thus could not account for the differences due to the manipulation.

5. The role of identity undermining

In order to test the hypothesis H2b, a regression analysis was first run with condition as the IV and the undermining effect of Britain on Scotland as the DV (for each item separately). This analysis revealed no main effect on the first item of identity undermining ($B = .002$, $SE = .951$, $\beta < .001$, *ns*), and a marginally significant main effect on the second item ($B = 1.92$, $SE = .845$, $\beta = .321$, $t_{45} = 2.27$, $p = .028$; as a reminder, analysis involving items of identity undermining had their level of significance set at $p <= .025$). Participants in both experimental conditions (combined) perceived Britain as more undermining ($M = 5.17$, $SD = 2.31$) on this item than participants in the control condition ($M = 3.25$, $SD = 3.11$). Thus, these analyses provided partial preliminary support for our hypothesis, as far as this second item was concerned.

Next, analyses were run in order to appraise if the effect of condition on separatism was indeed mediated by its impact on identity undermining. Following the procedure of mediation analysis (see Chapter 3; see also Baron & Kenny, 1986), participants' scores of separatism were regressed on both condition and identity undermining. Obviously, this was performed only for the second item of identity undermining given the lack of effect of condition on the first one.

This analysis revealed that the controlled effect of identity undermining on separatism was strongly significant ($\beta = .492$, $p < .001$), while, on the other hand, the effect of condition, once it was controlled for identity undermining, was substantially reduced to non-significance ($\beta = .200$, $t_{44} = 1.55$, $p = .128$). Thus, our mediation model, represented in Figure 4.1 (see below), was successful, a fact which was confirmed by a marginally significant Sobel's test ($z = 2{,}005$ $p = .045$; see Chapter 3). Our hypothesis H2b was therefore supported by the results, although it has to be noted once more that it was only so for one of the two items of identity undermining, a fact to which we will come back in more detail in the discussion.

FIGURE 4.1: MEDIATING ROLE OF IDENTITY UNDERMINING



All figures represent β Weights

Figures in brackets: effect controlled.

6. A question of power and self-determination?

Though our main hypothesis, in its revised form, received support from the results, one central question nevertheless remained: why, after all, was the policy and Britain perceived as undermining Scottish identity in the consonant condition, despite Scottish sources describing the policy as 'enhancing' for Scotland? And why did this condition also trigger a more separatist stance, as for the dissonant condition? Furthermore, the commonality between both experimental conditions also suggests that, although the dissonant manipulation yielded the expected result (i.e. increased perceptions that the policy and Britain are undermining Scottish identity), it might not be, as was first intended, the negative impact of the policy on Scotland as such which produced more separatism amongst the participants in this condition. We therefore had to ask what other feature(s) of the manipulation, common to both experimental conditions, might have made them having this similar effect.

One possibility is that the manipulation could simply have made Scottish identity more salient in both experimental conditions. Indeed, it is a fact that underlining the consequences of the policy on Scottish identity (whatever the valence of this impact) could also have made this identity more salient compared to the control condition, where any reference to this specific impact on Scottish identity was absent. However, this possibility, which would have undermined our results by providing them with an alternative explanation, could be rejected on the basis of the results on the identification scale reported above; for there was no significant difference between the control condition and both experimental conditions in the

level of identification of participants. Moreover, further regression analyses revealed that, though identification on its own was a marginally significant predictor of separatist scores (β = .270, t_{40} = 1.77, p = .084), this impact was actually not significant when the effect of condition was controlled for (β = .227, t_{39} = 1.57, p = .128).

Another possibility is that, in both cases, the manipulation paragraph could have made salient the fact that decisions were taken at the Westminster level on a matter that was underlined as having particular importance for Scotland, whereas this fact was only implicit in the neutral condition, where it was simply said, in common with the experimental conditions, that the policy would be applied throughout Britain. Participants might have then estimated that Scotland should be able to decide for herself on such an issue, given its specific Scottish relevance. In other words, compared to the control condition, the experimental conditions could have made more salient the lack of power of Scotland in the British decision-making process and its lack of self-determination. This could have been the crucial fact which, regardless of the valence of the policy, made participants perceive the situation as an undermining one, thereby showing more support for separatism.

This idea received some preliminary confirmation by the fact that, in contrast to the results on the identification scale, the manipulation did have quite a significant impact on the power variable (B = 2.19, SE = .678, β = .434, t_{45} = 3.23, p = .002), with participants in both experimental conditions (combined) perceiving Scotland as more powerlessness in Britain (M = 6.31, SD = 1.88) than participants in the neutral condition (M = 4.12, SD = 2.42). Furthermore, powerlessness revealed in turn to be a strongly significant predictor of separatism (β = .546, t_{45} = 4.38, p < .001)

However, this post-hoc explanation of our results could be more fully tested by performing a mediation analysis using powerlessness as a mediator of the effect of condition on political attitudes (see Figure 4.2 below). Following the same procedures as above, such an analysis revealed that, on the one hand, powerlessness remained a significant predictor of separatism even when condition was controlled for (β = .482, t_{44} = 3.48, p = .001), while, on the other hand, the significant effect of condition on separatism (β = .358, t_{45} = 2.57, p = .014) became non-significant when the effect of powerlessness was controlled for (β = .149, t_{44} = 1.07, p = .289). The

success of this mediation model was confirmed by performing Sobel's test, which was significant ($z = 2.425$, $p = .015$).

FIGURE 4.2: MEDIATING ROLE OF POWERLESSNESS



All figures represent β Weights

Figures in brackets: effect controlled.

7. A two-step model

Despite the fact that our post-hoc explanation of the unexpected effect of the consonant condition received some backing from the results, it also raised a further question. Indeed, we now had two potential mediators (i.e. identity undermining and powerlessness) for explaining our results, and one could therefore ask which of these mediators explained them the best, or else which respective part they play in the story.

However, if we follow more strictly our model presented in Chapter 1 (see also Chapter 3), the question to ask would be slightly different. Indeed, we would actually expect powerlessness to be an antecedent of identity undermining rather than its competitor or complement. Likewise, the idea of our post-hoc explanation was, to put it more precisely, that a salient powerlessness in both experimental conditions induced a perception of identity undermining, and that it is this latter which, in turn, had been responsible for increased separatism. In other words, our theoretical model as well as our post-hoc explanation suggested a two-step mediation process between condition and separatism, with power as the first mediator and identity undermining as the second.

This two-step model was tested using the causal steps method described by Judd and Kenny (1981), which can deal with causal chain involving several mediators. The differences between this method and one-step mediation analysis are

that, first, the controlled effect of the IV (i.e. condition) on the DV (i.e. separatism) is assessed by a regression which controls for the effect of *all* mediators (i.e. both powerlessness and identity undermining in our case), and, second, that the effect of each mediating variable should be controlled not only for the effect of the IV but also for all mediating variables that precede it in the mediation chain (i.e. in our case, the effect of identity undermining on separatism was controlled for both condition and power).

In order to provide evidence supporting our model, the following conditions needed to be met. First of all, the effect of condition on separatism needed to become non-significant or be substantially reduced when both mediators were taken into account. This fact was confidently confirmed by the results ($B = .576$, $SE = .567$, $\beta = .136$, $t_{43} = 1.02$, $p = .315$). Second, it was necessary for powerlessness to be a significant predictor of identity undermining even when the effect of condition was controlled for, a condition which was also easily met ($B = .773$, $SE = .148$, $\beta = .652$, $t_{44} = 5.24$, $p < .001$). Third, identity undermining needed to be a significant predictor of separatism once both condition and power were controlled for. The results provided some support for this conclusion, insofar as identity undermining was a marginally significant predictor of separatism in these conditions ($B = .239$, $SE = .115$, $\beta = .337$, $t_{43} = 2.09$, $p = .043$). Ideally, the significant effect of powerlessness on separatism controlled for condition, which was demonstrated above in our second mediation model (see section 6), also needed to be reduced to non-significance (or to be substantially reduced) when the effect of identity undermining was further added to the equation. The analyses also supported that conclusion ($B = .221$, $SE = .143$, $\beta = .262$, $t_{43} = 1.54$, $p = .130$; see also Figure 4.3 below for a representation of the model).

This last result not only showed that the mediating effect of power on separatism was accounted for by identity undermining; it also showed that the possible alternative model, which would postulate identity undermining as the antecedent of powerlessness in the causal chain, would not fit the data so well. Indeed, one condition for such a model to be successful would precisely be that the effect of powerlessness on the DV should be significant even when controlled for both condition and its preceding mediator (identity undermining), which was not the case.

FIGURE 4.3: MEDIATING ROLE OF POWERLESSNESS AND IDENTITY UNDERMINING



All figures represent β Weights

Figures in bold and italics: effect controlled for the IV (condition)

Figures in brackets: effect controlled for the IV (condition) AND the second mediator (power for identity undermining and vice-versa).

DISCUSSION

1. Summary of the results and interpretation

This experiment started with the purpose of manipulating the perception of the effect of Britain on Scottish identity and the Scottish way of life, in such a way that it would be possible to affect the political attitude to Britain in two opposite directions, i.e. towards both more and less separatism. Such a hope was, however, short-lived, as the memory question relating to the part of the texts designed to introduce the manipulation clearly indicated that the consonant condition was perceived antithetically to what it had been designed for.

Why most participants in the consonant condition answered this memory question 'wrongly' is unfortunately not totally clear. We can exclude the possibility that they did not pay enough attention to the manipulation paragraph, or forget its details by the time they reached the question, given that the constancy of their 'mistakes' cannot be thought as random, and given the fact that only 1 of the 17 participants in the dissonant condition made a similar mistake on this question (plus the simple fact that the manipulation did have an impact on their answers compared to the control condition). But there still remain at least two different possibilities. One is that they could have biased their memory according to their own views, without being aware of it. However, though the question did explicitly ask participants to answer 'according to the text', it is also possible that participants did remember correctly what was written in the account but misinterpreted that question and answered in terms of their personal opinion instead.

In any case, it was clear that, following the logic of our model, a change of predictions as regards the effects of the manipulation in the consonant condition had to be made. We then hypothesised, post-hoc to the manipulation check but a priori to the main analyses, that both the consonant and the dissonant conditions should lead participants to both disagree more with the policy as well as to take a more separatist stance.

If the legitimacy of such a shift in predictions is allowed, then, overall, the experiment provided some encouraging results. As we have seen, there was a significant effect of experimental condition on attitude to the policy and on separatism and those effects were going in the expected direction. Furthermore, the

results also provided some evidence supporting H2b that the effect of condition on separatism was mediated by changes in perception of identity undermining, at least on one of the two items which were used in the experiment.

As an aside comment, the results regarding H1 (i.e. the effect of condition on the attitude to the policy) suggest that identity considerations can be important not only in influencing attitudes towards superordinate groups, but can also help people in deciding on specific policies. In particular, given that the policy was selected and created to be balanced, one tempting hypothesis, which is consistent with the idea of identity as a sense-making device and as a guide to action, is that identity could be especially helpful for people in order to clarify their position when they have to decide on ambiguous issues, and where both sides of an argument can be seen as potentially convincing.

However, coming back to our main interests, the unexpected way in which the consonant condition was perceived and impacted on the attitude towards Britain also raised some questions. We asked ourselves why it was that this condition was perceived in that way and had this effect on participants' political attitude. In that respect, the two most plausible candidates were an increased salience of ingroup identity or an increased salience of the powerlessness of Scotland within Britain. The first of these possible post-hoc explanations was ruled out by the results on the Scottish identification scale, whereas the second one received strong support from the analysis using powerlessness as a mediator of the effect of condition on separatism.

Our interpretation of such a result runs as follows. It could be that what mattered for participants was not so much that the policy was said to be good or bad for Scotland, but the fact that decisions concerning the ingroup were (illegitimately) taken by someone else, especially in a context where Scotland now has a Scottish parliament where participants might have estimated that this kind of decision should be taken. To use a distinction common in justice theory (Leventhal, 1980; Thibaut & Walker, 1975), the source of their discontent might have been procedural rather than focused on the specific content of the policy. The increased separatism found in both experimental conditions, including the consonant condition, could then be interpreted as a way of claiming that 'we should decide for ourselves what is good or bad for us', especially given that the policy concerned a matter which was said, in those conditions, to be of particular relevance for Scotland. In other words, this increased

separatism might have arisen from a need to reaffirm Scotland's right for self-determination, seemingly undermined by the decision process which had led to the policy.

At first sight, that post-hoc explanation centred on a concern for power might seem to imply that participants were not chiefly determined in their attitudes by concerns for identity, and more particularly for identity undermining. However, as we pointed out in Chapter 2, power issues have to be understood in relation to identity. We believe that people do not claim power for its own sake, but that they do so in order to be able to act in the terms of their identity, and that it is precisely what makes power crucial in the issue of relationships with superordinate groups. Accordingly, the undermining of self-determination which, if our explanation is correct, seems to have concerned participants in our experiment, can be seen as closely related to a concern for the potential repression of ingroup identity, i.e. a concern for the undermining of the general capacity of agency and therefore of the means to enact and express this identity in practice (see Chapters 1 and 2). More formally, our theoretical model stipulates that powerlessness should be a direct antecedent of identity undermining, and that the effect of powerlessness on separatism should be mediated by its impact on identity undermining. At the empirical level, our study provided support for both these assumptions, by showing that it was indeed mainly by its (significant) effect on identity undermining that power affected the degree of support for separatism.

2. Limits and future directions

Thus, the issue made salient by our manipulation might have been one of identity repression, where the question was whether the Scottish ethos and the specific interests it defines can or cannot be represented in British politics, and therefore can or cannot be expressed in practice, in policies, social institutions, and people's ways of life. By the same token, these remarks might also help to explain one of the limits shown by the results of the study. Indeed, one could wonder why there was a poor correlation between the two identity undermining items and why there was no effect of condition on the first of those items. In that respect, it could be argued that the second item, which asked if Britain had undermined the 'Scottish way of life' (i.e. the expression of Scottish identity in practice), worked because it

was perhaps closer to the idea of repression and thus the most susceptible to being affected by the manipulation, which made that particular issue salient in the context of this particular experiment. By contrast, it could be argued that the first item (*Being part of Britain has allowed Scotland to keep its specific and separate identity*) was not affected by our manipulation because it measured a slightly different side of identity undermining, i.e. the concern for identity loss in the long-term, which, although it is definitely an important issue in general and is intimately linked to the issue of repression (see Chapter 2), was made less salient in this particular context.

Nevertheless, for all the attraction that this argument might perhaps provide, it must be stressed that it remains a post-hoc explanation of our results. Accordingly, such explanation must be seen less as an attempt to save our a priori hypotheses, in the view of unexpected results, than as aiming towards providing insights into the way subsequent studies could explore these questions further and provide a better test of our ideas.

Likewise, though we might have provided a consistent (and, hopefully, convincing) account of the unexpected results in the consonant condition, it remains that the failure of creating a condition which would actually have induced feelings of identity enhancement is a definite shortcoming of this study, and further research should address that issue. Indeed, providing direct experimental evidence that the attitude towards Britain can be manipulated in the direction opposite to separatism, as a function of its enhancing impact on Scottish identity, would constitute a more convincing case for our general argument.

In that respect, the present work then suggests that one possibility for doing so would be to try to manipulate perceptions of identity undermining/enhancement through a manipulation of perceptions of ingroup power, i.e. through the undermining or enhancement of the ingroup's capacity of agency by being part of the UK and its consequence for the expression of ingroup identity. The study also suggests that any enhancing manipulation should be made, one way or another, more convincing for participants, as apparently statements by ingroup members were not enough for that purpose. It is true that one possibility is that those latter were in fact discarded as not true group members, in which case more effort should be put into making them prototypical of the ingroup.

Finally, it has to be pointed out that the size of the sample used was modest, and should probably be increased in any further investigation. However, the reason

for this modest size is that the present study was conceived, and should therefore be seen, as no more than a first exploratory step in the issue of the causal relationship between perception of identity undermining/enhancement and political attitudes. Accordingly, if we see its value as much in its potential for raising new questions and ideas than in its hypotheses-confirming aspect, we can affirm that it has fulfilled its purposes quite honourably.

CHAPTER V

THE STRATGIC USE OF IDENTITY : TWO EXPERIMENTS ON GROUP PROTOTYPICALITY

INTRODUCTION

In the preceding chapters, we addressed the issue of political attitudes towards superordinate groups in two different, though complementary, ways. In Chapter 2, we asked ourselves what the origins are of the meanings associated with group identities and the social context, and we argued that they develop, at least in part, through the discursive and strategic constructions deployed by those whose aim is to mobilise others in favour of their political projects In Chapter 3 and in Chapter 4, we attempted to show that these meanings do indeed help to explain people's political attitudes. We have thus touched upon both sides of the two-way relationship between political attitudes and identity meanings.

However, the overall picture suggested by these studies could be misleading in one important respect. We have looked at the process of strategic construction only in the case of politicians, and in our two studies of 'ordinary people' we have treated meanings as perceptions (rather than active construction) explaining people's attitudes. This could (wrongly) suggest that strategic work would be the monopoly of politicians or other elites, whereas the role of 'ordinary people' would be limited to simply assimilating the meanings constructed by such elites. Thus, there is the danger of a somewhat elitist and 'top-down' view whereby politicians would consciously construct versions of the world which the public would be limited to passively absorbing and acting upon.

Although the importance of 'top-down' processes of social influence in the development of shared visions of groups and social reality cannot be denied, our perspective is that the cognitive and strategic dimensions of political attitudes and meanings, as well as the two-way relationship between them, applies to both elites and 'ordinary' people. On the one hand, and as we argued in Chapter 2, if politicians did not have some committed beliefs about social reality and groups, why would they defend any particular project in the first place? In other words, there is no good reason to think that politicians would be characterised by different psychological processes than ordinary people, which means they must have 'attitudes' too, with the usual cognitive implications of such a word. If there are any differences between them, they are to be found at the practical level (for example, in terms of an increased access to means of diffusion), and perhaps in the fact that convincing others on political issues is likely to be more frequently a salient purpose for politicians (as it is required by the nature of their job). Conversely, and more importantly for the present chapter, there is no reason to think that ordinary people cannot make strategic use of meanings. Thus, in the following studies, we intend to address this issue by extending our analysis of the strategic from the political elite to a more general public.

Furthermore, another limitation of our previous investigation of the strategic dimension is that we have only looked at it in qualitative (though systematic) terms (see Chapter 2). Although it is true that some methods can be better suited for addressing different questions, we do not believe that there should be a necessary amalgam between looking at the cognitive-perceptual or the constructivist-strategic sides of the issues and the choice of a particular method. In other words, though qualitative methods provided us with unequalled richness of data and was particularly suited to looking at the discursive construction of group identities and relationships, there is no reason why strategic effects could not also appear within experimental contexts and through the use of quantitative measures. It is one aim of this chapter to provide an illustration of how this can be achieved. Should such an attempt be successful, it would help us to avoid the trap of identifying a particular theoretical standpoint with one specific methodology.

Thus, in this chapter, we will try to show that the content of group judgements should not only be seen as a mere reflection of people's perceptions or cognitions, but can also be subject to strategic variations as a function of people's

communicational purpose. More precisely, we will attempt to do so through the use of one specific example of group 'perceptions' taken from the intergroup literature, i.e. the judgements of groups' prototypicality within a superordinate group, and the related phenomenon of *ingroup projection,* to which we alluded to briefly in Chapter 1. Before we carry on, then, we need to provide a more detailed explanation of this concept of ingroup projection as well as of the reasons why we see it as an appropriate platform in order to illustrate our broader point about the strategic construction of identity meanings.

Ingroup projection or relative ingroup prototypicality within a superordinate group

The ingroup projection effect, a term coined by Mummendey and Wenzel (1999), finds its origin in the older social psychological concept of social projection (Allport, 1924). The idea of social projection is that people tend to assume that their personal attributes (e.g. thoughts, opinions, beliefs) are shared by others, i.e. to project their own characteristic onto others. Consequently, they also tend to think that their characteristics and opinions are more prototypical more than they actually are or than other people would judge them to be (Clement & Krueger, 2000; Krueger & Clement, 1996; Spears & Manstead, 1989).

With their idea of ingroup projection, Mummendey and Wenzel hypothesised that a similar phenomenon could well happen at the intergroup level. That is, they predicted that ingroup members belonging to a common superordinate group should tend to project their ingroup's characteristics on this superordinate group. Based on SCT's tenet that ingroup and outgroup are compared in relation to how prototypical they are of the superordinate group (Turner et al., 1987), such projection should then go hand in hand with a tendency to believe that the ingroup is more prototypical of the superordinate category that the other subgroups (i.e. a high *relative ingroup prototypicality*), given that the characteristics of this latter are appraised with an ingroup bias. Empirically, Mummendey and her colleagues (Waldzus, Mummendey, Wenzel, & Weber, 2003; Wenzel et al., 2001) have collected data across many different types of groups (e.g. psychology and business students, Germans and poles within Europe, etc.) which support this hypothesis, by showing that the ingroup is indeed often judged more prototypical of the superordinate category than the outgroup.

As these authors also underline, however, reality constraints can sometimes make it difficult for the ingroup to sustain the claim of being more prototypical in an absolute sense. Where, for instance, the outgroup constitutes a clearly dominant majority, its higher prototypicality can be acknowledged by ingroup members. Nevertheless, their results show that, in those cases, there remains a relative ingroup projection effect. That is; minority ingroup members still see themselves as more prototypical than the judgements of ingroup members by outgroup members would suggest (Waldzus, Mummendey, Wenzel, & Boettcher, in press). In other words, while the outgroup's higher prototypicality is acknowledged by both groups, the difference in prototypicality between the two groups is judged to be lower by members of the ingroup minority than by members of the dominant majority.

From what we have seen in earlier chapters, the reasons why this constitutes an appropriate topic for our own purposes might already be apparent. Indeed, the studies we have described so far suggest that, in terms of judgements of prototypicality of both the ingroup and the outgroup, the opposite of ingroup projection could also happen in certain circumstances. That is, we have seen that one of the main basis on which supporters of Scottish independence sustain their separatist position is that Britain is dominated by the English (and their interests) and that, as a consequence, the Scots are under-represented within Britain (see in particular Chapter 2). They claim that the outgroup majority is dominant to the point that the identity of the superordinate group tends to be equated with outgroup identity, whereas ingroup identity is ignored and therefore does not contribute to defining the superordinate group. In consequence, we would expect support for independence to be associated with the claim that the Scots are in fact not prototypical of Britain, as a way to underline the fact that they are under-represented in Britain - or, to put it the other way round, to emphasise the monopoly of the majority over the definition of the superordinate category identity (see also van Knippenberg & van Oers, 1984).

Thus, one way of testing our position that group judgements are sensitive to strategic variations would be to appraise if judgements of ingroup relative prototypicality can vary as a function of the political projects supported by people, i.e. if they wish to be members of the superordinate group or if they wish to be separated from it. However, before we make that hypothesis, an important point to understand is that, still in line with the findings of Chapter 2, group judgements

should be seen as political statements rather than as reflecting fixed beliefs. Consequently, our argument is not that political attitudes necessarily lead to specific and unchanging accounts of groups' prototypicality, but that they can influence people's judgements when they try to make a case for their political position. In other words, it all depends upon the type of claim people are interested in making, which in turn depends upon their broad and relatively stable political project, but also on the specific communicational context in which they find themselves. What we are saying is not that it is the belief in independence as such which would trigger a low relative ingroup prototypicality, but the *claim* for independence. This also means that, depending on changes in the rhetorical context (and thus of the type of claim people are trying to make within this context, which can be other than making a case for independence), there could be variation in judgements of relative ingroup prototypicality even within supporters of independence themselves.

STUDY 1

Hypotheses

In order to test our ideas, we decided to run a first study whose main purpose was simply to appraise if, within the British context, the judgements of relative ingroup prototypicality would vary amongst Scottish participants, according to how much they did support or oppose Scottish independence. More specifically, we hypothesised that the more Scottish participants supported independence, the less they should judge the Scots to be prototypical of Britain in comparison with the English - i.e. the less they should show the 'ingroup projection effect' (**H1**).

Correlatively, in relation to Wenzel and Mummendey's (1999) own hypothesis, we did not have a specific expectation as to whether there would be ingroup projection within the Scottish group taken as a whole. Indeed, should H1 be true, whether there would be such an ingroup projection effect in the overall sample would then depend on the relative proportion of supporters and non-supporters of independence (i.e. should this proportion be balanced, the ratings of those different subsets of Scots could compensate for each other). However, it was nevertheless worth testing Wenzel and Mummendey's hypothesis within the Scottish/British context. Since Scots constitute a numerical minority against the English majority, we also included a group of English participants in the study, in order to provide a comparison group in case Scottish participants showed relative, rather than absolute, ingroup projection.

Secondly, should we find support for our main hypothesis, a potential alternative explanation would nevertheless need to be considered. Indeed, Wenzel and Mummendey have underlined the importance of dual identification (i.e. identification both with the ingroup and the superordinate group) in predicting the effect of ingroup projection. Given that separatists are unlikely to possess a strong British identity, should we find a lower degree of relative ingroup prototypicality amongst them, it could then be argued that this would be due to the absence of such dual identification. In other words, there is a possibility that any relationship between support for independence and relative ingroup prototypicality would be spurious and explained by a lower dual identity. Thus, we needed to include identification

measures in our studies in order to check for this alternative explanation. We do not deny that dual identification could indeed be a significant predictor of relative ingroup prototypicality. However, should that be the case, we would need to show that support for independence would nevertheless remain a separate and significant predictor of relative ingroup prototypicality, even once variations in dual identification were taken into account (**H2**).

Thirdly, in relation to ingroup (Scottish) identification - considered independently of British identity - a more specific hypothesis could be made, in line with our own perspective. According to our content-based approach, the more one identifies with the ingroup, the more one might be motivated to make a claim related to this ingroup (in this case through judgements of group's prototypicality); but the direction of judgements should depend upon the nature of the claim which is made, which in turn can be determined by the nature of one's political attitude. To put it more formally, and mirroring in some ways the hypothesis we made in Chapter 3, we predicted that, rather than leading to more or less relative ingroup prototypicality as such, Scottish identification would interact with (or would be moderated by) support for independence in predicting judgements of prototypicality. For those who do not strongly support independence, ingroup identification should lead to higher relative ingroup prototypicality. However, for high supporters of independence, a higher degree of identification should lead to lower relative ingroup prototypicality - i.e. to judge the Scots as less prototypical of Britain than the English (**H3**).

Finally, as this argument just reminded us, the effect predicted by H1 is hypothesised to be underlined by the type of claim people are making through their judgements of group prototypicality. In this first study, we relied mainly on an interpersonal difference (support for independence), which was thought to determine that type of claim, in order to study the strategic variability in judgements it can induce. However, given that the order of questions was varied in the research questionnaire (see below), a way of testing the impact of the more immediate rhetorical context was also available. The alleged topic of the research was not political attitudes to Britain, so the willingness to make a claim in favour or against independence through judgements of prototypicality should only have come into play when political attitudes were asked first, i.e. before groups' prototypicality was measured. Only in these circumstances should the issue of independence have been made salient for participants, who could thereby use their subsequent answers on the

prototypicality measures as a political statement in relation to this issue. The hypothesised difference between supporters and non-supporters of independence in their degree of relative ingroup prototypicality should therefore only become evident (or at least be much stronger) when political attitudes were measured first, as opposed to when they were measured after groups' prototypicality (**H4**).

METHOD

Procedure and participants

100 students at the University of St Andrews, of both Scottish and English nationalities, took part in the study. They were approached in university accommodation and asked to fill in a short questionnaire about Scottish and English people's perception of each other and of Britain. After completion of the questionnaire, which took about 5 to 10 minutes, participants were thanked and debriefed.

A significant proportion of participants ($N = 22$) had to be excluded from the analyses because they simply failed to answer the main dependent variable measuring the prototypicality of the Scots and the English (see below). Of the remaining 78 participants, 37 were of English nationality (18 males, 19 females; *age range* 18-29) and 41 of Scottish nationality (18 males and 23 females; *age range* 17-29).

Questionnaire Design

The research questionnaire included three types of questions (an example of this questionnaire can be found in Appendix 5.1).

a) Dependent measure: prototypicality of the Scots and the English.

The dependent measure was directly borrowed from Waldzus et al.'s (in press) ingroup projection studies. People were first asked to generate traits which they thought were characteristics of each subgroup as compared with the other subgroup (3 for each subgroup). They then had to rate how much each of those self-generated traits applied to members of the superordinate category in general (i.e. to British people, on a scale ranging from 0 to 10). The mean scores for each subgroup on these items gave us an index of how prototypical the members of this subgroup were judged to be of British people in general, and the difference between the scores for the ingroup and the outgroup on this 'British prototypicality' measure thus constituted the index of relative ingroup prototypicality.

In relation to the relatively high rate of missing data found on this measure (see above), we should note that most participants who failed to fill in these questions commented, in the space provided for generating traits, that they refused to give general descriptions of groups because they were of the opinion that 'all individuals are different'. It is then very likely that, rather than being random missing data or the sign of a defect in the measure or in the procedure, they constituted a subgroup of participants adopting, in all awareness, an individualist stance (in the specific sense of refusing to judge individuals on the basis of their group membership, i.e. refusing to use stereotypes), and could then be estimated as not relevant for our research purposes interested in group judgements.

b) Independent measure: attitude towards independence.

This measure, which constituted our main independent variable, assessed attitude towards the independence of Scotland in Britain (2 items ranging from 0 to10). The two items were taken from the independence scale used in the survey study (see Chapter 3).

c) Measures of identification.

In this section of the questionnaire, participants were first asked to indicate their nationality, and then were asked to fill in a scale of either Scottish or English identification, depending on their nationality. Also, all participants had to fill a scale of British identification (3 scales of 4 items ranging from 1 to 7; again those were taken from the survey study, see Chapter 3).

The order of these three scales was alternated, thus yielding six different types of questionnaires. At the end of the questionnaire (irrespective of the order of questions), some additional questions relating to personal details were also asked (age, sex, membership in political association), and a space for open comments was provided. The questionnaire also included a few other measures which will not be used in subsequent analyses and thus are not described here for purpose of simplicity (see Appendix 5.1. for full details).

RESULTS

1. Scale reliability

All the scales used in subsequent analyses yielded a reliability index ranging from very satisfactory to very good. The independence scale yielded an standardised alpha of .90, the Scottish identification scale of .84, and the British identification scale of .76[1].

2. Ingroup projection amongst Scots and English

Before testing our own hypotheses, we first ran an analysis to check if the effect of ingroup projection found by Waldzus et al. could also be found in our study, within the British context. Mirroring these authors' analysis, a 2 (participants' nationality: Scottish vs. English) x 2 (nationality of the target: the Scots vs. the English) ANOVA was run with the first factor between-subjects and the second within-subjects.

The results of this analysis showed no main effect of the nationality of participants ($F_{1,76} = 1.21$; $p = .275$) but a marginally significant main effect for the target group ($F_{1,76} = 3.66$; $p = .060$). The interaction between participants' group and target group was not significant ($F_{1,76} = 2.11$, $p = .150$). The marginally significant main effect of target group indicates that there was an overall tendency for the English to be judged more prototypical than the Scots by both groups (see Table 5.1 for means). In other words, in absolute terms, English participants did show ingroup projection whereas Scots did not.

In terms of relative ingroup projection, however, the table of the means shows that the difference in prototypicality between the two subgroups was stronger for English participants. In fact, when making a direct comparison between cells, this difference was significant only for the English participants ($t_{36} = 2.37$, $p = .025$), whereas the scores of prototypicality for Scottish participants did not differ significantly from each other ($t_{40} = .331$, $p = .742$). Thus, Scots seemed not to have underlined the higher prototypicality of the English as much as the English did.

[1] These alphas scores were computed using Scottish participants only, given that all analyses involving those scales were run exclusively on these participants.

However, the fact that the interaction was not even marginally significant does not allow us to support the conclusion of relative ingroup projection with confidence. In any case, whether or not this conclusion could be made was not relevant as far as our hypotheses are concerned.

TABLE 5.1

Prototypicality of the Scots and the English as a function of participants' nationality

PARTICIPANTS' NATIONALITY	TARGET	
	The English	The Scots
	Mean (Std. Dev.)	
Scottish ($N = 41$)	5.34 (1.35)	5.22 (1.52)
English ($N = 37$)	5.96 (1.68)	5.14 (1.56)

3. Relative ingroup prototypicality amongst Scots as a function of support for independence

Let us now consider in more detail the results pertaining only to Scottish participants (to whom we will refer from now on as 'the participants'). First of all, in order to simplify the analyses, and as alluded to in the method section, a composite score of relative ingroup prototypicality for the Scots was created by subtracting the ratings of prototypicality of the English from those of prototypicality of the Scots. Secondly, in order to test our central hypothesis H1 that the degree of relative ingroup prototypicality should vary as a function of support for independence, a regression analysis was conducted with the latter variable as predictor and the former as dependent variable. The results of this analysis showed that support for independence was not a significant predictor of relative ingroup prototypicality (B = -.0922, SE = .12, β = -.122, $F_{1,39}$ = .59, p = .448), thus failing to provide support for our hypothesis.

However, a closer look at the scatterplot of the data revealed that there was a possibility of a curvilinear (rather than linear) relationship between the two variables, in the form of an inverted U-shape. Indeed, for low to average scores on the scale of support for independence, the degree of relative ingroup prototypicality seemed to increase as support for independence increased, whereas for average to high scores of independence, it seemed to decrease as support for independence increased. A curvilinear quadratic regression yielding an inverted U-shape provided some support for this idea, as the quadratic component of this regression was indeed marginally significant ($B2 = -.0935$, $SE = .04$, $F_{2,38} = 3.09$, $p = .057$).

This suggested the possibility that, while participants with moderate to high levels of support for independence might have behaved according to our expectation, participants showing very little support for independence (or, one might say, participants who were actively anti-independence, given their very low scores on that scale) might have constituted a special case which had not been foreseen. That is, they might also have shown a lower degree of relative ingroup prototypicality, as we expected from high supporters of independence (but perhaps for different reasons). We will come back briefly in the discussion to those participants and suggest a post-hoc explanation for their answers. For the moment, as this group did not as such constitute the most relevant focus for our inquiry, it was decided to exclude it from all subsequent analyses aimed at testing our different hypotheses. Practically speaking, this was done by taking out all participants who scored on the quarter point of the scale or lower (i.e. <= 2.5; $N = 14$), as it can be argued that those participants not only did not support independence but were strongly opposed to it.

Thus, as far as H1 is concerned, this hypothesis was tested again on the remaining 27 participants by means of a linear regression, and the results revealed that this time the level of independence significantly predicted (negatively) the degree of relative ingroup prototypicality ($\beta = -.497$, $t_{25} = 2.87$, $p = .008$). As expected, participants supporting strongly independence showed judged the ingroup as (relatively) less prototypical of Britain than participants who were neutral or moderate in their support.

4. Impact of dual identification

As stated earlier, however, this result confirming our main hypothesis needed to be checked for the possibility of a spurious relationship, in case varying support for independence would be associated with different degree of dual identification. Thus, following Waldzus et al.'s procedure, we first calculated a composite score of 'Dual Identification' by multiplying the exponential function of both Scottish and British identification (both variables first standardised). As these authors argue, such a transformation is necessary in order to capture their prediction, because what they predict is not any kind of interaction but a particular effect where both variables need to be high in order to lead to a higher degree of relative ingroup prototypicality. A simple product of both variables would not be adequate because the regression coefficient would equally increase if a combination of two low levels of identification also led to a higher relative ingroup prototypicality[2].

The regression analyses using this new rescaled variable of dual identification and support for independence as predictors showed that dual identification did not have a significant effect on relative ingroup prototypicality ($B = .074$, $SE = .129$, $\beta = .116$, $t_{19} = .57$, $p = .573$)[3]. On the other hand, support for independence remained significant predictor of this variable ($B = -.463$, $SE = .203$, $\beta = -.459$, $t_{19} = 2.28$, $p = .035$), i.e. it was significant even with the possible effect of dual identification taken into account. This might not be surprising given that dual identification did not actually correlate with support for independence ($r = -.085$, $p = .707$). Thus, those results confirmed H2 and that the results supporting hypothesis H1 could not be accounted by differences in dual identification.

[2] It would also have been possible to test this hypothesis using the MR procedure followed in Chapter 3 (for testing interactions), as the danger pointed by Waldzus et al. would become apparent when plotting the interaction. Nevertheless, the exponential transformation was used here because, given the modest size of the sample, it also allowed us to minimise the number of variables entered into the equation compared to an interaction analysis.

[3] The fact that the degrees of freedom in this analysis differ from the ones in section 3 is explained by missing values on the dual identification variable.

5. Impact of ingroup identification

Further analyses were conducted in order to check hypothesis H3, concerning the role of Scottish identification and its expected interaction with the level of independence in predicting relative ingroup prototypicality. First of all, a multiple regression was run with relative ingroup prototypicality as dependent variable and ingroup identification, level of independence, and the product of those two variables as predictors. As in all our multiple regression analyses involving an interaction term, the two predictor variables were first centred (see Aiken and West, 1991; see also Chapter 3). This analysis yielded a significant interaction (B = -.362, SE = .154, $t_{22} = 2.36, p = .028$).

Simple slopes on different conditional values of support for independence were then calculated in order to appraise the direction of this interaction. Following the standard procedure (see Chapter 3), the chosen conditional values (CVs) were the mean, one SD below and one SD above the mean of scores of support for independence. As Table 5.2 shows, the analyses revealed a pattern of results consistent with our predictions. Indeed, as expected, at low level of support for independence (CV = 3.97), ingroup identification led to significantly higher scores of relative ingroup prototypicality (β = .432, p = .035). However this tendency gradually changed direction as the level of support of independence increased. On the mean (CV = 6), the simple slope was virtually flat and not significant (β = -.038, p = .845). At high conditional value of independence (CV = 8.03), the relationship was negative as predicted, though it failed to reach statistical significance (β = -.510, p = .156). Thus, those results provided support for our hypothesis H3, though it did so more for low supporters of independence than for high supporters, i.e. identification seems to have been a more important factor for the former than for the latter.

TABLE 5.2

Relationship between Scottish identification and relative ingroup prototypicality (RIP) as a function of level of support for Scottish independence

		Conditional values of independence		
		Low (= 3.97)	Medium (= 6)	High (= 8.03)
Simple slopes (regression of RIP on identification)	B	.674	-.061	-.796
	SE	.294	.308	.542
	β	.432	-.038	-.510
	t (22)	2.25	.198	1.47
	p	**.035**	.845	.156

6. Effect of the order of questions

As was stated before, the fact that the order of questions in the study was alternated allowed us to test indirectly the effect of the rhetorical context on judgements of prototypicality. In order to perform that test, the questionnaires were first coded according to whether measures of prototypicality preceded or followed the measure of support for independence, creating a new dichotomic variable (Order). A multiple regression was then run with relative ingroup prototypicality as dependent variable, and with level of support for independence, Order, and their interaction as predictors. As expected, the analysis revealed a significant interaction (B = -.771, SE = .314, t_{23} = 2.46, p = .022), showing that the effect of support for independence on relative ingroup prototypicality did vary as a function of the order of the questions. Confirming that the pattern of this interaction was as predicted by H4, the analyses of the simple slopes for each group based on Order showed that support for independence was a significant predictor of relative ingroup prototypicality only in the case where support for independence was measured first (B = -.898, SE = .240, β = -.929, t_{23} = 3.74, p = .001), with higher support for

independence leading to lower relative ingroup prototypicality. When support for independence was measured second, it failed to bear a significant relationship with relative ingroup prototypicality (B = -.127, SE = .202, β = -.214, t_{23} = .63, p = .535; given the dichotomous nature of the order variable, the test of whether the coefficients of these two simple slopes are significantly different is equivalent to the interaction test).

Taking the issue the other way round, simple slopes were also calculated for the effect of Order at different level of support for independence. The three conditional values chosen were again the mean, one SD below and one above the mean (see above). The simple slopes on these values revealed that the order of question had a significant impact only at the high CV of support for independence (B = -2.27, SE = .874, β = -.590, t_{23} = 2.60, p = .016), while it did not have an effect at the low CV (B = .859, SE = .896, β = .223, t_{23} = .958, p = .348) or with the CV on the mean (B = -.705, SE = .616, β = -.183, t_{23} = 1.15, p = .264). Thus, only for those participants strongly supporting independence, measuring their support for independence first led to lower relative ingroup prototypicality compared to when it was measured second. On the other hand, the order of questions did not affect the judgements of relative ingroup prototypicality of participants with low or moderate support for independence.

Nonetheless, an alternative possible explanation of those results could be that when groups' prototypicality was not measured at the beginning of the questionnaire, the questions preceding this measure could have made ingroup (and/or superordinate group) identity salient, thus explaining the effect of order which was found. In particular, the identification questions would be likely to have such an effect, and there was an inevitable degree of overlap between the order of the independence and identification measures in relation to the prototypicality measures (logically, in 4 cases out of 6, both independence and identification were measured conjointly either before or after groups' prototypicality). However, a similar multiple regression analysis that that above but with Order coded as a function of whether identification (rather than support for independence) was measured before or after prototypicality did not yield a significant interaction (B = -.084, SE = .355, t_{23} = -.236, p = .816), allowing us to reject that possibility. By the same token, this provided a test for an alternative model against which the validity of ours was reinforced. It indicated that

the significant effect of order was not just a matter of groups' prototypicality being measured later in the questionnaire, but that it was the fact that it was preceded by the measure of independence which mattered.

DISCUSSION

Overall, this study yielded very satisfactory results as regards our hypotheses, and provided at the very least sufficient ground for exploring the issues further. First of all, in the whole sample, there was evidence that judgements of relative ingroup prototypicality *did* vary as a function of attitude towards independence, even if the relationship between the two was not linear as first expected. Secondly, this relationship did take the expected shape (i.e. higher level of support for independence leading to lower relative ingroup prototypicality) once participants who scored very low on support for independence (and who also showed lower relative ingroup prototypicality) were taken out of the equation.

As far as the answers of this latter group of participants are concerned, we can see at least two possible explanations for them. One possibility is that they could constitute a group of people recognising that the English are the dominant majority in Britain, and are thus more prototypical than the Scots of Britain (in a similar way to strong supporters of independence), but accept this fact as normal and legitimate (as opposed to strong supporters of independence). This would be consistent with the fact that not only do they not support independence, but they are strongly opposed it. Alternatively, they could also constitute a group of people taking an individualist stance (it is indeed possible that individualism might be associated with rejection of independence) and who therefore did not want to take a position on the respective prototypicality of both groups. But rather than refusing to answer the questions altogether as some participants did, they might have chosen to express their individualist stand by giving similar scores of prototypicality to both groups, thereby yielding low scores of relative ingroup prototypicality.

In any case, whatever the reason for the answers of this unexpected group, the main point remains that its presence does not undermine the overall logic of our argument relating to the importance of attitude to independence in predicting how much ingroup and outgroup are judged prototypical of the superordinate group.

Furthermore, the results supporting our main hypothesis could not be accounted for by varying degree of dual identification amongst participants. This does not necessarily mean that ingroup, superordinate group and dual identification do not play an important role in judgements of prototypicality, only that this role might not be a simple and linear one. In particular, in relation to ingroup

identification, our analysis showed that its impact worked in interaction with the level of support for independence. Our interpretation of this result is that, whereas for all participants ingroup identification might have reinforced their motivation to make a claim through judgements of prototypicality, the direction in which those judgements were affected depended upon the nature of this claim. Thus, for those participants strongly supporting independence, a higher degree of identification led to lower relative ingroup prototypicality because this is what sustained their claim for independence. However, for those participants who did not support independence, ingroup identification had the opposite effect and increased the degree of relative ingroup prototypicality. One possibility is that, through their judgements of prototypicality, those participants aimed to underline the importance of the ingroup in the superordinate group, and that their motivation to do so increased as ingroup identification increased. That is, it could be that their answers were underpinned by the ingroup projection mechanism hypothesised by Wenzel and Mummendey (1999) and involved more classic motivations usually related to ingroup bias (although this is not to say that such projection could not also involve a strategic element).

Finally, the analyses based on the order of the questions provided support for our hypothesis as to the mechanism underlying the impact of support for independence on judgements of prototypicality, namely, that judgements of low relative ingroup prototypicality are used as claims by strong supporters of independence in order to sustain their political position. This was confirmed by the fact that only when support for independence was measured before judgements of groups prototypicality did those participants show a lower degree of relative ingroup prototypicality. Only in those circumstances was the issue of independence made salient prior to the measure of group prototypicality, thus allowing (and, in our view, inducing) participants supporting independence to use these latter as a claim sustaining their position.

In terms of our own research purposes, however, the main aim of this first study was not to explore in great detail the impact of variations in the rhetorical/communicational context, but simply to appraise the effect of a political attitude such as support for independence on judgements of groups prototypicality. In other words, it approached the issue of strategic variability through the use of relatively stable interpersonal difference. The study was successful in that regard, but in order to address strategic questions more fully, a more direct and systematic

manipulation of the situated rhetorical context would be needed. It is with this purpose in mind that the next study was designed. Furthermore, given the small size of our sample, the analyses using MR in the present study should be taken with caution. Accordingly, another objective of our second study was to replicate our findings with a more extended sample. Finally, a third aim of this study was also to see if these findings could be replicated using an additional and alternative measure of groups' prototypicality.

STUDY 2

So far, our main claim has been that low relative ingroup prototypicality can be strategically used as a rhetorical claim in order to sustain a separatist position. However, to repeat our earlier argument, it is important to understand that we are not proposing that it is support for independence in and of itself which leads to such judgements of low relative ingroup prototypicality. Rather, it is the combination of support for independence with a rhetorical context that makes the issue of independence salient, thereby motivating supporters of independence to make a direct claim in its favour - in which case this claim for independence is best served by underlining the under-represented nature of the Scots within Britain (or, to take the other side of the coin, by underlining the dominance of the English through a high relative outgroup prototypicality). In other words, support for independence should not necessarily be always linked with a lower relative ingroup prototypicality in every context. Should the communicational purpose of supporters of independence be different than making a direct case for their separatist project, they could well be led to different, perhaps even opposite, judgements about groups' prototypicality. In fact, if this were not the case, the strategic dimension of these judgements would be reduced to inter-individual variability, and the unsympathetic critic could even question whether this variability were strategic at all.

Our first study provided some answers to that potential criticism through the analyses of the effect of questions' order, but our second study aimed to tackle that issue more directly. In this experiment, we used a similar questionnaire to Study 1. However, in contrast to Study 1, we also attempted to induce a systematic variation in the type of claim that participants would be trying to make through their answer on measures of groups prototypicality. Our general idea was that judgements of groups' prototypicality should still vary as a function of support for independence, but this time in different ways depending on the rhetorical context made salient. In particular, an attempt was made to create conditions in which support for independence would lead to a higher relative ingroup prototypicality as well as to a lower one, compared to non-supporters of independence.

Accordingly, the experiment comprised three conditions, depending upon which issue was made salient for participants (see method section). In one condition

(*independence*), it was the issue of independence itself which was made salient. This condition was akin to the circumstances in which half of our participants in the first study were put, i.e. when support for independence was measured before groups' prototypicality (except that this time it was made explicitly salient). Based on the results of Study 1 as well as on our theoretical model, we therefore expected that in this condition participants supporting independence would show a lower relative ingroup prototypicality than participants who did not support independence.

In a second condition (*neutral or control*), the salient issue was "what Scottish and English people are like". Though the topic in this condition cannot be called neutral in an absolute sense, it corresponded to what the measures of groups' prototypicality would have made salient by themselves, should no other specific issue have been made salient to participants. This condition was akin to the conditions in which the other half of our participants in the first study were put (i.e. when groups prototypicality was measured before support for independence), and therefore we expected to find no specific effect of support for independence in that condition.

The third condition (*history*) made salient the issue of the importance of the contribution of Scotland to British history. This was the condition in which we expected supporters of independence to show *more* relative ingroup prototypicality than non-supporters. To understand why we made that prediction, it is important to emphasise that it is commonplace within the Scottish population to think that the Scottish contribution to British history is usually ignored, or at least very much underrated (e.g. in history books or teaching in schools). Thus, we hypothesised that in the history condition, participants would use the measures of groups' prototypicality to make a claim about the abnormality and the illegitimacy of such underrating. The measures would allow participants to 'contradict' this view by underlining that the Scots are indeed prototypical of Britain (i.e. important in defining what Britain and British people are). Though this might affect all participants in general, it was expected that it would particularly affect supporters of independence (i.e. that they would be even more motivated to make such a claim), given that they believe more than others that Britain is dominated by the English and that Scotland is ignored within Britain.

Another way to see this manipulation of history vs. independence conditions is that it drew participants attention towards the past or the future, with the

expectation that it would change their description of the present (i.e. their judgements of groups prototypicality). Indeed, in the history condition, it was expected that, in order to 'correct' the underrating of Scotland's past contribution in making Britain what it is today, rating the Scots as prototypical of Britain would be used as a way to underline the present importance of Scotland in the definition of Britishness - and more so by supporters of independence. By contrast, in the independence condition, and as in Study 1, it was expected that supporters of independence would underline the present un-prototypicality of the Scots and domination of the English in what it means to be British, in order to promote projects which aim to correct that ignorance in the future.

Hypotheses

Thus, our main hypothesis was that, in the independence condition, supporters of independence would show a lower degree of relative ingroup prototypicality than non supporters, while in the history condition, they would show a higher degree of relative ingroup prototypicality than non supporters. In the neutral condition, it was expected that support for independence would not affect relative ingroup prototypicality (**H1**).

We also made two additional hypotheses which mirrored H2 and H3 of the first study. That is, first of all, should the effects predicted by H1 be found, those effects should not be explainable by varying degree of dual identification amongst participants (**H2**). Secondly, we hypothesised that there would be an interaction between ingroup identification and support for independence in predicting judgements of relative ingroup prototypicality (**H3**). However, in contrast to the first study, the form of this interaction should also depend on the experimental condition. This is because, as it has already been argued, the effect of identification is assumed to be due to the fact that it enhances the willingness to make a claim in relation to the ingroup, while the direction of this effect is assumed to depend on the nature of this claim. Thus, in the independence condition, we expected to find an interaction similar to the one found in the first study (i.e. ingroup identification would raise the degree of relative ingroup prototypicality at low levels of support of independence but decrease it at high levels). However, according to H1, in the history condition, the claim made by supporters of independence should be associated with higher

relative ingroup prototypicality. We thus expected the interaction to take the opposite direction in that condition (i.e. ingroup identification would decrease the degree of relative ingroup prototypicality at low levels of independence and increase it at high levels). In the neutral condition, we expected no specific effect or interaction.

METHOD

Material and manipulation

The questionnaire used in this study was divided into two main sections (see Appendix 5.2 for full details of the questionnaire). The first part of the questionnaire introduced the manipulation. First of all, the front page introduced the alleged topic of the research, and the title as well the description of the research purposes differed according to the condition. Thus, in the history condition, the title was '*What is Scotland's contribution to British history?*'. Participants were told that there was a controversy about whether or not books and TV series on British history were too much dominated by English history, ignoring the contribution of Scotland, and that we were interested in getting their own opinion on this issue as well as on the real contribution of Scotland to British history. In the neutral condition, the title was '*What Scottish and English people are like?*'. Participants were told that there was a controversy about the respective characteristics of the Scots and the English and that the research was designed to get their own point of view on that issue. Finally, in the independence condition, the title was '*Should Scotland be independent?*'. Participants were told that there was a controversy about whether Scotland's interests were or were not properly represented within Britain, that some Scots advocated independence because Scotland would always come second to England but that others thought that Scotland would lose out by leaving Britain, and that the research was interested in knowing their opinion on this issue. Furthermore, in order to maximise the impact of the communicational dimension in participants' answers, in all conditions they were told that their answers would be shown to an English audience.

Secondly, just after this description and a page of general instructions, participants were indeed asked to give their opinion on the alleged topic of the research, in an open format. They were also asked to indicate what an English audience would think of the issue. Those questions were not aimed at providing data but were again designed to reinforce the motivation to make a claim in relation to the particular issue at stake, by further reinforcing its salience and/or by leading

participants to commit themselves through an open statement of their opinion (Kiesler, 1971)[4].

The second part of the questionnaire dealt with the dependent measures, and the same scales were used as in Study 1 - though this time the order of questions was constant, with attitude to independence and identification being measured after groups' prototypicality so that they would not affect the scores on this latter measure. However, a second, alternative measure of groups' prototypicality was also introduced, in order to reinforce the strength of any potential findings. As for the first one, this second measure was adapted from Waldzus et al. (in press). Rather than asking participants themselves to generate traits for the Scots and the English, 8 pre-defined traits (e.g. friendly, arrogant, adventurous, etc.) were listed, and participants were asked to rate the extent to which each of those traits applied to Scottish, English and British people (3 scales of 8 items).

The traits for those 3 scales were selected on the basis of a pre-test on Scottish students at the university of St Andrews ($N = 11$). These participants were asked to rate both English and Scottish people on a set of 25 traits, chosen on the basis of the self-generated traits most commonly found in Study 1, as well as on the basis of a study by Hopkins and Moore (2001) on Scottish and English stereotypes. Participants also had to indicate the general valence of those traits. Traits were then selected with the aim of ensuring that the final set of 8 items was balanced both in terms of valence and in terms of how the traits were judged to be prototypical of either the Scots or the English. On the 8 selected traits, 4 were judged by pre-test participants to apply more to the Scots and 4 to apply more to the English as compared to the other subgroup (participants indicating a significant difference between the two groups at $p < .05$ using t-tests, except in one case where it was marginally significant, $p = .010$), and, within each of these two subsets, two traits were judged as being rather positive and two as being rather negative.

In the experiment, the ratings by participants of how much these traits applied to the Scots and the English allowed us to compute profile dissimilarity scores for each subgroup (i.e. the reverse of their prototypicality), by calculating the square root of the sum of squared traits differences between the subgroup and the superordinate group (Cronbach & Gleser, 1953). Subtracting the profile dissimilarity of the ingroup

[4] In relation to our research purposes, the details of the exact underpinning process need not to concern us here.

from the profile dissimilarity of the outgroup in turn provided us with scores of relative ingroup prototypicality.

Participants and procedure

In total 191 participants took part in the study. They were recruited amongst the student body of Dundee College in Dundee, Scotland. As for Study 1, however, some participants (N = 38) had to be withdrawn from the analyses because they failed to answer the first measure of groups' prototypicality, for reasons similar to those noted previously[5]. Furthermore, on the basis of the results of Study 1, an additional 33 participants were also withdrawn a priori as they indicated they were strongly opposed to independence (using the same criterion, i.e. <= 2.5 on a scale from 0 to 10). Of the remaining 120 participants, 32 were male and 86 female (2 missing values; *age range*: 16-55, M = 21.67, *median* = 18).

The experiment was run in 4 sessions, during class time (one session per class, groups of 30 to 57). Participants were randomly assigned to one of the three conditions, depending on which type of questionnaire they received. The design was based on the manipulation of one between-subjects factor (experimental condition), with three levels: history (N = 41) vs. neutral (N = 40) vs. independence (N = 39).

[5] Although some of these participants might have answered the second measure using pre-defined traits, they were nevertheless withdrawn as it was reasonable to suspect that their answers on that second measure might not be meaningful.

RESULTS

1. Effect of support for independence in function of experimental condition

In order to test our main hypothesis, two sets of regression analyses, with support for independence as predictor and the two indexes of relative ingroup prototypicality as criteria, were computed separately in each experimental condition. On the first measure of relative ingroup prototypicality (RIP1: self-generated traits), these analyses revealed, as expected, a marginally significant effect in the history condition, where support for independence led to higher scores of relative ingroup prototypicality (B = .228, SE = .130, β = .271, t_{40} = 1.76, p = .087), as well as no significant effect in the neutral condition (B = .046, SE = .146, β = .051, t_{39} = .31, p = .755). Contrary to our expectations, however, the effect of support for independence was not significant in the independence condition (B = -.066, SE = .187, β = -.057, t_{38} = .36, p = .728).

On the second measure of relative ingroup prototypicality (RIP2: pre-defined traits), the analyses revealed the opposite picture. That is, on this measure, support for independence did not predict significantly relative ingroup prototypicality in the history condition (B = .005, SE = .065, β = .013, t_{39} = .08, p = .938). However, in line with our prediction, the effect of support for independence was significant in the independence condition, with higher support leading to less relative ingroup prototypicality (B = -.179, SE = .084, β = - .355, t_{37} = 2.13, p = .040). The effect of independence in the neutral condition was again not significant (B = -.036, SE = .052, β = -.112, t_{39} = .70, p = .49).

In sum, the results of those analyses provided partial support for our main hypothesis H1. Setting apart the neutral condition, we found 2 out of the 4 effects which were expected.

2. Impact of dual identification

Following those results, further analysis were conducted in order to test for the potential impact of dual identification in the 2 cases where support for independence was a significant predictor of relative ingroup prototypicality. Using

the same composite variable of Dual Identification as in Study 1 (i.e. the product of the exponential of both identification variables first standardised), multiple regressions revealed that, in the history condition, dual identity had no significant impact on RIP1 (B = .001, SE = .045, β = .057, t_{37} = .365, p = .717), while support for independence remained a marginally significant predictor of this measure (B = .228, SE = .131, β = .272, t_{37} = 1.74, p = .090). In the independence condition, and on RIP2, no significant effect of dual identification was found either (B = .064, SE = .071, β = .145, t_{35} = .91, p = .37), while support for independence changed from being a significant predictor to being a marginally significant one (B = -.167, SE = .085, β = -.312, t_{35} = 1.96, p = .058). In absolute terms, however, this change was minimal. Thus, confirming H2, the two effects which supported H1 could not be alternatively explained by different levels of dual identification.

3. Interaction between Scottish identity and support for independence

As with the test of H2, interaction analyses between ingroup identification and level of independence were calculated only in the two cases where a significant effect supporting H1 was found, and this, separately for each of them. These analyses used the same multiple regression equation as in Study 1, i.e. both variables (centred) as well as their product, representing the interaction, were entered as predictors. In the history condition (and on RIP1), the interaction emerged as marginally significant (B = .296, SE = .080, t_{36} = 1.79, p = .081), while in the independence condition (and on RIP2), this interaction was fully significant (B = -.153, SE = .071, t_{34} = 2.15, p = .039).

The calculation of the simple slopes for those two interactions, using also the same CVs as in Study 1 (i.e. the mean, 1 SD above the mean, and 1 SD below the mean) revealed a pattern which was, overall, in line with our expectations (see Table 5.3). In the independence condition, the simple slopes showed that, at high values of support for independence, identification led to significantly less relative ingroup prototypicality (β = -.544, p = .037). This relationship was still negative on the mean of independence but not significant (β = -.191, p = .247), while at a low CV of independence, the relationship was positive, though not significant either (β = .161, p =.448). Thus, in slight contrast with Study 1, it seems that in this study ingroup

identification had the most effect for high supporters of independence . In any case, the general direction of the interaction was as expected.

In the history condition, the interaction took the opposite shape. In this condition, it was at low levels of support of independence that ingroup identification tended to lead to less relative ingroup prototypicality, whereas at high levels it tended to lead to more relative ingroup prototypicality. However, reflecting the fact that the interaction was only marginally significant, the simple slopes calculated at the chosen CVs were all non-significant (at low CV: $\beta = -.207$, $p = .305$; at medium CV: $\beta = .174$, $p = .375$; at high CV: $\beta = .554$, $p = .126$). Nevertheless, the general direction of this marginally significant interaction was also as expected.

TABLE 5.3

Relationship between Scottish identification and relative ingroup prototypicality as a function of level of support for Scottish independence

		Conditional values of independence		
		Low (= 1SD below mean)	Medium (= mean)	High (= 1SD above mean)
Independence condition (DV = RIP 2)	B	.180	-.214	-.607
	SE	.234	.181	.279
	β	.161	-.191	-.544
	t (34)	.77	1.18	2.17
	p	.448	.247	**.037**
History condition (DV = RIP 1)	B	-.336	.283	.901
	SE	..323	.314	.575
	β	-.207	.174	.554
	t (36)	1.04	.90	1.57
	p	.305	.375	.126

GENERAL DISCUSSION

1. Summary and conclusions

In sum, the results of our second study provided some support for our main hypothesis H1. Study 2 found that judgements of groups' prototypicality were affected by support for independence, but in different ways depending on which issue was made salient for participants. Since the manipulation induced the same group of supporters of independence to react in opposite ways, and as such variability could not be accounted for by differences in dual identification, it ruled out the possibility that this variability could be reduced to interpersonal differences. Rather, our interpretation of the results is that the variability in judgements of prototypicality was strategic and reflected the different types of claim that participants were trying to make, which was in turn determined by a combination of their broad political project and the immediate rhetorical context. In the independence condition, those participants who supported independence were motivated by making a case for their separatist project by stressing the low prototypicality of the Scots in comparison to the English, whereas participants who did not support independence had no interest in making such a claim. In the history condition, our assumption is that participants were motivated to make a case for the importance of Scotland in Britain by stressing their relatively high prototypicality, and that, although this might have been the case for all participants, supporters of independence were motivated to make a stronger case in that respect in comparison to other participants. This strategic interpretation is also consistent with the results supporting our hypothesis H3, which showed that interpersonal differences in the degree of ingroup identification affected judgements in opposite ways, depending on participants' level of support for independence but also on the salient issue at stake - i.e., in our view, depending on what claim participants were making. Overall then, the results of our two studies provided good evidence that judgements of groups' prototypicality can be used strategically.

If we now try to relate our results to the existing research on ingroup projection, let us first stress that our main objective has not been to provide a critique of Wenzel et al.'s (2001; Waldzus et al., in press) findings. Although our research explored the impact of strategic factors which might moderate, in some

circumstances and/or for some people, the prediction of ingroup projection, this does not necessarily contradict the possibility that ingroup projection might constitute a general and overriding tendency (i.e. a main effect) when those strategic factors are not taken into account.

Nevertheless, our data is not entirely congruent with the existing literature. In our first study, there was no sign of *absolute* ingroup projection and only a weak indication of *relative* ingroup projection. Moreover, in both our studies, dual identification was not a significant predictor of relative ingroup prototypicality. These findings seem to go directly against two of the predictions made by Wenzel et al. and to contradict their data collected in a number of different groups. The straightforward explanation for this contradiction is that our own results might be dependent on the particular intergroup context within which our data was collected and/or our particular design, while it might well be that their results were collected in contexts and with groups for which the particular strategic factors we investigated were not particularly relevant (or at least much less pro-eminent) or where not made salient by their paradigm.

However, should this be the correct explanation, it would imply that ingroup projection might not be an universal phenomenon. Rather, whether or not it appears would depend on the specific intergroup context under consideration and/or the specific rhetorical context in which judgements of groups prototypicality are measured. In particular, we believe that these judgements can depend on the strategic purposes that both these contextual features can induce in people.

This brings us back to the main argument of this thesis. Our studies illustrate the more general point that, although general processes might be involved in group judgements, no specific predictions on the nature and direction of these judgements can be made without taking into account the social context in which these processes take place. In terms of judgements of group prototypicality, and depending on the specifics of this context, the same cognitive, motivational, and/or strategic processes can lead to judge the outgroup as well as the ingroup as being more prototypical of the superordinate group (i.e., to use Wenzel et al.'s terminology, to 'outgroup projection' as well as to 'ingroup projection').

2. Limits and future directions

One limitation of our studies stems from the fact that participants' claims were not directly manipulated and/or directly measured in our design, but only assumed to be induced by the issues made salient (in interaction with their political project). Our assertion that the variability in participants' judgements reflected those claims therefore remains an interpretation which cannot fully rule out other possibilities. For instance, it could still be argued that the underlying processes are purely cognitive and that this variability reflects a different accessibility of category representations triggered by the salient issues - although the effect of issue salience was shown not to be a straightforward one but to work in interaction with support for independence and with ingroup identification. Our position does not rule out the possibility that variability in judgements might indeed be tied to changes in cognitive salience. However, if that is the case, this cognitive variability should in turn be underpinned by strategic concerns and by the claims made by participants, rather than being an automatic product of the 'objective' salience of a particular issue *per se*. Whether these claims could be directly manipulated is open to question. Nevertheless, further studies could explore ways of assessing them more directly, and try to relate them more systematically to different effects on group judgements (Ellemers, Barreto, & Spears, 1999).

Another way of ruling out the possibility that issue salience *per se* is responsible for judgement variability would be to perform audience manipulation (see e.g. Reicher & Levine, 1994; Reicher, Spears, & Postmes, 1995; Barreto, Spears, Ellemers, & Shahinger, 2003), i.e. to lead participants to believe that their positions will be communicated either to an ingroup (i.e. Scottish) or an outgroup (i.e. English) audience. The aim of such a manipulation would be to show that it can equally lead to variability in judgements, despite the issue at stake being kept constant. Indeed, while the choice of an English audience in the present study might have been the most appropriate in order to trigger the particular claim associated with the history condition, one might wonder whether it is not a Scottish audience which would have more impact when it is the issue of independence which is made salient. In this study, we needed to keep that factor constant in order to avoid potential confound, but further research could well manipulate the anticipated audience to appraise its effect on judgements of groups' prototypicality.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSIONS

1. Summary of results

This thesis was concerned with the social psychological processes involved in political attitudes towards supra-national bodies – and, more specifically, with the attitudes of Scots towards union in Britain and Europe. Taking the research by Reicher and Hopkins (2001) as a starting point, we suggested that support for, or opposition to, supra-national bodies depends both on the psychological process of identification and the social context and meanings of identities – and, more specifically, on the extent to which inclusion in the supra-national body is believed to enhance or undermine the ability of its members to live in terms of the norms, values, beliefs and interests associated with their national identity. We also suggested that beliefs in identity enhancement vs. identity undermining would, in turn, depend upon whether or not there is a sense of incompatibility between ingroup identity and interests and those of the other nations composing the supra-national body, and also on the power relations between the ingroup and these other groups.

Finally, we argued that, while features of the social context and the meaning of identities impact on political attitudes, they can also be actively argued over and constructed in order to fulfil strategic purposes. In particular, we stressed that those who are interested in persuading listeners in favour of separatism or integration will actively construct versions of national identity and the meaning of the supra-national body so as to create a sense of identity undermining or enhancement.

Empirically, five studies were designed and run in order to test different facets of our general model. In the first study (Chapter 2), we investigated the discourses of Scottish politicians who were interested in promoting different political

projects relating to the status of Scotland vis-à-vis Britain and Europe, and we looked at their argumentative and strategic work on identities and social reality. Our analysis showed that all of our speakers discussed issues of supra-national integration or independence in identity terms. They all claimed that their own political project – be it separatist or unionist – was designed to protect and enhance the national self. However, there was considerable variability between speakers in terms of their specific accounts of the nature of ingroup identity, of the superordinate group and/or of the outgroup(s), and of the relationship between the two. By providing a systematic mapping of these arguments, our aim was to show that this variability did not simply reflect interpersonal cognitive and/or perceptual differences (nor was it random), but could be understood in strategic terms, in relation to speakers' underlying political projects. Thus, the variability at the argumentative level actually reflected something very stable and constant at the level of political projects.

Qualitatively, this analysis also unveiled two further important points. First of all, it illustrated that the importance of the social context and social meanings in political attitudes can act on at different levels. Besides the meaning which can be attributed to the impact of the superordinate group on ingroup identity, we saw that the specific content of ingroup norms and values can also be important to consider, for these norms and values can be argued to prescribe the way in which ingroup members should relate to others and to superordinate groups. Furthermore, we also saw that political claims have to be understood in the specific ideological context of today's political world, where the predominance of nationalist ideology means that claims to sovereignty (if not always for statehood) are to be made on the basis of nationhood.

Secondly, the analysis emphasised the key role of power issues and their relation to identity issues, insofar as power is sought after as the ability to express ingroup identity and the specific values and interests it defines. This plays in both unionist and separatists project, for what is argued is whether these projects enhance or undermine this ability.

In the second study (Chapter 3), which used a survey design, our main purpose was to see whether the relationship found in the first study between political attitudes and the way the impact of the superordinate body on ingroup identity is construed, could also be demonstrated quantitatively for a sample of 'ordinary' (i.e. non-politicians) Scots. Focusing more particularly on the notion of identity

undermining, we hypothesised that the relationship between the level of national identification and attitudes to supranational bodies should be *moderated* by beliefs of identity undermining, and that the impact of perceptions of incompatibility and ingroup powerlessness on these attitudes should be *mediated* by these beliefs. The results unambiguously supported these hypotheses in relations to attitudes to Britain. In relation to attitudes to Europe, and for various possible reasons which were discussed in the relevant chapter, it had to be acknowledged that the results were less clear-cut (i.e. the expected interaction between identification and identity undermining did not appear). Nevertheless, these results also confirmed the key role of perceptions of identity undermining in shaping political attitudes.

As the second study used a correlational design, in the third study (Chapter 4), we sought to clarify the causal relationship between identity enhancement/undermining and unionist/separatist attitudes, by attempting an experimental manipulation of the former and looking at the effects on the latter. Although, as we have seen, this manipulation was not entirely successful, insofar as participants had a sense of Scottish identity being undermined in both experimental conditions, the study did show that identity undermining could be manipulated and that it did lead to increased support for separatism. Moreover, confirming once again the key role of power and its relation to identity, the effect of the experimental manipulation on perceptions of identity undermining was partially mediated by a sense of powerlessness in Britain.

In the final two studies of the thesis (Chapter 5), we returned to the issue of the strategic nature of identity constructions, but this time within an experimental context. Indeed, one aim of these studies was to show that politicians (or other 'elites') do not have the monopoly of a strategic use of group definitions, and that the investigation of this strategic dimension is not limited to discursive and qualitative methodologies. Thus, in these studies, we used the paradigm of 'ingroup projection', according to which sub-groups tend to over-state the extent to which they, compared to other sub-groups, are prototypical of a shared superordinate group. In the first study, we reasoned that Scots who support independence should stress that Britain is actually more like England than Scotland (i.e. the opposite of ingroup projection), in order to suggest that Scottish identity is undermined in Britain and hence to sustain their separatist position. The results supported that view, but only when the issue of independence was made salient, which showed that this variability could not be

accounted for by mere interpersonal differences in perceptions but was dependent on the argumentative claim participants were trying to make. In the second of the studies, we developed the idea that constructions of the relationship between Scotland and Britain (reflected in measures of groups prototypicality) should depend upon the argumentative context and on the claim made by participants within that context. Thus different argumentative issues were made salient to participants in order to induce them to make different sort of claims. When the salient issue was independence, the findings of the first study were replicated. However, when the salient issue was the need to recognise the importance of the contribution of Scotland to British history, then supporters of independence rated the Scots as (relatively) prototypical of Britain (as in the classic ingroup projection effect) more than non-supporters. These brought further support to the overall argument that constructions of supra-national/national relations are fluid and depend upon strategic considerations.

Overall, then, the contribution of this thesis to social psychology can be summarised at three levels. First of all, at the methodological level, it shows the value of methodological plurality. It is by combining discursive, survey and experimental approaches, that we have been able to ask different questions and to address different, but complementary, aspects of our model. Secondly, at the theoretical level, and through the use of these different methods, it provides convergent evidence for a novel model of international integration/separation. We have been able to show: a) how national/supra-national relations are constructed and used strategically, in both a quasi-natural and an experimental context; b) the existence of a quantitative relationship between the variables postulated by the model; and, finally, c) the causal relations between these variables and hence the ability to alter attitudes. Furthermore, and through such results, this thesis makes a significant contribution to two central theoretical debates in social psychology. On the one hand, it shows that any analysis of the impact of social identity processes on behaviour must take into account the specific construction of category meanings rather than seeking to make generic statements about the impact of social identity on behaviour. On the other hand, it shows the importance of viewing identity constructions as active and strategic rather than passive and perceptual. On both these counts, our research has demonstrated the viability and the fruitfulness of a perspective which tries to take these points seriously.

Finally, at the metatheoretical level, and through its contribution to such theoretical debates, this thesis also hopes to contribute to the wider debate on the relationship between social reality, psychological processes and social action, and to provide an illustration of the way an interactionist social psychology can be conceived.

Nevertheless, it is now time to appraise the limits of the research presented in this thesis, as well as some of the future avenues for investigation towards which these limits might point us.

2. Limits and future directions for research

At an immediate level, the limits relating to each specific study of this thesis have already been mentioned in the discussion of their results. We have underlined how part of these limitations were addressed by other studies in the thesis, but we also identified some shortcomings which are still in need of further work. However, as those points have already been discussed, let us now focus on some broader issues.

First of all, as it is the case for any work looking at attitudes, it is necessary to underline that further work should be conducted in order to look more directly at the impact of these attitudes on social behaviour, especially given the discrepancy that has sometimes been argued to exist between the two realms (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993; Wicker, 1969). Although we have looked at one form of political action (i.e. political argumentation/discursive mobilisation), and although it could be argued that the gap between our measures of political attitudes and certain types of political behaviour such as voting might be small, it remains that there would many other forms of political behaviour which would be worth investigating, either in natural or experimentally created contexts. For instance, it would be worthwhile to investigate the role of factors such as identity repression/dilution or enhancement/realisation in the involvement in social and political movements aiming at promoting or impeding social and political change in the relationships with superordinate groups, as well as the various strategies of action (other than electoralist) which can be followed in that context. Likewise, a related avenue for further research would be to look more in detail at the impact of these variables on intergroup attitudes and behaviour, i.e. how these could affect the relationship with other subgroups within a superordinate group.

Secondly, although we have looked, on the one hand, at the construction and the strategic use of identity meanings (as well as at the argumentative processes which ensue), and, on the other hand, at the impact of meanings on people's attitudes, we have done so in separate studies and using, in the latter case, our own experimentally designed material. This means that we have not looked directly at the impact of the actual arguments and constructions used by 'entrepreneurs of identity' on the intended recipients of their message, and at the factors which might render certain constructions more efficient than others in terms of persuasiveness.

This is an area which could turn out very fruitful for investigation, especially since so far the literature on persuasion has tended to focus either on the effects of the characteristics of the speaker and/or his/her message or on the characteristics of the target of that message. By contrast, our own view is that the persuasiveness of arguments and constructions does not simply depend on either the content of the argument or the characteristics of the audience, but on an interaction between the two. Indeed, it could be argued that efficient constructions are the one which are successful in providing a framework for making sense of people's everyday experience, capturing their feelings by some appropriate formula. In other words, constructions are efficient when, on the one hand, they rely on existing psychological realities (both cognitive and emotional), and when, on the other hand, they manage to objectify these realities, i.e. to transform them into social facts through public expression (Geertz, 1993). They then offer an articulate discourse through which people can make sense of their feelings and communicate their experience to others. This helps in creating connections between their individual experiences, which can be argued to be the prelude to their translation into social action.

Thirdly, the fact that we have looked at the strategic and cognitive-perceptual sides of identity meanings in different studies also raises another issue. Indeed, it means that, although our model tried to do justice to both sides at the theoretical level, we have offered no direct empirical articulation of those two dimensions, and of their respective role in particular contexts. There is probably no simple way (if any) to capture all the complexities of such a relationship, but what is certain is that improving our understanding of it would at least require, at the empirical level, to move from the synchronic approach we have adopted to a more diachronic approach.

Indeed, it is in part because the studies carried out have frozen the phenomena at one point in time that, as a result, we focused mainly on one side at a

time in terms of the explanation of our results. By contrast, studies with a longitudinal perspective would allow to appraise the development of meanings over time, as a function of the social conditions, giving us a better appreciation of those beliefs which cannot be entirely reduced to strategic expressions and which contribute to explain, amongst other things, the development of the very political projects we have shown to lead to strategic work on identity meanings. On the other hand, it would also allow us to investigate the effects of changes in the social context which might trigger subsequent changes in both the broad or the more immediate strategic purposes of social actors, thereby affecting their constructions of identity meanings (and, according to our model, they should be affected in different ways, depending on whether it is a change in the political project or only a change in the immediate communicational or argumentative strategy). Concretely speaking, this could mean something even as straightforward as studying political argumentation at different points in time, as a function of noticeable and identifiable changes in political conditions. In that respect, the ongoing process of European integration provides a highly valuable opportunity to investigate these questions.

Furthermore, should we extend our investigation beyond political attitudes to political behaviour as suggested above, a diachronic perspective would also allow to enrich our view of the two-way relationship between social context and social action. Indeed, by limiting ourselves to a synchronic view, there is a danger that this dialogue might take the appearance of a somewhat tautological circle, whereby each element explains the other, or else where each side of the dialogue ends up being reified as a separate realm in order to avoid such tautology. By replacing social action within its temporal dimension, we would be able to investigate how the social context, which might impact on social action and practices at one point in time, is in fact constituted through the actions and practices of social actors which have taken place at an earlier point in time – that is, how socially determined behaviour feeds back, in turn, into the very social context which has helped shaping it (Reicher, 1996a, 1996b).

This also implies that the issues of the meanings of social reality and identities are not only fought out at the argumentative or ideological level, but they are also fought out and formed at a more material level, i.e. through the actions and the social processes which aim at concretely shaping social structures and practices. As Geertz (1993) put it: "*The 'patterns of meaning' by which social change is*

formed grow from the processes of that change itself and, crystallized into proper ideologies or embedded in popular attitudes, serve in turn, to some inevitably limited degree, to guide it." (p.253). We could add that the meanings and ideologies formed at one point through social action are, in turn, crystallised into institutions and practices which form the context for further social action.

Finally, in Chapters 1 and 2 (and as reminded above; see section 1), we made the claim that national identities might present some peculiarities which are not necessarily shared with other types of identities, notably because of the particular content of nationalist ideology. Within the contemporary world, national identity is a fundamental basis on which rights and resources can be claimed, upon which sovereignty is claimed and self-determination is asserted. Its special status in this respect is perhaps best reflected in debates about intervention in the internal affairs of states as opposed to intervening when states pose a threat to others. Thus, we argued that, if taken seriously, the claim that psychological processes need to be put within their social context in order to understand and predict their effects on attitudes and behaviour would also require us to address this ideological dimension, and the particularities of national identities and of nationalist ideology.

Yet, though we touched upon that dimension and provided some empirical illustration of its impact in the analysis of Chapter 2, the fact remains that, throughout the remainder of this thesis, we have used the terms ingroup identity/national identity and superordinate group/supra-national body almost as if they were exchangeable, thereby bracketing any further consideration of those potential peculiarities. As pointed out in Chapter 1, it might well be true that, in order to make empirical predictions, taking for granted the specifics of nationalist ideology can be, in most cases, less problematic, given the dominance of this ideology in the contemporary world of politics. But this is only an empirical - and thus contingent – fact, and it does not mean that a more proper theoretical understanding of what is going on can bypass those questions. On the contrary, it could be argued that the more an aspect of social life is taken for granted, the more it requires our attention as social psychologists (Billig, 1991). Moreover, however dominant any ideology might be, this dominance is never ubiquitous, even within a single cultural context, for societies always harbour alternative ideological forces, creating dilemmas and points of resistance (Billig, 1987, 1991; Foucault, 1984). To take but one example, we have seen in Chapter 2 that political discourse could also rely on the use of class

categories, thereby potentially appealing to other ideological forces, which can be used in combination, but also in opposition to national categories and nationalist ideology.

Thus, although the dynamics of attitudes and behaviour related to national identities might share the same universal psychological basis as those related to any sort of identity, it remains that the specific political attitudes or projects we have investigated in this thesis, and the constructions of national identities and social reality these can lead to, should also be seen as dependent on the specific content of nationalist ideology. A fuller understanding of these nationalist projects, arguments and constructions, and, more generally, of the politics of national identity (e.g. the importance and the role of reference to authenticity, realisation of the national self, historical continuity, immortality of the nation, etc.) would therefore require a deepened investigation at that level.

This does not mean, of course, that all aspects of these phenomena are specific to nationalist ideology and to the national self, and do not apply to any other types of identity. Certainly the claims for freedom and self-determination, for instance, can be made for individual or collective agents other than national ones – though, as it has been argued in Chapter 2, it is mostly through nationhood that the claim can be made that this should be actualised in a separate state. Indeed, such values are predominantly part of a larger modern (and mostly Western) ideology of individual freedom, which can potentially be applied to any such agent. But, to take the question one step further, one could then also ask to what extent political claims related to identity and national identity can reflect the historically and culturally situated characteristics of such other ideological forces (like the ones associated with individual freedom) rather than reflecting universal features of identity dynamics.

In our view, there is no doubt that the self, and some of the basic motivations which come with it, can be seen as universal – although the precise nature of these latter motivations might be a matter of controversy. Yet, getting a better understanding of these universal features also requires us to consider the possibility that the way this self is conceived of - both in terms of its specific content and of its functioning -, as well as certain concerns related to this self, can be a result of cultural and ideological conditions, and might therefore not be as universal as most of the social psychological literature, and even some of our own statements, might

lead us to presuppose. At the very least, if this might not be a matter of cultural exclusivity, questions relating to differences in cultural emphasis remain relevant.

To be more concrete, let us give one example, already alluded to in Chapter 1, of some of the questions which might be raised at that level. In an impressive study of the sources of our modern conception of the self, Charles Taylor (1989) has proposed that the view of the self prevalent in modern Western societies is one where this self is seen has having inner depths. Moreover, with what he calls the "*expressivist turn*", rooted in the ideologies of romanticism, the notion has emerged that the depths of the self must be expressed in order to reach its realisation and self-fulfilment (see also Foucault, 1984; Giddens, 1991). This is not only a question of right but also of duty, as the message of expressivism is that one ought to express one's authentic identity in order to reach self-fulfilment, lest one ends up living a inauthentic and meaningless life - the correlate of this being that a situation of repression or inhibition of this 'self expression' is understood as a pathological one.

Such a vision of the self took shape not only at the individual level but also at the social level and promoted the notion of a national self and a national culture to which people should be true by expressing and realising it. In other words, nationalist movements took up the language of expressivism and self-realisation and applied it on their own ground. Given that such a vision is historically, culturally and ideologically situated, the question could then arise about how much and in which ways the concerns for the expression and realisation of the national self we have seen throughout this thesis, and their invocation in political discourse, might also be themselves, and at least in part, historically, culturally and ideologically situated, rather than reflecting universal identity processes. This remains an open question, but one which merits to be asked.

In sum, and as we argued in Chapter 1, it is not only that we need to investigate the particularities of the social and ideological context in order to get a better understanding of the specifics of human social action, but that such investigation is also required if we want to make generic statements about human social psychology and about the relation between psychological processes and social/cultural factors, which are neither too abstract to be interesting nor too contestable in their universality.

3. A final word

This final discussion has led us to reiterate some of the bold claims we have made at the metatheoretical level, in particular in terms of the development of a truly interactionist approach to social behaviour. We shall leave the reader as the judge of how successfully we have applied these claims within our own research. However, as the history of social sciences and our own exposition of the trajectory of the SI approach has shown, claims at that level have invariably failed to satisfy everyone. It would therefore be foolish or over-pretentious on our behalf to expect that ours should be so different in this respect. Let us then finish by saying that we would be content already if some of our more modest claims, concerning more specifically the phenomena of national separation/integration, are granted. That is, most fundamentally, we hope that this research has led us to a better understanding of these phenomena and of the dynamics of identity involved in them. If the reader were to share a similar feeling, this thesis will have successfully achieved its main purpose.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER II

2.1. Interview questions/guidelines.

1. **During the election campaign, what did you see as the key issues?**

2. **What are, for you, the key elements of Scottish society and of being Scottish?**
Are there distinctive priorities, interests, characteristics, values, cultural traits, way of life, etc. that characterise Scottish people and institutions?

3. **What do you think of Scotland being part of Britain?**
a) What are the relations between Scotland and England, how would you define this relationship?
b) What are the effects of being in Britain on Scotland? Does it benefit Scotland or does it harm its interests?
c) What are the implications in terms of the distribution of power between Scotland and England? Do you wish for more autonomy for Scotland or do you think there should be more integration?
d) More specifically, what do you think of the Scottish Parliament? Has it been a good thing for Scotland? Should it have more powers, less, or about the same in the future? Are there specific areas in which you believe in more or less integration?

4. **What do you think of Scotland being part of Europe?**
a) What are the relations between Scotland and the other European countries, how would you define this relation?
b) What are the effects on Scotland of being in Europe? Does it benefit Scotland or does it harm its interests?
c) What are the implications in terms of power? Dou you wish more autonomy from Europe or do you wish more integration? Are there specific areas in which you believe in more or less integration?

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER III

3.1. E-mail advertising the survey

What do you think about Scotland being part of Britain and being part of Europe? Should Scotland remain part of the UK? Should it remain within the European Union? In the psychology department, we are conducting a research project which is looking at the way Scottish people see these issues and we need your help! All you have to do is to go at the following web address: http://psy.st-and.ac.uk/misc/scotq2.html. Fill in the questionnaire and, when you have finished, simply click on the 'submit' button and it will automatically be sent back to us.

The questionnaire should be filled in on your own and it will take about 20 minutes of your time - but it deals with important and interesting issues which will affect our future and will give you an opportunity to express your views on these crucial matters. The more people who respond, the richer and the more valid the picture we will get - so please help us do a good job. Thank you very much for helping - we rely on your support!

If you have any questions or queries, please do not hesitate to contact Denis Sindic at ds31@st-andrews.ac.uk

3.2. Survey questionnaire

The following pages contain an example of the questionnaire used in the study. The questionnaire has been annotated in order to indicate the scales/items used in the analyses (the annotations are made in text boxes, using a different font). Reverse coded items have been put in italics.





SCOTLAND IN BRITAIN AND IN EUROPE

Opinion survey

Dear participant,

Thank you very much for agreeing to take part in this opinion survey. This study is concerned with Scottish people's attitudes towards England, Britain and Europe.

Please answer ***all the questions***. There are no right or wrong answers to any of the questions in this survey; we are only interested in your opinion. Everything you put down will be **confidential**. In fact, we are not even asking for your name on this questionnaire, since we are interested in you as part of a general Scottish sample.

Please also ***read carefully all the instructions preceding the questions***. On several questions in this survey we want you to give your answer on a numerical scale. This will usually run from "1" ('strongly disagree' or 'not at all') to "7" ('strongly agree' or 'very much'). You should use this scale to show your personal opinion by **circling** just one of the numbers which best represents your choice. Here is an example:

I like classical music

Not at all 1 2 3 4 5 (6) 7 *Very much*

Thus, if you like classical music quite a lot, you might circle the number 6 on the scale, as shown in the example. Alternatively, if you do not like it very much at all, you might select the number 1 or 2.

Filling this questionnaire should take about 20 minutes of your time. Please remember that you are free to withdraw at any time, without having to give a reason. Please also be aware that, although we would like you to answer all of the questions, you are free not to answer any question if you do not wish to do so.

If you have any comments on any of the questions, just write them in the margin. There is also a space provided for general comments at the end.

If you have any questions, before or after having completed the questionnaire, you are more than welcome to contact Denis Sindic, at ds31@st-andrews.ac.uk or at the phone number 01334 42 7849

University of St Andrews
School of Psychology

SCALE OF SCOTTISH IDENTIFICATION

FEELINGS ABOUT BEING SCOTTISH

First of all, we would like to ask you some questions concerning your feelings about being Scottish. Please state whether you agree or disagree with the following statements, circling the number which best represents your personal opinion.

1. Being Scottish is very important for me.

   Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 *Strongly agree*

2. I feel strong ties with other Scottish people.

   Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 *Strongly agree*

3. I see myself as being Scottish.

   Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 *Strongly agree*

4. I feel personally criticised when someone who is not Scottish criticises the Scots.

   Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 *Strongly agree*

THE QUALITIES OF SCOTTISH, ENGLISH, BRITISH AND EUROPEAN PEOPLE

Please now briefly describe what, for you, are the distinctive qualities that are characteristic of **Scottish** people.

Please now briefly describe what, for you, are the distinctive qualities that are characteristic of **English** people.

Please now briefly describe what, for you, are the distinctive qualities that are characteristic of **British** people.

Please now briefly describe what, for you, are the distinctive qualities that are characteristic of **European** people.

SCALE OF INCOMPATIBILITY WITH THE ENGLISH (items 3-8)

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE SCOTS AND THE ENGLISH

Now we would like to ask your opinion about how you see the relationship between the characteristics of the Scots and those of the English. Please state whether you agree or disagree with the following statements, circling the number which best represents your personal opinion.

1. There are no differences between English identity and Scottish identity.

   Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 *Strongly agree*

2. In general terms, the qualities of Scottish people and of English people are identical.

   Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 *Strongly agree*

3. The Scottish way of life is basically out of tune with the English way of life.

   Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 *Strongly agree*

4. *Scottish and English people are like pieces of a jigsaw puzzle. They may differ, but they fit together well.*

   Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 *Strongly agree*

5. *The fact that the Scottish way of life might differ from that of the English does not mean that they are necessarily in opposition.*

   Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 *Strongly agree*

6. The Scots and the English are like chalk and cheese: they just don't go together.

   Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 *Strongly agree*

7. *Scotland and England are like members of a team where the different qualities of each member combine together to make a coherent whole.*

   Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 *Strongly agree*

8. The Scots and the English are simply incompatible.

   Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 *Strongly agree*

SCALE OF POWER IN BRITAIN
(items 1-6)

THE POWER OF SCOTLAND IN BRITAIN

Now we would like to know your opinion about how much power you think that Scotland does or does not have in Britain. Please indicate whether you agree or disagree with the following statements, circling the number which best represents your personal opinion.

1. *If the Scots really want to, they can get their way in determining British government policies.*
   Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 *Strongly agree*
2. *The Scottish interest plays a part in determining British government decisions.*
   Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 *Strongly agree*
3. Decisions in Britain are based on what the English want irrespective of what others want.
   Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 *Strongly agree*
4. *Even though they might have the power to push things through alone, the English generally take the Scottish view into account when determining British government policy.*
   Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 *Strongly agree*
5. When push comes to shove, the English always get their way in British policy.
   Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 *Strongly agree*
6. English people too often take advantage of their stronger power to make their point of view prevail in the politics of Britain.
   Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 *Strongly agree*
7. For me, Britishness means essentialy the same thing as Englishness.
   Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 *Strongly agree*

SCALES OF UNDERMINING OF SCOTTISH IDENTITY IN BRITAIN AND IN THE E.U.

THE IMPACT OF BRITAIN AND THE EUROPEAN UNION ON SCOTTISH IDENTITY

Now we would like to ask your opinion about how you think that being part of Britian and/or the European Union affects Scottish identity. Please state whether you agree or disagree with the first set of statements, concerning the impact of Britain on Scottish identity. Circle the number which best represents your personal opinion. Then please do the same for the second set of statements concerning the impact of the European Union on Scottish identity.

1. *Being part of Britain has allowed Scotland to keep its specific and separate identity.*
   Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 *Strongly agree*
2. By being part of Britain, Scottish values are corroded by alien values which are imposed on them.
   Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 *Strongly agree*
3. Being part of the UK has undermined the Scottish way of life.
   Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 *Strongly agree*
4. *Being part of Britain has helped Scotland to preserve its identity more than if Scotland had stood alone.*
   Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 *Strongly agree*
5. Scotland might lose part of its identity if it were independent of Britain but the loss will be even greater if it decides to stay in Britain.
   Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 *Strongly agree*
6. Scottishness has flourished inside the Union with Britain, but it would have flourished even more if it had been independent.
   Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 *Strongly agree*

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1. *Being part of the European Union has allowed Scotland to keep its specific and separate identity.*
   Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 *Strongly agree*
2. By being part of the E.U., Scottish values are corroded by alien values which are imposed on them.
   Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 *Strongly agree*
3. Being part of the European Union has undermined the Scottish way of life.
   Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 *Strongly agree*
4. *Being in the European Union has helped Scotland to preserve its identity more than if Scotland had stood alone.*
   Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 *Strongly agree*

5. Scotland might lose part of its identity if it were independent of the European Union but the loss will be even greater if it decides to stay in it.

   Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 *Strongly agree*

6. Scottishness has flourished inside the European Union, but it would flourish even more if it was outside.

   Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 *Strongly agree*

SCALES OF POLITICAL ATTITUDE TO BRITAIN AND THE E.U.
(section B and D respectively)

THE CONSTITUTIONAL STATUS OF SCOTLAND

Now, we would like to ask you your opinion about the political future of Scotland, regarding its relationship to Britain and the European Union. That is, we would like to ask you whether you support independence, devolution or a stronger union in relation to these two political entities.

A. *Please choose among the following statement the one which best represents your opinion by circling its number (you should* ***choose one and only one of the five statements).***

1. Scotland should become independent, separate from the rest of the UK.
2. Scotland should remain part of the UK with its own parliament, but this parliament should have more power than at present.
3. Scotland should remain part of the UK with its own parliament, and this parliament has about the right amount of power at present.
4. Scotland should remain part of the UK with its own parliament, but this parliament should have less power than at present.
5. Scotland should remain part of the UK without its own parliament.

B. *Please state whether you agree or disagree with each of the following statements, circling the number which best represents your personal opinion.*

1. Scotland should become an independent country, separate from the rest of the UK.

   Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 *Strongly agree*

2. The goal of having a parliament in Scotland should be ultimately to achieve total independence in the long-term.

   Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 *Strongly agree*

3. Having a Scottish parliament is a good thing only if it ultimately leads to total independence.

   Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 *Strongly agree*

4. Scotland should have its own parliament but remain part of the UK.

   Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 *Strongly agree*

5. Having a Scottish parliament is a good thing but it should not lead to total independence from the UK.

   Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 *Strongly agree*

6. I support devolution but I don't support independence nor do I support being in the UK without a Scottish parliament

   Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 *Strongly agree*

7. Scotland should remain part of the UK but without a separate parliament.

   Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 *Strongly agree*

8. I support the Union in Britain but not devolution or independence

   Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 *Strongly agree*

9. I oppose devolution because it endangers the union between Scotland and England.

   Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 *Strongly agree*

C. *Please choose among the following statement the one which best represents your opinion by circling its number (you should* ***choose one and only one of the five statements).***

1. Scotland would be best off being totally independent of the European Union.
2. Scotland should remain part of the European Union, but more power should be given to the nation-states and less to the EU than at present.
3. Scotland should remain part of the European Union, and the balance of power between the nation-states and the EU is about right at present.
4. Scotland should remain part of the European Union and more power should be given to the EU over the nation-states than at present.
5. Scotland should be part of the European Union and the EU should become a new state in which the old nation-states would cease to exist as such.

D. *Please state whether you agree or disagree with each of the following statements, circling the number which best represents your personal opinion.*

1. Scotland would be best off being totally independent of the European Union.

   Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 *Strongly agree*

2. Scotland should not pool any of its sovereignty into the European Union

   Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 *Strongly agree*

3. I do not the support the European Union at all.

   Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 *Strongly agree*

4. Scotland should remain part of the European Union, but the nation-states should retain their sovereignty and their veto on important matters.

   Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 *Strongly agree*

5. Scotland should be part of the European Union, but keep most of its sovereignty.

   Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 *Strongly agree*

6. I generally support the European Union but not if it means the disappearance of the nation-states.

   Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 *Strongly agree*

7. Scotland should be part of the European Union and the EU should become a new state in which the old nation-states would cease to exist as such.

   Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 *Strongly agree*

8. The European Nations, including Scotland, should look beyond their own interest to create a real European Community where only the interests of all Europeans would rule.

   Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 *Strongly agree*

9. I support the idea of an European Union as a new state in which the old nation-states would cease to exist as such.

   Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 *Strongly agree*

E. Which political party do you intend to vote for at the next election?.....

SCALES OF INTERGROUP STEREOTYPES (section 1, 2 and 3) and INTERGROUP ATTITUDES (section 4, 5 and 6)

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE ENGLISH, EUROPEANS AND SCOTS

Now, please try to think about typical people in Scotland, in England and in Europe, and sum them up using the following characteristics. For each one, circle the number which best represents your impression of the relevant group. We know how difficult it is to make generalisations like this, but please try your best.

1. I think that the English are in general

Hard working	*not at all*	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	*very much*
Unsociable	*not at all*	*1*	*2*	*3*	*4*	*5*	*6*	*7*	*very much*
Intelligent	*not at all*	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	*very much*
Arrogant	*not at all*	*1*	*2*	*3*	*4*	*5*	*6*	*7*	*very much*
Creative	*not at all*	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	*very much*
Unfriendly	*not at all*	*1*	*2*	*3*	*4*	*5*	*6*	*7*	*very much*

2. I think that the Europeans are in general

Hard working	*not at all*	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	*very much*
Unsociable	*not at all*	*1*	*2*	*3*	*4*	*5*	*6*	*7*	*very much*
Intelligent	*not at all*	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	*very much*
Arrogant	*not at all*	*1*	*2*	*3*	*4*	*5*	*6*	*7*	*very much*
Creative	*not at all*	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	*very much*
Unfriendly	*not at all*	*1*	*2*	*3*	*4*	*5*	*6*	*7*	*very much*

3. I think that the Scots are in general

Hard working	*not at all*	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	*very much*
Unsociable	*not at all*	*1*	*2*	*3*	*4*	*5*	*6*	*7*	*very much*
Intelligent	*not at all*	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	*very much*
Arrogant	*not at all*	*1*	*2*	*3*	*4*	*5*	*6*	*7*	*very much*
Creative	*not at all*	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	*very much*
Unfriendly	*not at all*	*1*	*2*	*3*	*4*	*5*	*6*	*7*	*very much*

4. What are your general feelings towards the English?

How much do you like the English?	*not at all*	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	*very much*
How much do you admire the English?	*not at all*	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	*very much*
How much do you trust the English?	*not at all*	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	*very much*

5. What are your general feelings towards the Europeans?

How much do you like the Europeans?	*not at all*	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	*very much*
How much do you admire the Europeans?	*not at all*	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	*very much*
How much do you trust the Europeans?	*not at all*	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	*very much*

6. What are your general feelings towards the Scots?

How much do you like the Scots?	*not at all*	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	*very much*
How much do you admire the Scots?	*not at all*	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	*very much*
How much do you trust the Scots?	*not at all*	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	*very much*

SCALES OF BRITISH AND EUROPEAN IDENTIFICATION

FEELINGS ABOUT BEING BRITISH

Now we would like to ask you some questions concerning your feelings about being British. Please state whether you agree or disagree with the following statements, circling the number which best represents your personal opinion.

1. Being British is very important for me.
   Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 *Strongly agree*
2. I feel strong ties with other British people.
   Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 *Strongly agree*
3. I see myself as being British.
   Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 *Strongly agree*
4. I feel personally criticised when someone who is not British criticises the British.
   Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 *Strongly agree*

FEELINGS ABOUT BEING EUROPEAN

Now we would like to ask you some questions concerning your feelings about being European. Please state whether you agree or disagree with the following statements, circling the number which best represents your personal opinion.

1. Being European is very important for me.
   Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 *Strongly agree*
2. I feel strong ties with other European people.
   Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 *Strongly agree*
3. I see myself as being European.
   Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 *Strongly agree*
4. I feel personally criticised when someone who is not European criticises the Europeans.
   Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 *Strongly agree*

GENERAL QUESTIONS ABOUT YOURSELF

How old are you ? .....

What sex are you ?:.....

Are you a member of a political party or a political student association ? If Yes, please state which one(s).....

Are you a member of any other relevant association ? If Yes, please state which one(s).....

What is your occupation ?.....

What is your parents occupation ?.....

If you want feedback on the results of this study, please provide your e-mail address.....

OPEN COMMENTS

If you have any comments on this questionnaire, you can put them down here and/or use the back of this page. Also, if there is anything you would like to add about your political opinion and your attitudes towards Britain and the European Union, please feel free to do so. We cannot ask people about everything in a questionnaire, and you might think that there are other important things to consider in order to explain your attitudes.

THANK YOU FOR YOUR TIME AND HELP IN COMPLETING THIS QUESTIONNAIRE

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER IV

4.1. Experimental questionnaire

The following pages contain an example of the questionnaire used in the study. This questionnaire has been annotated in order to indicate the changes due to experimental conditions (i.e. changes in the description of the policy and in the memory questions) and the scales/items used in the analyses. Reverse coded items have been put in italics.

Attitudes to Public Policy

This study is concerned with attitudes towards policies and policy-making in Britain. First of all, you will be asked to listen to the account of a new policy regarding access to the land and the countryside. A transcription of what you will hear will also be provided on the next page to help you follow. This should not take more than 5 minutes. **It is very important that you listen to the tape and read the text very carefully**. We will be checking your memory of the account later.

When you have finished listening and reading about the policy, you will be asked to answer a series of questions, mostly concerned with what you think of the policy and what your views are in general. This should take no more than 15 minutes. **Please note that all your answers will remain anonymous.** You will be asked to sign a consent form, but this will be kept separate from the questionnaire in which you won't be asked for your name.

Please try your best to **answer all the questions.** However, if there is any question you really feel uncomfortable to answer, you are free not to do so. Please also remember that you are free to withdraw from the study at any time, without having to give a reason.

On several questions in this research we want you to give your answer on a numerical scale. This will usually run from "0" ('strongly disagree', 'not at all',...) to "10" ('strongly agree', 'very much',...). You should use this scale to show your personal opinion by **circling** just one of the numbers which best represents your choice. Here is an example:

I like classical music

Not at all 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 (9) 10 *Very much*

Thus, if you like classical music quite a lot, you might circle the number 9 on the scale, as shown in the example. Alternatively, if you do not like it very much at all, you might select the number 0,1 or 2.

If you have any questions, please ask them now.

A new policy on access to the countryside

IN ALL CONDITIONS, THE FOLLOWING TEXT DESCRIBED THE POLICY:

An All-Party Environment Select Committee of the Westminster Parliament last week published a report on Access to the Countryside. The report recommended important changes which will affect all outdoor activities, most notably hill walking and mountain biking. Given the consensus amongst members of the Committee, it is very likely that this recommendation will soon be accepted by the House of Commons and become law throughout Britain.

The most significant proposals concern a licensing system which will limit what people can do and where. For instance activities such as walking may be prohibited at particular times (such as walking near nest sites during breeding times) and other activities such as cycling may be totally prohibited in particular places. Violations could lead to withdrawal of licences and to other punishments such as fines.

These ideas have led to considerable controversy.

On the one hand it has been argued that such steps are absolutely crucial if we are to maintain the environment and to protect wildlife. Increasing use and lack of respect has led to problems of erosion in some of our most treasured sites and to several species becoming endangered. The proposals will make the countryside a much more attractive place for everyone to enjoy.

Others have suggested that the proposals are an attack on one of our basic freedoms: the freedom to enjoy our national countryside. They are a means by which landowners can restrict the ability of ordinary people to access the land. They represent an attempt to roll the clock back by half a century or more and to get rid of hard won liberties.

IN THE DISSONANT CONDITION, THE FOLLOWING PARAGRAPH WAS ADDED:

In Scotland, where the policy would have particular relevance, it has been argued that the proposal would destroy something that is central to Scottish life and to what it means to be Scottish. In the words of one Scottish campaigner: "Scotland is a big and beautiful country with a small population and so we have always had a special relationship with the land. Many of our

symbols are of the land – the hills and the moors and the lochs and the glens. Our countryside is unique, in terms of landscape, vegetation, and wildlife. It is known and admired throughout the world. It is a precious heritage which should be available for everybody in Scotland to enjoy. So if you keep us from the land you take away an important part of who we are. What's more, since we understand and we care about the land, we certainly don't need a law to tell us to respect it". Indeed, another Scottish activist has said: "this proposal takes no account of the situation in Scotland; if it goes through, it would mean changing our traditions and undermining an essential part of the Scottish way of life".

IN THE CONSONANT CONDITION, THE FOLLOWING PARAGRAPH WAS ADDED:

In Scotland, where the policy would have particular relevance, it has been argued that the proposal would support something that is central to Scottish life and to what it means to be Scottish. In the words of one Scottish campaigner: "Scotland is a big and beautiful country with a small population and so we have always had a special relationship with the land. Many of our symbols are of the land – the hills and the moors and the lochs and the glens. Our countryside is unique, in terms of landscape, vegetation, and wildlife. It is known and admired throughout the world. It is a precious heritage which should be available for everybody in Scotland to enjoy. So if you damage the land you destroy an important part of who we are. What's more, since we understand and we care about the land, we, more than anyone, appreciate the need to take steps to protect it". Indeed, another Scottish activist has said: "this proposal is sensitive to the situation in Scotland, if it goes through, it would enhance our traditions and protect an essential part of the Scottish way of life".

REACTIONS TO THE POLICY

When reading about the policy and its effects, to what extent did you feel:

angry	*Not at all*	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	*Very much*
irritated	*Not at all*	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	*Very much*
happy	*Not at all*	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	*Very much*
enthusiastic	*Not at all*	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	*Very much*

SCALE OF ATTITUDE TO THE POLICY

ATTITUDES TO THE POLICY

To what extent do you agree or disagree with this policy?

Strongly disagree 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 *Strongly agree*

There should be tighter controls of where and when people have access to the land

Strongly disagree 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 *Strongly agree*

This policy will be effective in protecting the land

Strongly disagree 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 *Strongly agree*

This policy will undermine the ability of ordinary people to enjoy and experience the land

Strongly disagree 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 *Strongly agree*

SCALE OF POLITICAL ATTITUDE TO BRITAIN

THE CONSTITUTIONAL STATUS OF SCOTLAND

We would like you now to indicate to what extent you think that the Scottish parliament should receive more or less power in the future, on a scale of 0 to 20, where

0 = no power at all for the Scottish parliament (i.e. total union in Britain)

10 = the present balance of power

20 = total power for the Scottish parliament (i.e. independence.)

No power *Present situation* *Total power*

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20.

---

1. Scotland should become an independent country, separate from the rest of the UK.

   Strongly disagree 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 *Strongly agree*

2. The goal of having a parliament in Scotland should be ultimately to achieve total independence in the long-term.

   Strongly disagree 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 *Strongly agree*

3. Having a Scottish parliament is a good thing only if it ultimately leads to total independence.

   Strongly disagree 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 *Strongly agree*

4. Scotland should have its own parliament but remain part of the UK.

   Strongly disagree 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 *Strongly agree*

5. Having a Scottish parliament is a good thing but it should not lead to total independence from the UK.

   Strongly disagree 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 *Strongly agree*

6. I support devolution but I don't support independence nor do I support being in the UK without a Scottish parliament

   Strongly disagree 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 *Strongly agree*

7. Scotland should remain part of the UK but without a separate parliament.

   Strongly disagree 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 *Strongly agree*

8. I support the Union in Britain but not devolution or independence

   Strongly disagree 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 *Strongly agree*

9. I oppose devolution because it endangers the union between Scotland and England.

   Strongly disagree 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 *Strongly agree*

SCALES OF IDENTITY UNDERMINING (items 1-2) AND POWERLESSNESS (items 5-6)

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SCOTLAND, ENGLAND AND BRITAIN

1. *Being part of Britain has allowed Scotland to keep its specific and separate identity.*

   Strongly disagree 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 *Strongly agree*

2. Being part of the UK has undermined the Scottish way of life.

   Strongly disagree 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 *Strongly agree*

3. *Scottish and English people are like pieces of a jigsaw puzzle. They may differ, but they fit together well.*

   Strongly disagree 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 *Strongly agree*

4. The Scots and the English are simply incompatible.

   Strongly disagree 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 *Strongly agree*

5. *The Scottish interest plays a part in determining British government decisions.*

   Strongly disagree 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 *Strongly agree*

6. Decisions in Britain are based on what the English want irrespective of what others want.

   Strongly disagree 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 *Strongly agree*

ATTITUDES TO THE WESTMINSTER AND SCOTTISH PARLIAMENTS

1. To what extent do you think that the policy proposed has been pushed by the English?

   Not at all 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 *Very much*

2. To what extent do you think that Westminster politicians in general

- have a concern for people in Scotland?

   Not at all 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 *Very much*

- are only interested in themselves?

   Not at all 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 *Very much*

- care about ordinary people?

   Not at all 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 *Very much*

- do a good job?

   Not at all 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 *Very much*

3. To what extent do you think that politicians in the Scottish parliament

- have a concern for people in Scotland?

   Not at all 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 *Very much*

- are only interested in themselves?

   Not at all 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 *Very much*

- care about ordinary people?

   Not at all 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 *Very much*

- do a good job?

   Not at all 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 *Very much*

FEELINGS TOWARDS THE ENGLISH

1. How much do you like English people in general?

   Not at all 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 *Very much*

2. How much do you admire English people in general?

Not at all 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 *Very much*

3. How much do you trust English people in general?

Not at all 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 *Very much*

EFFECTS OF THE POLICY ON SCOTLAND

Regarding the policy which has been proposed in the text:

Do you think that this policy is, on the whole, a good or a bad thing for Scotland?

A very bad thing 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 *A very good thing*

This policy threatens an important aspect of the Scottish way of life

Strongly disagree 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 *Strongly agree*

This policy protects an important aspect of the Scottish way of life

Strongly disagree 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 *Strongly agree*

SCALE OF PRESENTATION OF THE POLICY

THE PRESENTATION OF THE POLICY

Do you think the presentation of the policy was

- fair? *Not at all* 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 *Very much*
- convincing? *Not at all* 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 *Very much*
- clear? *Not at all* 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 *Very much*

MEMORY QUESTIONS

MEMORY QUESTIONS

1. According to the text, who is proposing the policy:

a) An All-Party Environment Select Committee of the Westminster Parliament

b) An All-Party Environment Select Committee of the Scottish Parliament

c) A government Environmental Comittee in the Westminster Parliament

d) A government Environmental Comittee in the Scottish Parliament

2. Which of the following statements best describes the policy:

a) A licensing system which limits where and when people can have access to the countryside

b) A trespass law which makes it illegal to walk near the nests of endangered birds

c) A permit system where people have to pay to walk in the countryside

d) An access law which gives people greater rights to go where they want in the countryside

3. What arguments have been made in favour of the proposed law

a) It is absolutely crucial if we are to maintain the environment and to protect wildlife

b) It is absolutely crucial if we are to raise money for new environmental schemes

c) It is absolutely crucial if we are to get more people to experience the countryside

d) It is absolutely crucial if we are to stop too many people using the countryside

4. What arguments have been made against the proposed law

a) It is an attack on our basic freedom to enjoy our national countryside

b) It is an attack on private property rights

c) It means that only the rich will have access to the countryside

d) It will endanger wildlife

In consonant and dissonant conditions only:

5. According to the text, what is the effect of the policy on the way of life

a) It will undermine the Scottish way of life

b) It will protect the Scottish way of life

c) It will undermine the British way of life

d) It will protect the British way of life

SCALE OF SCOTTISH IDENTIFICATION

FEELINGS ABOUT NATIONALITY

What is your nationality? _____

If you are not Scottish, please replace with your nationality in the following questions

1. Being Scottish is very important for me.

   Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 *Strongly agree*

2. I feel strong ties with other Scottish people.

   Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 *Strongly agree*

3. I see myself as being Scottish.

Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 *Strongly agree*

4. I feel personally criticised when someone who is not Scottish criticises the Scots.

Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 *Strongly agree*

POLITICAL ORIENTATION (left vs. right-wing: item1)

POLITICAL ORIENTATION

1. In general terms, would you define your views in politics as being rather left-wing or rather right-wing in ?

left-wing 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 *Right-wing*

2. Which political party do you intent to vote for at the next Scottish elections?

_____

3. Which political party do you intent to vote for at the next Westminster elections?

_____

PERSONAL DETAILS

Age .....

Sex:.....

Are you a member of a political party or a political student association ? If Yes, please state which one(s).....

Are you a member of any other relevant association ? If Yes, please state which one(s).....

What is your subject of study?....

What is your parents occupation ?.....

How often do you go walking or cycling off road in the countryside

A. Once a week or more B. Roughly once a month C. few times a year D. Never

---

OPEN QUESTIONS AND COMMENTS

Please indicate what you know concerning current laws governing land access (e.g. trespass laws) and, in particular, the role of the Westminster and Scottish parliaments in deciding on those laws.

If you have any comments on this questionnaire or on the policy which you have been presented, you can put them down here and/or use the back of this page. Also, if there is anything you would like to add about your political opinion and your attitudes towards Britain, please feel free to do so. We cannot ask people about everything in a questionnaire, and you might think that there are other important things to consider in order to explain your attitudes.

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER V

5.1. Study 1 questionnaire.

Pages 314 to 319 contain an example of the questionnaire used in this study. It has been annotated in order to indicate scales/items used in the analyses. The order of the three sections of questions was alternated (i.e. section 1: measures of prototypicality; section 2: measure of support for independence and other measures; section 3: measures of identification – personal details and comments always presented at the end)

5.2. Study 2 questionnaire.

Pages 320 to 333 contain an example of the questionnaire used in this study. It has been annotated in order to indicate the scales/items used in the analyses. Changes due to experimental conditions are also indicated, i.e. there are three different versions of the first and the third pages of the questionnaire.

SCOTS AND ENGLISH IN BRITAIN

Opinion survey

Dear participant,

Thank you very much for agreeing to answer this questionnaire. This study is principally concerned with Scottish and English people's perceptions of each other and of Britain.

Please note that all your answers will remain anonymous. In fact, we are not even asking for your name on this questionnaire, since we are interested in you in terms of your nationality - either Scottish or English.

Please try your best to **answer all the questions.** There are no right or wrong answers to any of the questions in this survey; we are only interested in your opinion. However, if there is any question you really feel uncomfortable to answer, you are free not to do so. Please also remember that you are free to withdraw from the study at any time, without having to give a reason.

On several questions in this research we want you to answer on a numerical scale. This scale will usually run from "0" ('strongly disagree', 'not at all',...) to "10" ('strongly agree', 'very much',...). You should use this scale to express your personal opinion by **circling** the number which best represents your choice. Here is an example:

I like classical music

Not at all 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 (9) 10 *Very much*

Thus, if you like classical music quite a lot, you might circle the number 9 on the scale, as shown in the example. Alternatively, if you do not like it very much at all, you might select the number 0,1 or 2 (but please circle **only one number** on each scale).

If you have any comments on any of the questions, just write them in the margin. There is also a space provided for general comments at the end.

If you have any questions, please feel free to ask them now.

University of St Andrews
School of Psychology

SECTION 1 : MEASURES OF GROUP PROTOTYPCALITY

THE QUALITIES OF SCOTTISH, ENGLISH, BRITISH PEOPLE

A. Please list three attributes that you think are characteristic of **Scottish** people, as compared to English people.

1.

2.

3.

B. Please list three attributes that you think are characteristic of **English** people, as compared to Scottish people.

1.

2.

3.

C. Now, please indicate how much exactly you feel that the attributes you choose to describe Scottish and English people apply to British people in general.

Scottish attributes (please fill in the gaps according to your answers above)**:**

1.....

How much do you think this attribute apply to British people?

Does not apply at all 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 *Does apply very much*

2.....

How much do you think this attribute apply to British people?

Does not apply at all 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 *Does apply very much*

3.....

How much do you think this attribute apply to British people?

Does not apply at all 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 *Does apply very much*

English attributes (please fill in the gaps according to your answers above)**:**

1.....

How much do you think this attribute apply to British people?

Does not apply at all 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 *Does apply very much*

2.....

How much do you think this attribute apply to British people?

Does not apply at all 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 *Does apply very much*

3.....

How much do you think this attribute apply to British people?

Does not apply at all 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 *Does apply very much*

SECTION 2

THE CONSTITUTIONAL STATUS OF SCOTLAND

We would like you now to indicate to what extent you think that the Scottish parliament should receive more or less power in the future, on a scale of 0 to 20, where

0 = no power at all for the Scottish parliament (i.e. total union in Britain)

10 = the present balance of power

20 = total power for the Scottish parliament (i.e. independence.)

No power *Present situation* *Total power*

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20.

SCALE OF SUPPORT FOR INDEPENDENCE (items 1-2)

1. Scotland should become an independent country, separate from the rest of the UK.

   Strongly disagree 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 *Strongly agree*

2. The goal of having a parliament in Scotland should be ultimately to achieve total independence in the long-term.

   Strongly disagree 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 *Strongly agree*

3. Scotland should have its own parliament but remain part of the UK.

   Strongly disagree 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 *Strongly agree*

4. Having a Scottish parliament is a good thing but it should not lead to total independence from the UK.

   Strongly disagree 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 *Strongly agree*

5. Scotland should remain part of the UK but without a separate parliament.

   Strongly disagree 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 *Strongly agree*

6. I support the Union in Britain but not devolution or independence

   Strongly disagree 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 *Strongly agree*

7. England should have its own English parliament.

   Strongly disagree 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 *Strongly agree*

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SCOTLAND, ENGLAND AND BRITAIN

1. Being part of Britain has allowed Scotland to keep its specific and separate identity.

   Strongly disagree 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 *Strongly agree*

2. Being part of the UK has undermined the Scottish way of life.

   Strongly disagree 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 *Strongly agree*

3. Being part of Britain has allowed England to keep its specific and separate identity.

   Strongly disagree 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 *Strongly agree*

4. Being part of the UK has undermined the English way of life.

   Strongly disagree 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 *Strongly agree*

THE POWER OF SCOTLAND AND ENGLAND IN BRITAIN

1. The Scottish interest plays too little a part in determining British government decisions.

   Strongly disagree 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 *Strongly agree*

2. The Scottish interest plays too much a part in determining British government decisions.

   Strongly disagree 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 *Strongly agree*

3. The English interest plays too little a part in determining British government decisions.

   Strongly disagree 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 *Strongly agree*

4. The English interest plays too much a part in determining British government decisions.

   Strongly disagree 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 *Strongly agree*

POLITICAL ORIENTATION

1. In general terms, would you define your views in politics as being rather left-wing or rather right-wing?

   left-wing 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 *Right-wing*

2. If you live in Scotland, which political party do you intent to vote for at the next Scottish elections?

   _____

3. Which political party do you intent to vote for at the next Westminster elections?

   _____

SECTION 3 : IDENTIFICATION SCALES

FEELINGS ABOUT NATIONALITY

What is your nationality? _____

If you are **Scottish**, please answer the questions in section A.

If you are **English**, please answer the questions in section B.

In either case, please also answer the questions in section C.

A. FEELINGS ABOUT BEING SCOTTISH

1. Being Scottish is very important for me.

   Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 *Strongly agree*

2. I feel strong ties with other Scottish people.

   Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 *Strongly agree*

3. I see myself as being Scottish.

   Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 *Strongly agree*

4. I feel personally criticised when someone who is not Scottish criticises the Scots.

   Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 *Strongly agree*

B. FEELINGS ABOUT BEING ENGLISH

1. Being English is very important for me.

   Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 *Strongly agree*

2. I feel strong ties with other English people.

   Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 *Strongly agree*

3. I see myself as being English.

   Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 *Strongly agree*

4. I feel personally criticised when someone who is not English criticises the English.

   Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 *Strongly agree*

C. FEELINGS ABOUT BEING BRITISH

1. Being British is very important for me.

   Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 *Strongly agree*

2. I feel strong ties with other British people.

   Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 *Strongly agree*

3. I see myself as being British.

   Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 *Strongly agree*

4. I feel personally criticised when someone who is not British criticises the British.

   Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 *Strongly agree*

PERSONAL DETAILS

Age: .....

Sex: .....

Are you a member of a political party or a political student association? If Yes, please state which one(s).....

Are you a member of any other relevant association? If Yes, please state which one(s).....

What is your occupation?.....

If you would like to receive a feedback concerning the results of this research, please provide an e-mail address or other contact details (optional)

.....

OPEN QUESTIONS AND COMMENTS

If you have any comments on this questionnaire you can put them down here and/or use the back of this page. Also, if there is anything you would like to add about your perceptions of English/Scottish people, your political opinion and your attitudes towards Britain, please feel free to do so. We cannot ask people about everything in a questionnaire, and you might think that there are other important things to consider in order to explain your attitudes.

THANK YOU FOR YOUR TIME AND HELP IN COMPLETING THIS QUESTIONNAIRE

Study 2 questionnaire

INDEPENDENCE CONDITION

SHOULD SCOTLAND BE INDEPENDENT ?

Opinion Survey

For many years now there has been a controversy about how well Scotland fares in Britain and how much influence Scotland has when it comes to key decisions. Some argue that Scotland will always come second to England within Britain and therefore should seek independence. Others argue that Scottish interests are very well represented and that Scots would lose out by leaving Britain. So what do you think? Should Scotland seek independence. We want your views on the real influence that Scotland has in Britain today.

This study is part of a program of research we are conducting in Scotland and England looking at how people think about Scotland England and Britain. Our aim is to understand how Scots and English people think about these issues and also to improve understanding by showing each group what the other thinks. Hence, in future studies we will be showing your responses to English groups and looking at how it affects their views.

Hence your views have a double importance – both to let us know what you think and also to help an English audience know what you think.

University of St Andrews
School of Psychology

NEUTRAL CONDITION

WHAT SCOTTISH AND ENGLISH PEOPLE ARE LIKE ?

Opinion Survey

For many years now there has been a controversy about what English and Scottish people are like. People hold many different views, some which are very much at odds with each other. So what do you think? We want your own views on the characteristics of the Scots and the English and how both are related we view British people as a whole.

This study is part of a program of research we are conducting in Scotland and England looking at how people think about Scotland, England and Britain. Our aim is to understand how Scots and English people think about these issues and also to improve understanding by showing each group what the other thinks. Hence, in future studies we will be showing your responses to English groups and looking at how it affects their views.

Hence your views have a double importance – both to let us know what you think and also to help an English audience know what you think.

University of St Andrews
School of Psychology

HISTORY CONDITION

WHAT IS SCOTLAND'S CONTRIBUTION TO BRITISH HISTORY ?

Opinion Survey

In recent years a number of books and a number of television series about the history of Britain have led to a controversy about the part Scotland has played in shaping what Britain is today. Some argue that these histories concentrate far too much on England and ignore the contribution of Scotland and the Scots. Others argue that Scotland has played a small part in the history of Britain and therefore it is only right that the major focus should be on England. So what do you think? How much influence has Scotland really had? We want your views on the real contribution to British history.

This study is part of a program of research we are conducting in Scotland and England looking at how people think about Scotland, England, and Britain. Our aim is to understand how Scots and English people think about these issues and also to improve understanding by showing each group what the other thinks. Hence, in future studies, we will be showing your responses to English groups and looking at how it affects their views.

Hence your views have a double importance – both to let us know what you think and also to help an English audience know what you think.

University of St Andrews
School of Psychology

Instructions

On several questions in this research we want you to answer on a numerical scale. This scale will usually run from "0" ('strongly disagree', 'not at all',...) to "10" ('strongly agree', 'very much',...). You should use this scale to express your personal opinion by **circling** the number which best represents your choice. Here is an example:

I like classical music

Not at all 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 (9) 10 *Very much*

Thus, if you like classical music quite a lot, you might circle the number 9 on the scale, as shown in the example. Alternatively, if you do not like it very much at all, you might select the number 0,1 or 2 (but please circle **only one number** on each scale).

Please try your best to **answer all the questions.** There are no right or wrong answers to any of the questions in this survey; we are only interested in your opinion. However, if there is any question you really feel uncomfortable to answer, you are free not to do so. Please also remember that you are free to withdraw from the study at any time, without having to give a reason.

If you have any comments on any of the questions, just write them in the margin. There is also a space provided for general comments at the end.

If you have any questions, please feel free to ask them now.

INDEPENDENCE CONDITION

SHOULD SCOTLAND BE INDEPENDENT ?

A. Please write down, in your own words, whether you think Scotland should become independent or not.

B. What do you think a typical English person would have to say about Scotland's independence?

C. Finally, please answer these questions from your own point of view

1. I really don't care what English people think about these issues

   Strongly disagree 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 *Strongly agree*

2. I feel it is important that English people are aware of how Scottish people see things

   Strongly disagree 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 *Strongly agree*

3. I want to put the English right about things are for us in Scotland

   Strongly disagree 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 *Strongly agree*

4. The views of English people on these matters are unimportant.

   Strongly disagree 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 *Strongly agree*

NEUTRAL CONDITION

WHAT SCOTTISH AND ENGLISH PEOPLE ARE LIKE ?

A. Please write down, in your own words, what Scottish and English people are like.

B. What do you think a typical English person would have to say about what Scottish and English people are like?

C. Finally, please answer these questions from your own point of view.

1. I really don't care what English people think about these issues

   Strongly disagree 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 *Strongly agree*

2. I feel it is important that English people are aware of how Scottish people see things

   Strongly disagree 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 *Strongly agree*

3. I want to put the English right about things are for us in Scotland

   Strongly disagree 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 *Strongly agree*

4. The views of English people on these matters are unimportant.

   Strongly disagree 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 *Strongly agree*

HISTORY CONDITION

WHAT IS SCOTLAND'S CONTRIBUTION TO BRITISH HISTORY ?

A. In your own words, what are the main things you would want to say to an English audience about the contribution of Scotland to British history.

B. What do you think a typical English person would have to say about the contribution of Scotland to British history?

C. Finally, please answer these questions from your own point of view.

1. I really don't care what English people think about these issues

   Strongly disagree 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 *Strongly agree*

2. I feel it is important that English people are aware of how Scottish people see things

   Strongly disagree 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 *Strongly agree*

3. I want to put the English right about things are for us in Scotland

   Strongly disagree 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 *Strongly agree*

4. The views of English people on these matters are unimportant.

   Strongly disagree 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 *Strongly agree*

THE QUALITIES OF SCOTTISH, ENGLISH, BRITISH PEOPLE

A. Please list three attributes that you think are characteristic of **Scottish** people, as compared to English people.

1.

2.

3.

B. Please list three attributes that you think are characteristic of **English** people, as compared to Scottish people.

1.

2.

3.

C. Now, please indicate how much exactly you feel that the attributes you choose to describe Scottish and English people apply to British people in general.

Scottish attributes (please fill in the gaps according to your answers above)**:**

1.....

How much do you think this attribute applies to British people?

Does not apply at all 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 *Does apply very much*

2.....

How much do you think this attribute applies to British people?

Does not apply at all 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 *Does apply very much*

3.....

How much do you think this attribute applies to British people?

Does not apply at all 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 *Does apply very much*

English attributes (please fill in the gaps according to your answers above)**:**

1.....

How much do you think this attribute applies to British people?

Does not apply at all 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 *Does apply very much*

2.....

How much do you think this attribute applies to British people?

Does not apply at all 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 *Does apply very much*

3.....

How much do you think this attribute applies to British people?

Does not apply at all 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 *Does apply very much*

SCALES OF GROUP PROTOTYPICALITY (second measure)

D. Please indicate how much do you think that the following attributes apply to Scottish people:

- Unhealthy	*Does not apply at all*	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10 *Does apply very much*
- Adventurous	*Does not apply at all*	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10 *Does apply very much*
- Arrogant	*Does not apply at all*	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10 *Does apply very much*
- Passionate	*Does not apply at all*	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10 *Does apply very much*
- Boastful	*Does not apply at all*	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10 *Does apply very much*
- Pessimistic	*Does not apply at all*	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10 *Does apply very much*
- Successful	*Does not apply at all*	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10 *Does apply very much*
- Friendly	*Does not apply at all*	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10 *Does apply very much*

E. Please indicate how much do you think that the following attributes apply to English people:

- Unhealthy	*Does not apply at all*	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10 *Does apply very much*
- Adventurous	*Does not apply at all*	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10 *Does apply very much*
- Arrogant	*Does not apply at all*	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10 *Does apply very much*
- Passionate	*Does not apply at all*	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10 *Does apply very much*
- Boastful	*Does not apply at all*	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10 *Does apply very much*
- Pessimistic	*Does not apply at all*	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10 *Does apply very much*
- Successful	*Does not apply at all*	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10 *Does apply very much*
- Friendly	*Does not apply at all*	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10 *Does apply very much*

F. Please indicate how much do you think that the following attributes apply to British people:

- Unhealthy	*Does not apply at all*	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10 *Does apply very much*
- Adventurous	*Does not apply at all*	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10 *Does apply very much*
- Arrogant	*Does not apply at all*	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10 *Does apply very much*
- Passionate	*Does not apply at all*	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10 *Does apply very much*
- Boastful	*Does not apply at all*	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10 *Does apply very much*
- Pessimistic	*Does not apply at all*	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10 *Does apply very much*
- Successful	*Does not apply at all*	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10 *Does apply very much*
- Friendly	*Does not apply at all*	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10 *Does apply very much*

IDENTIFICATION SCALES

FEELINGS ABOUT NATIONALITY

ARE YOU SCOTTISH? YES / NO

(If you are not Scottish, please replace with your nationality in the following questions).

A. FEELINGS ABOUT BEING SCOTTISH

1. Being Scottish is very important for me.

   Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 *Strongly agree*

2. I feel strong ties with other Scottish people.

   Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 *Strongly agree*

3. I see myself as being Scottish.

   Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 *Strongly agree*

4. I feel personally criticised when someone who is not Scottish criticises the Scots.

   Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 *Strongly agree*

B. FEELINGS ABOUT BEING BRITISH

1. Being British is very important for me.

   Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 *Strongly agree*

2. I feel strong ties with other British people.

   Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 *Strongly agree*

3. I see myself as being British.

   Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 *Strongly agree*

4. I feel personally criticised when someone who is not British criticises the British.

   Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 *Strongly agree*

THE CONSTITUTIONAL STATUS OF SCOTLAND

We would like you now to indicate to what extent you think that the Scottish parliament should receive more or less power in the future, on a scale of 0 to 20, where

0 = no power at all for the Scottish parliament (i.e. total union in Britain)

10 = the present balance of power

20 = total power for the Scottish parliament (i.e. independence.)

No power *Present situation* *Total power*

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20.

SCALE OF SUPPORT FOR INDEPENDENCE (items 1-3)

1. Scotland should become an independent country, separate from the rest of the UK.

   Strongly disagree 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 *Strongly agree*

2. The goal of having a parliament in Scotland should be ultimately to achieve total independence in the long-term.

   Strongly disagree *0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10* *Strongly agree*

3. Having a Scottish parliament is a good thing only if it ultimately leads to total independence.

   Strongly disagree *0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10* *Strongly agree*

4. Scotland should have its own parliament but remain part of the UK.

   Strongly disagree *0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10* *Strongly agree*

5. I support devolution but I don't support independence nor do I support being in the UK without a Scottish parliament

   Strongly disagree 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 *Strongly agree*

6. Having a Scottish parliament is a good thing but it should not lead to total independence from the UK.

   Strongly disagree 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 *Strongly agree*

7. Scotland should remain part of the UK but without a separate parliament.

   Strongly disagree 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 *Strongly agree*

8. I support the Union in Britain but not devolution or independence

   Strongly disagree 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 *Strongly agree*

9. I oppose devolution because it endangers the union between Scotland and England.

   Strongly disagree 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 *Strongly agree*

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SCOTLAND, ENGLAND AND BRITAIN

1. Being part of Britain has allowed Scotland to keep its specific and separate identity.

   Strongly disagree 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 *Strongly agree*

2. Being part of the UK has undermined the Scottish way of life.

   Strongly disagree 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 *Strongly agree*

3. Being part of Britain has allowed England to keep its specific and separate identity.

   Strongly disagree 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 *Strongly agree*

4. Being part of the UK has undermined the English way of life.

   Strongly disagree 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 *Strongly agree*

THE POWER OF SCOTLAND AND ENGLAND IN BRITAIN

1. The Scottish interest plays too small a part in determining British government decisions.
   Strongly disagree 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 *Strongly agree*
2. The Scottish interest plays too great a part in determining British government decisions.
   Strongly disagree 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 *Strongly agree*
3. The English interest plays too small a part in determining British government decisions.
   Strongly disagree 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 *Strongly agree*
4. The English interest plays too great a part in determining British government decisions.
   Strongly disagree 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 *Strongly agree*

PERSONAL DETAILS

Age: .....

Sex: .....

In general terms, would you define your views in politics as being rather left-wing or rather right-wing?

left-wing 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 *Right-wing*

If you live in Scotland, which political party do you intend to vote for at the next Scottish elections?

.....

Which political party do you intend to vote for at the next Westminster elections?

.....

Are you a member of a political party or a political student association? If Yes, please state which one(s).....

Are you a member of any other relevant association? If Yes, please state which one(s).....

OPEN QUESTIONS AND COMMENTS

If you have any comments on this questionnaire you can put them down here and/or use the back of this page. Also, if there is anything you would like to add about your perceptions of English/Scottish people, your political opinion and your attitudes towards Britain, please feel free to do so. We cannot ask people about everything in a questionnaire, and you might think that there are other important things to consider in order to explain your attitudes.

THANK YOU FOR YOUR TIME AND HELP IN COMPLETING THIS QUESTIONNAIRE